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The main thesis of this dissertation is that it is

compatible with American legal theory on legal rights and
legal right-holders to ascribe legal rights to non-human,

non-human made "natural objects" such as forests, rivers,
and seals, thesis

basic moves.

(T)

The defense of

One move is to defend

(T)

(T)

involves two

against objections

which are based on the historical positions in American
what
legal theory on what a legal right is and on who or

can have legal rights.

The other move is to defend

(T)

particular
against objections which do not presuppose any

historical position.

Taken together, these two moves

unreasonable to
establish that it is neither absurd nor

construe natural objects as legal right-holders.
The development of the argument for
is as follows.

in Chapter

thesis

I

two-move strategy for defending
V

(T)

(T)

(T)

by chapters

is stated and the

is outlined.

In

Chapter II various concerns which motivate the move to give
natural objects legal rights are discussed.

This discus-

sion shows how the issue "rights for natural objects" arises

and sets the stage for the main argument that natural objects could be legal right-holders.
The notions of a legal person and a legal repre-

sentative are discussed in Chapter III.

This discussion

furnishes the basis for the argument, made repeatedly

throughout the dissertation, that theorists cannot hold
the positions they do and feel they must hold regarding
the doctrines of legal personality and legal representa-

tion and deny the possibility of ascribing legal rights to

natural objects.
In Chapter IV the notion of a legal fiction is

examined.

It is argued that it is consistent with ac-

justificepted legal theory on the nature, purposes and

suppose that
cation for proper use of a legal fiction to
or involves,
the notion of environmental personality is,
a legal fiction.

Thus, even if ascription of legal

a legal fiction,
rights to natural objects is, or involves,

the argument for

(T)

is not damaged by it.

legal theory on
The various positions in American

are discussed in
legal rights and legal right-holders
In particular, eight historical
Chapters V and VI.
vi

.

.

positions are identified.

,

e

.

They are referred to as two

"strictly natural law positions" (The Moral Sense and Moral

Validation Positions) and six "non-strictly natural law
positions"

(the Interest, Power, Claim, Rules, Prediction

and Correlativity Positions)
It is argued in Chapters VII and VIII that none of

the eight historical positions on legal rights and legal

right-holders poses

a

successful objection to

(T)

Fur-

thermore, at least the favored Claim and Rules Positions

provide suggestions of specific legal rights natural objects might be said to have.
In Chapter IX remaining objections are stated and

defeated.

These include objections which call into ques-

tion the significance of establishing

truth of

(T)

The case for

(T)

(T)

then is reviewed and

brought together in the Conclusion, Chapter
The defense of

(T)

rather than the

X.

provided may not dispel doubts

one might have about the desirability of giving natural

objects legal rights, since no attempt is made in the

dissertation to show that natural objects should ha\
legal rights.

But it should dispel doubts one might have

them.
about the possibility of ascribing legal rights to

legal rightIt establishes that natural objects could be

holders

.
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CHAPTER

I

THE PROGRAMME OF THE DISSERTATION

Introduction
That there is an "environmental problem" is clear.

That action needs to be taken to combat the problem also
is clear.

What is not so clear is the appropriate nature

and direction of remedies to the problem.

puted, then,

What is dis-

is how to solve the problem.

Many remedies have been proposed.

Despite dif-

ferences between them, all point to the need for supportive legal principles to handle environmental policy.

search for relevant legal mechanisms is underway.

A

One

noteworthy feature of that search is that the various
legal maneuvers suggested or used construe the central

question "Who has, or should have, which legal rights as
environmental plaintiffs?" as
and their legal rights.

pected.

a

question about humans

This is natural and to be ex-

After all, basically legal systems are designed

adjudicate cases and
to safeguard human interests and to
before
controversies between individuals assumed "equal
the law."

duties,
Legal relations (e.g., legal rights,

relations which
powers and privileges) are construed as
view is that ultimately
hold between persons. The familiar
1

—

.

2

humans are the bearers of legal rights and legal duties.
Thus, a search for legal mechanisms to protect the natural

environment suggests the plausible move of expanding or
redefining the legal rights of humans in environmental
cases
That move may be very helpful.

But there is

another possible move, one which represents a significant

departure from current environmental law.
the natural objects themselves

— forests

3

It is to construe

rivers s wildlife , etc

.

or the natural environment as a whole 3 as having legal rights.

This

unusual but promising tack has been proposed by Christopher
Stone in his provocative essay, Should Trees Have Standing?

Towards Legal rights for Natural Objects

.'''

Stone's thesis

is not simply that the law of standing ought to be liber-

alized to include natural objects as entities having legal
standing.

He argues that natural objects themselves

should have legal rights.

Stone's proposal suggests an innovative legal means
to
for handling environmental litigation, an alternative

means currently in use.

Yet he claims that the move to

convengive natural objects legal rights is supported by
tional legal scholarship.

He argues that the history of

or classes
American law provides many examples of entities

legal rights yet now are
of entities who/which once had no

.

3

genuine legal right-holders.

They are entities or classes

of entities to which the law has attributed legal person-

ality.
The attribution of legal personality to an entity
is an important juristic device for extending legal rights

to hitherto legally rightless entities.

Stone argues that

the law ought to recognize natural objects as legal

persons, just as it has recognized as legal persons many

other non-human entities, e.g., corporations, ships and
trusts
A move to ascribe legal rights to natural objects
is a serious move.

It is a move away from construing

humans only as legal right-holders where environmental

matters are concerned.
kinds of concerns

philosophical.

It is motivated by many different

— legal,

political, economic, religious,

Obviously any thorough defense or rebuttal

of Stone's thesis that natural objects should have legal

rights must address these various concerns.

But if

Stone's thesis is to be taken seriously at all, it also

must be shown that natural objects oould be said to have
legal rights within the American legal framework.
To date no one has done that; no one has shown
is
that ascription of legal rights to natural objects

on
compatible with the positions in American legal theory
I intend to provide
legal rights and legal right-holders.

:

4

such an argument in this dissertation.

I

will show that,

given the prima facie exhaustive positions in American
legal theory on legal rights and legal right-holders,

natural objects could be legal right-holders.

By showing

that familiar legal concepts can be fitted to handle the

striking case of natural objects, the argument offered
here shows that a conceptual basis for giving natural

objects legal rights is available within the American
legal framework.

In addition,

the argument provided

defeats a whole set of reasonable objections to the move
to confer legal rights on natural objects--ob jections

based on theories of what

a legal

right is and on who or

what meaningfully can be said to have legal rights.

As

such, the argument of this dissertation sets the stage
for any argument designed to establish Stone's thesis that

natural objects should have legal rights.
The Main Thesis of the Dissertation

The main thesis of this dissertation is that it is

compatible with American legal theory on legal rights to
ascribe legal rights to non-human, non-human made "natural
objects" such as seals, forests, streams and mountains,
thesis
(T)

(T)

Ascription of legal rights to natural objects
on
is compatible with American legal theory
right-holders.
legal
legal rights and

2

,

.

.

.

:

5

is a thesis about the possibility of ascribing legal

(T)

rights within a particular legal system to
entities.

It must be distinguished from another intui-

tively related thesis, thesis
(S)

new class of

a

(S)

Natural objects should have legal rights.

The distinction between the main thesis of the dissertation,
(T)

,

and thesis

(S)

is important to the argument of this

The claim at

dissertation.

(S)

is that ascription of

legal rights to natural objects is desirable or justified

and ought to be implemented.

The claim at

(T)

is that

ascription of legal rights to natural objects is possible,
given a particular legal framework.

defense of

then,

(T)

and defense of

(S)

is

The truth and

independent of both the truth

As such, the defense of

(T)

provided

in this dissertation does not include arguments for

Appeal to the distinction between theses
(S)

(S)

(T)

.

and

points to the basic difference between the account

provided here and the account provided by Christopher
Stone in Should Trees Have Standing?

Stone's book

attempts to establish that natural objects should have
legal rights, thesis

(S)

This dissertation attempts to

establish that natural objects could have legal rights,
thesis

(T)

This basic difference is manifested in

several significant ways.

First, the thrust of Stone's

dissertation, is to
book, quite unlike the thrust of this

.

.

6

discuss concerns which warrant or justify the conferral
of legal rights on natural objects.

Here, concerns under-

lying the move to give natural objects legal rights are

discussed just insofar as they do or might motivate,
rather than justify, that move.

provided here includes

a

Second, the account

detailed, systematic analysis of

the notions of a legal right and a legal right-holder,

and of the attendant notions of

a

legal duty, legal

person and legal fiction; this is necessary for a defense
of

(T)

Stone's account does not attempt any such

analysis; a defense of

(S)

does not require it.

Third,

after cataloging and discussing the various positions in

American legal theory on legal rights and legal rightholders, the reasonable basic kinds of objections to

(T)

based on each position are stated and defeated in the

account provided here.

In addition,

several kinds of

objections which call into question the significance of
establishing

(T)

are stated and defeated.

the survey of basic kinds of objections to

here is taken to be exhaustive

4
.

Accordingly,
(T)

provided

In Stone's account,

the most
where objections are considered, they are, for

part, objections to

(S)

only

5
.

Furthermore, Stone's

to be,
treatment of them is not, and is not intended
might be
exhaustive of the kinds of objections which

raised against

(S)

,

.

,
.

,

7

These three specific differences between the

account provided here and Stone's account underscore the
basic difference between the two accounts, viz, that

Stone's book is a defense of thesis

(S)

dissertation is

(T)

establishing

a

(T)

defense of thesis

whereas this
Nonetheless, by

this dissertation shows that it is

possible to speak meaningfully of non-human, natural
objects as legal right-holders.

In effect, then,

it

removes a host of objections to arguments in favor of

Stone's thesis,

(S)

The Organization of the Dissertation

The defense of

(T)

involves two basic moves.

provided in this dissertation
One move is to defend

(T)

against objections to it which are based on the various

historical positions in American legal theory on legal
rights and legal right-holders.
(T)

The other is to defend

against objections which do not presuppose any of

the historical positions.

These are objections which

could be advanced by theorists of any of the historical
positions.

Thus, the first and second moves are aimed at

defeating the following two sorts of objections to
respectively:

"Legal rights are claims.

objects cannot make claims.

(T)

But natural

Thus, natural objects cannot

8

have legal rights."

persons only.

"Legal rights are ascribable to moral

Since natural objects are not moral persons,

natural objects cannot have legal rights."
The chapter organization of the dissertation

roughly is as follows.

The programme of the dissertation

is explained in Chapter I.

In Chapter II, the various

concerns which motivate the move to give natural objects
legal rights are discussed.

This discussion explains

how the issue "rights for natural objects" arises.

In

Chapters III through VI, material necessary to the defense
of

(T)

against plausible objections to it is laid out.

In Chapters VII and VIII,
to

(T)

the basic kinds of objections

based on the various historical positions in

American legal theory on legal rights and legal rightholders are stated and defeated.
stated in Chapter IX.

Other objections are

The argument for

(T)

is reviewed

and brought together in the Conclusion, Chapter X.

The two-move strategy for defending

(T)

provided

in this dissertation may not dispel doubts one might have

about the desirability of, or justification for, giving
legal rights to natural objects, since it does not attempt
rights.
to show that one should give natural objects legal

about
But it should dispel any reservations one might have
legal rights
the possibility or meaningfulness of ascribing

^

^

9

to them within the American legal framework.

defense of

(T)

Thus, the

should show that the position taken by

philosopher John Passmore in Man's Responsibility for
Nature is untenable:
The supposition that anything but a human
being has 'rights' is, or so I have suggested,
quite untenable.
It also should establish that the views of legal theorists

Hearn, Korkunov and Corbin, respectively, are incorrect:
...it is to men and not to things, whether
animate or inanimate, that duties and rights
exclusively belong.
as we have seen, only men who can be
subjects to legal relations. 8
It is,

All jural relations are between persons,
"Things"
either as individual or in groups.
do not have rights, and there is no "legal
relation" between a person and a thing.
By showing that it is neither absurd nor impossible to

give natural objects legal rights, this dissertation

renders unfounded any view which assumes otherwise.

.;

CHAPTER

I

I

WHY GIVE NATURAL OBJECTS LEGAL RIGHTS?

Introduction
This dissertation is a defense of thesis

(T)

only.

It is not an attempt to show that one should give natural

objects legal rights, thesis

(S)

Nonetheless, a brief

consideration of concerns which motivate the move to give
natural objects legal rights not only points to the

significance of establishing

(T)

it also neatly puts into

focus how the issue "rights for natural objects" arises.

Moves to secure legal support for environmental

policy fall into two groups.
natural objects legal rights.

One move involves giving
I

refer to it as "the

natural object move" or, simply, NOM.

The other move does

not involve giving natural objects legal rights.
to it as "a non-natural object move" or,
In this chapter

I

I

refer

simply, NONOM.

discuss those concerns which

have motivated or might motivate the natural object move,
NOM.

Although many of these concerns also have motivated

attention
or might motivate the alternative move, NONOM, no
is given to that move.

Furthermore, no attempt is made

motivating NOM
to discern whether any of the concerns
10

.

11

provides compelling grounds for granting natural objects
legal rights.

As such, none of the arguments offered in

favor of NOM are assessed.

The point of the discussion

simply is to outline the different sorts of answers

theorists do or might give to the question "Why give

natural objects legal rights?" and thereby to furnish an

effective backdrop for the main argument of the dissertation, viz., a defense of

Concerns motivating NOM
NOM

— prudential,

.

(T)

Many concerns have motivated

economic, social

(including psychologi-

cal, recreational and aesthetic concerns), religious,

moral, philosophical and legal concerns.

Roughly, the

prudential and economic concerns focus on pollution and

resource depletion, the most visible target of environ-

mental policy.

The others focus on broader issues, such

as the desirability of abandoning anthropocentric attitudes

toward the natural environment and the need for increased

understanding of biospherical relationships.
Prudential concerns

.

Prudential concerns implore

us to provide legal protection of the natural environment
so that future generations will have adequate resources

and natural areas for consumption.

They call for "species

appealing
self-restraint" in resource allocation and use by

12

to our self-interest,

to "what's in it for us."

In his

defense of NOM, Christopher Stone argues that
...the strongest case can be made from the
perspective of human advantage for conferring
rights on the environment.-^Thus,

the concern that there be adequate protection of

natural objects now in order to guarantee their availability and usefulness for future generations underlies NOM.

Economic

concerns

.

Economic concerns are linked

closely to prudential concerns.

Nearly all theorists

agree that legal regulation of resource use is necessary
to ensure future commodity production.

Some argue that

legal means are necessary to help remedy important defects
in the allocation and valuation mechanisms of the market.

For example,

it is argued that where pollution is an

"external diseconomy," i.e., a cost not included in an

industry's production costs and presently borne by indivi-

duals or groups in addition to those generating the
pollution, legal constraints on pollution activity are

needed to guarantee cost-internalization by producers.

Where non-economic or "social" costs (e.g., injury to

health imposed on individuals by pollution activity) are
incurred, legal devices are needed to guarantee that these

costs are weighed in the balancing of interests between
the injury

("cost")

to individual plaintiffs and the

.

13

social utility ("benefit") of the production
activity.

Such economic concerns have motivated NOM.

Defenders of NOM argue that costs to natural objects
themselves, and not merely costs to humans, should be

included in interest balancing and in damage calculations.
The rationale is that natural objects themselves are

injured by pollution and resource use activities.

By

making natural objects legal right-holders, one provides
a

legal means for natural objects to seek legal remedies

for damages to them,

for injury to natural objects to be

taken into account in granting relief, and for the relief

awarded to benefit the natural objects directly.
shall see,

As we

these three legal-operational advantages of

awarding natural objects legal rights are the cornerstone
of Stone's argument that natural objects should have legal

rights
Social concerns

.

Various social concerns

— inter-

related psychological, recreational and aesthetic concerns

— also

have motivated NOM.

Psychological concerns

focus on the untoward effects of unchecked environmental

degredation on humans.

One view advanced is that the

presence of untamed nature is essential for our emotional
well-being.

Sidney Wolinsky argues that a justification

for NOM might be based on the psychological concern that

14

"the world of nature may serve as an antidote to our

culture's most prevalent problem

— alienation ."

3

One might frame other psychological concerns in

support of

NOM along lines suggested by Kant and Bentham.

Kant argues that since cruelty to animals may induce in
us a callousness toward human suffering, we have a duty

not to be cruel to animals

4
.

Bentham argues against

cruelty to animals on the grounds that animals are capable of suffering

5
.

Suppose it is desirable to discourage

callousness toward the suffering of animals by imposing
legal sanctions for cruelty to animals.

One might argue

that the conferral of legal rights on at least some

natural objects (e.g., animals)

is one effective way of

checking such abuse legally.
Many theorists have argued that humans need
places to walk, hike, canoe, fish, picnic and the like.
These social concerns underlie

J.

S.

Mill's argument

against unlimited increase of population and wealth.

In

his Principles of Political Economy Mill argues that

humans need, and ought to have, places of solitude in
"the presence and grandeur of natural beauty."
for,

The need

and desirability of preserving such places constitute

part of Mill's argument against unchecked population

expansion and economic growth.

15

Mill

'

s

concern is shared by contemporary theorists

who argue that the worth of natural objects as invaluable
sources of inspiration and as irreplacable aesthetic

wonders provides a reason for implementing NOM.

For

instance, in his dissenting opinion in Sierra Club v.
Morton, Justice Douglas cites the need to protect "all the

aesthetic wonders of this beautiful land" from "the bull-

dozers of progress" as

a

reason for supporting NOM.

Religious concerns

7

Several theorists base their

.

support of NOM on religious concerns.

Some appeal to

the attitude that "nature is sacred" in their arguments
for making certain kinds of behavior toward natural

objects subject to legal, as well as moral, sanction.
Some call for "a new religion," "a new ethic," "a land

ethic," an ethic to replace the anthropocentric attitude
that humans have full rein to exploit nature's bounty at
will,

in their support of NOM.

For example, Christopher

Stone argues that by giving natural objects legal rights
a

change in the view that nature exists only for humans

might be accomplished.

g

Ecosophic concerns
"ecosophy" as

equilibrium.

a

.

Arne Naess describes an

"philosophy of ecological harmony and

Borrowing Naess's terminology, ecosophic

concerns are at the heart of the rationale for the National

Environmental Policy Act of 1969:

16

The purposes of this Act are:
To declare a
national policy which will encourage productive
and enjoyable harmony between man and his
environment; to promote efforts which will
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment
and biosphere and stimulate the health and
welfare of man; to enrich the understanding
of the ecological systems and natural resources
important to the Nation; and to establish a
Council on Environmental Quality.
.

The function of the Council on Environmental Quality is to

guarantee that "presently unquantified environmental
amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decision making."

Similar ecosophic concerns have led several
theorists to urge giving natural objects themselves the
legal rights to seek their own protection.

For example,

in Sierra Club v. Morton, Justice Douglas cites the need

to "protect nature's ecological equilibrium" and to

ensure that all forms of life and all the values of an

ecological group are represented in environmental cases
as reasons why

"environmental issues should be tendered

by the inanimate object itself.

Justice Douglas goes

on to suggest two other ecosophic concerns motivating
NOM: the need to prevent the destruction of species we

know nothing about, and the need to increase our scientific understanding of the natural environment.

His

illustration of the importance of these ecosophic concerns to NOM is engaging:

17

A teaspoonful of living earth contains 5 million
bacteria, 20 million fungi, one million protozoa,
and 200,000 algae.
No living human can predict
what vital miracles may be locked in this dab
of life, this stupendous reservoir of genetic
materials that have evolved continuously since
the dawn of the earth.
For example, molds
have existed on the earth for about 2 billion
years.
But only in this century did we unlock
the secret of the penicillins, tetracyclines,
and other antibiotics from the lowly molds,
and thus fashion the most powerful and effective
medicines ever discovered by man... When a
species is gone, it is gone forever. Nature's
genetic chain, billions of years in the making,
is broken for all time. 12

Moral and philosophical concerns

.

Moral and

philosophical concerns surface in connection with other
For example, underlying certain

concerns motivating NOM.

prudential and economic concerns is the assumption that

present generations have
serve natural resources.

a

"duty to prosperity" to con-

Bentham's injunction against

cruelty to animals rests on the assumption that it is

wrong to inflict unnecessary pain on beings capable of
suffering.

Mill's argument against unlimited increase in

population and wealth is grounded in his famous "greatest
happiness principle."

Some religious concerns are based

on the view that humans ought to revere all forms of life,
it
and some ecosophic concerns are based on the view that
is wrong to destroy species.

Arne Naess makes explicit

principles
this link of ecosophic concerns to normative

when he states,

18

To the ecological field-worker, the equal right
to live and blossom is an intuitively clear and
obvious value axiom.
Its restriction to humans
is an anthropocentrism with detrimental effects
upon the quality of humans themselves 13
.

However

,

sometimes NOM is endorsed outright by

appeal to moral and philosophical principles.

so-called "principles of diversity"

For example,

the principle

(e.g.,

that it is better to maintain a multiplicity of life
forms than not) have been invoked to show that, e.g., a

species ought not be destroyed and that the moral and
legal onus always is, or should be, on humans who destroy
to justify their actions.

Clarence Morris

appeals to

such principles to show that a presumption in favor of
the natural, akin to the presumption of innocence in

criminal law, provides a reason for supposing that
natural objects should have legal rights.

14

Despite differences between the various moral and

philosophical concerns motivating NOM,

a

concern which

underlies each of them is that
There would have to be something a bit wrong
with a legal system freely given over to
questions like whether the shirts really were
burned at the laundry but which refuses to
allow a judge to determine whether the
society's most precious assets can be
destroyed forever.

Supporters of NOM argue that giving natural objects legal
rights is one way to insure their protection.

—

.

19

Legal concerns

.

The most complete account of why

natural objects should have legal rights is given by

Christopher Stone in Should Trees Have Standing ?

Stone

identifies three specific legal-operational advantages

which legal right-holders have and natural objects, as
non-legal right-holders, lack:
They are, first, that the thing can institute
legal actions at its behest second, that in
determining the granting of legal relief, the
courts must take injury to it into account;
and, third, that relief must run to the
benefit of it
;

According to Stone, all three advantages
...go towards making a thing count jurally
to have a legally recognized worth and dignity
in its own right, and not merely to serve as a
means to benefit "us" (whoever the contemporary

group of right-holders may be ).!”7
Stone's illustration compares a society, S^, in which

a

master can collect reduced chattel damages from someone
who has beaten his slave, with a society,

S

2

,

in which

the slave can institute the proceedings himself, for his

own recovery.

Stone argues that though neither society

leaves wholly unprotected the slave's interests in not

being beaten, the slave has these three operationally

significant advantages in

S

2

that it lacks in S^.

According to Stone, to say natural objects do not,
but ought to, have legal rights is to emphasize these
objects
three legal-operational advantages which natural
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lack but ought to have.

Since in large part Stone's

argument for NOM turns on his discussion of these three
advantages,

a

few remarks on each are appropriate.

The advantage of allowing natural objects to

initiate legal actions on their own behalf involves giving

natural objects legal standing.

'Legal standing' refers

to a plaintiff's capacity to maintain legal action in a

particular instance.

Usually "standing to sue" refers to

the capacity to sue where more than the plaintiff's own

interest is involved.

Parties having legal standing may

invoke the judicial process to initiate suits, or to seek

review on the correctness of an official action, an
agency decision, or a court ruling.
A move to give natural objects legal standing has

certain legal advantages over moves to liberalize present
laws of standing which do not involve giving natural

objects any legal capacities as plaintiffs.

First,

it

provides a basis for saying that they have certain legal
rights, e.g., the rights to initiate suits, to seek re-

dress in their own behalf, to seek review of a court
ruling.

Second, it provides a mechanism for ensuring

that natural objects receive certain benefits, e.g.,
legal awards in injunctive settlements.
a

Third,

it provides

which
legal means for challenging environmental activity
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does not require showing "injury in fact" to human
interests, economic or otherwise.
The last point deserves elaboration.

There are

three customary criteria for standing: the existence of a

genuine dispute, the assurance of adversariness

,

and a

conviction that the party whose standing is challenged
will adequately represent the interests he/she asserts. 18
However, often it has not been clear in environmental

litigation what conditions must be met for an environmental plaintiff to have standing.

At one time the

invasion of a "legally protected interest" was required. 18
But,

in the important Data Processing Case

(1970)

,

the

Supreme Court rejected the legal interest test and de-

clared a new, two-part test for standing: the plaintiff

must assert that "the challenged action caused him injury
in fact,

economic or otherwise," and that "the interest

sought to be protected ... [is

]

arguably within the zone of

interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or

constitutional guarantee in question."
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The Data Pro-

cessing case expanded the notion of "interests" to endorse
non-economic interests--aesthetic
servational interests--as
In Sierra Club v. Morton

a

,

recreational and con-

sufficient basis for injury.

(1972)

,

the Supreme Court up-

held that non-economic interests could be the basis for

requisite injury, but it warned that "injury in fact
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requires that the party seeking relief has suffered an
injury.

Since the Sierra Club had not alleged that it or

its members had been injured personally, the court ruled

that the Club did not have standing.

Like Justice Douglas,

Justice Blackman argued in his dissenting opinion that
the traditional concept of standing ought to be expanded
to enable an organization like the Sierra Club to litigate

environmental issues. 21

Both suggest that the customary

three criteria of standing ought to be expanded to include
the fourth condition that the litigant be one who speaks

knowingly for the environmental values he asserts. 22
The denial of standing has been a serious obstacle
to environmental plaintiffs seeking court relief.

Some

theorists suggest that by giving natural objects themselves legal standing, a route is provided for bypassing
the often circuitous, cumbersome task of establishing

"injury in fact" to humans when the real issue at hand is
some injury to some natural objects.

The second legal advantage right-holders have that

non-right-holders lack is that recognition of injuries to
them are taken into account in adjudicating the merits of
a controversy.

In environmental cases,

typically only

injuries to identifiable humans are considered and balanced.

What is not included is any damage or "cost" to

,.
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natural objects themselves.

right-holders

,

By making natural objects

costs to natural objects would be

included in damage calculations.

Stone argues that one

way to measure damage to natural objects is to calculate
the "costs of making the natural object whole."

He

writes
The costs of making a forest whole, for example,
would include the costs of reseeding, repairing
watersheds, restocking wildlife the sorts of
costs a Forest Service undergoes after a fire.
Making a polluted stream whole would include
the costs of restocking with fish, water-fowl,
and other animal and vegetable life, dredging,
washing out impurities, establishing natural
and/or artificial aerating agents, and so forth 23

—

.

If "costs" or damages to natural objects are recognized,

then injury to them could be balance in granting legal

relief
The third legal advantage right-holders have is

that they are the beneficiaries of favorable judgments.
In the present system,

if a plaintiff repairian wins a

damage suit for water pollution, cash benefits go to the
repairian.

The decision whether or not to use the relief

to "clean up" the water is a matter left to the repairian.
In a legal system in which natural objects had legal

rights and were beneficiaries of favorable judgments, cash

awards would go to them, to repair damages to them or to

otherwise "benefit" them.

24

Underlying Stone's argument in favor of NOM is the
view that it simply is not the whole picture to construe

environmental problems as problems of human needs and

preferences only, and to construe environmental costs and
benefits as costs and benefits to humans only.

In a legal

system which implemented NOM, one must address the questions "what is the cost to the environment itself?" "What

damages to it must be balanced?"
An altogether different legal concern motivating

NOM is that it is conceivable that environmental cases
could arise which properly are construed as involving only

natural objects, i.e., where no human activity, interest
or injury is involved, at least in any direct or legally

significant way.

In such cases,

the appropriate descrip-

tion of the legal situation would be that it concerns

case and controversy between natural objects.

a

Were the

legal machinery available for doing so, legal action

could be brought by one natural object against another.
For example, suppose that in some isolated place,

unoccupied by humans, an animal species A is threatened
with extinction because of the overpopulated presence of
animal species

B,

A's natural predator.

Where previously

there had been a natural balance between them, there no

longer is one.

Perhaps the present imbalance resulted

from prior human activity.

Hunters may have killed

a

.
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significant portion of the population of A though not of
B.

In addition,

suppose that there is no "injury in fact"

to any humans by the threatened existence of species A,

except perhaps the "remote" injury to humans incurred by
the possible extinction of the species.

In the present

system, it is unlikely that favorable judgments for

animals of species A would be forthcoming.

One reason for

this is that present court practice is to discourage

environmental litigation by parties only remotely injured,
by disallowing proof of damages to those parties.

must show "proximate cause."
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Parties

In our example, any humans

who brought suit as environmental plaintiffs would be
likely to fail this "proximate cause" test.

It is an

example of a case where a "judgment of remoteness" is
likely
The legal situation would be quite different if

the animals of species A had some legal rights against
the animals of species B.

The legal representatives of

animal of species A could initiate court action on their

behalf against the animals of species

B.

To borrow

Justice Douglas's phrase, they could "sue for their own

preservation."

A favorable legal judgment in an injunc-

tive settlement could provide sufficient funds and human

energy to safeguard their survival.
This example raises many difficult issues.

Who
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are the legal representatives of the species?

Is each

species to have a single representative, or is a single

agency to stand for all?

Nonetheless, if plausible, it

illustrates that legal situations could arise where the

relevant environmental problem is, and correctly is construed as being, between natural objects.

The concern

that a legal means be available to handle such cases

might motivate NOM.
Another legal concern motivating NOM is that
giving natural objects legal rights could speed up the

process of preserving or protecting those objects.

Suppose

an industry's activity threatens to pollute a river.

By

giving natural objects legal rights, legal representatives
of the natural objects could bring suit against the in-

dustry based on considerations of actual or potential
injury to the river itself.

This could be done in the

absence of any regulation enjoining such activity or of
any evidence of possible injury in fact to any humans.

Although administrative or legislative enactment might
eventually forestall such activity, ascription of legal
rights to natural objects could hasten the process.

Much is at stake by granting or refusing to grant
legal rights to natural objects.

By conferring legal

rights on natural objects one plugs into a whole system of
rights which can be much more powerful and efficacious

.
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than anything which might be warranted by policy
consider-

ations alone.

For example,

if a river has a right to seek

redress for damages to it caused by the presence of toxic
pollutants, then persons and institutions (industries,
agencies, courts, governments) may be required to spend

much time, energy and money to secure that right, e.g., by

cleaning up the river, constructing treatment facilities
to handle waste,

or restocking the river with fish.

Mere

considerations of social policy or of human interest may
justify only limited preventive measures.

Summary

Many concerns motivating NOM have been offered.
Each provides an explanation of how the issue "rights for

natural objects" arises and

a

reason why theorists have or

might argue for awarding legal rights to non-humans,
natural objects.

No attempt has been made to assess these

reasons or to identify the disadvantages of giving natural
objects legal rights.

Thus, the question whether one

should give natural objects legal rights, has been left

open

.

CHAPTER

III

LEGAL PERSONS AND LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES

Introduction
The argument of this dissertation is that ascrip-

tion of legal rights to natural objects is compatible with

American legal theory on legal rights, thesis
establish

(T)

.

To

one must show that none of the prima facie

(T)

exhaustive positions on legal rights within the American
legal framework raises a successful objection to

(T)

Although the positions on legal rights and legal rightholders differ greatly, in many cases my argument in defense of

(T)

makes essentially the same move.

It is that

theorists cannot hold the positions they do and feel they

must hold regarding legal persons and legal representatives
and deny the possibility of ascribing legal rights to

natural objects.

This move is straightforward.

However,

in the context of law and in the case of natural objects,
it involves coming to terms with some knotty concepts,

principles and arguments.

It requires considering in

detail each position on legal rights and legal rightholders, and defeating a whole set of objections to

based on them.

(T)

Nonetheless, the purpose of chiseling away
28
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at the different positions is always the same, namely,
to

show that attempts to exclude natural objects as possible
legal right-holders fail.
In this chapter

I

discuss the notions of a legal

person and a legal representative.
a

I

argue that there is

reasonable, prima facie case for describing natural

objects as legal persons whose legal affairs could be

conducted by legal representatives.
I

In the next chapter,

discuss the notion of a legal fiction.

I

argue that no

noxious legal fiction is involved in describing natural

objects as legal persons.

The arguments of these two

chapters lay the groundwork for arguments in succeeding
chapters that attempts to exclude natural objects as legal

right-holders are unsuccessful.
The Notion of a Legal Person

Traditional legal theory assumes that legal rights
and duties are ascribed to persons.

But not all humans

always have been recognized by law as legal right-holders.
At different times women, racial minorities, children and

mentally incompetent persons have not been.

Furthermore,

often entities other than individual humans have been

recognized as legal right-holders, e.g., corporations,
nation-states, churches, funds, trusts, idols.

What, then,
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is the legally relevant notion of a person according to

which all legal right-holders are "persons"?
What is a legal person?

In law and in legal theory, a

distinction is made between the notions of human personality (or, a human or "natural" person) and legal

personality

(or,

a legal person)

Often this distinction

.

is put by saying that the expressions

'person' and

'personality' have both a philosophic sense or use and
legal sense or use.

a

In its philosophic sense or use,

'person' designates rational beings, moral agents,

"choosers."

In its legal sense or use,

'person' desig-

nates entities or units which the law recognizes as having
legal rights and bound by legal duties.

Setting aside

discussion of the concept of human personality, or the
philosophic view of persons, just what is the concept of
legal personality, or the legal view of persons?
The standard definition of a legal person is that
it is "a right and duty bearing unit," "the subject of

Some

legal rights and duties."

(e.g.,

loosen this definition by defining

a

F.

K.

von Savigny)

legal person as

simply the subject or bearer of a legal right.
(e.g., A.

Kocourek)

Others

loosen the definition by defining a

legal person as a right or duty bearing unit, an entity to

which the law attributes

a

capacity for legal rights or

.

,
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duties.

Some legal theorists offer expanded versions of

the standard definition.

For example, T. E. Holland

defines a legal person as "such masses of property or
groups of human beings as are in the eyes of the law

capable of rights and liabilities, in other words, to

which the law gives a status."

F.

Pollock defines it as

"a subject of duties and rights which is represented by

one or more natural persons." 4

view is that

a

Nonetheless, the standard

legal person is the subject of legal rights

and legal duties.

Who or what can be a legal person?

It is common to

classify legal persons in the following way

5
:

(a)

ordinary

individual humans, i.e., adult men and women with legally

sufficient mental capacities;

(b)

non-ordinary individual

humans, e.g., children, infants, mental incompetents;

juristic persons, e.g., corporations, nation-states;

animate non-humans, e.g., animals;
humans, e.g., ships, idols.

descriptions given at

(a)

and

(e)

(c)
(d)

inanimate non-

Legal persons fitting the
(b)

are "natural persons;"

those fitting the descriptions given at

(c)

(d)

and

(e)

are "artificial persons."
One important feature of the legal view of persons,
then,

is that it admits that individual humans may be genuine

persons

F.

Pollock states the legal view succinctly

^
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when he claims that in law, "a person is such not because
he is human, but because rights and duties are ascribed
to him.

"

Legal persons as mere legal constructions

generally regard the notion of
juristic, technical notion.
"a juristic

a legal

.

Legal theorists

person as

a

mere

Hans Kelsen describes it as

construction" which must be distinguished from

the notion of a physical or natural person.

Kelsen argues

that it is a tautology that only legal persons exist within
the law.

ferently

^

G.

W.

Paton puts the same point slightly dif-

:

Legal personality is a particular device by
which the law creates units to which it
ascribes certain powers ... legal personality
remains, in essence, merely a convenient
juristic device by which the problem of
organizing rights and duties is carried
out ^
.

The notion of a legal person is an artificial creation of
the law, a convenient juristic device whereby entities are

created or recognized and to which the law ascribes
certain legal advantages and disadvantages.
To regard the notion of legal personality ulti-

mately as

a

technical legal construction is not to regard

it as a wholly contrived,

novel or insignificant notion.

It is not a wholly contrived notion since in ordinary

speech, groups or units often are personified and treated

.
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as having a continuity and identity separate from that of

any particular individual members.

For example, we speak

of property "belonging to the Club," of contracts "made

with the University," of actions "brought by the Government."

In common parlance,

it is the Club,

the University

or the Government, taken as a whole or unit, and not any

individual members thereof, which is said to own property,

make contracts, or bring and defend actions.

They are the

entities or units to which rights and duties are attributed.
Where the law recognizes these units as legal persons, it
endows them with

a

definite legal capacity for exercising

and vindicating their rights, or for safeguarding their

property
Nor is the notion of legal personality the novel

development of an advanced, highly complex legal system.
In early Roman law,

in the interval between the death of

the ancestor and the assumption of the inheritance by the
heir,

the estate or

"

hereditas " of the deceased was

treated as a legal person.

By personifying the estate,

the law provided a way to have the estate represented

during the time when no natural person actually owned the
estate.

Similarly, in order to have some person who could

represent the claims of the public, Roman law created the
legal person the "fiscus" or "treasury."

It was proper

legal talk to speak of property belonging to the estate

,
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and of money belonging to the public treasury.
is the same in modern law.

The case

It is proper to speak,

e.g.

of contracts made with a firm, or of liabilities of a

corporation, where the rights and duties spoken of actually
are attributed to the firm or corporation and not to

members of the firm or corporation.

The firm or corpora-

tion is the legal person in such cases.

Furthermore, the device of awarding legal person-

ality is an important juristic device, since it permits
the law to recognize and create legal right and duty

bearing units where the property and legal relations of
individual humans is not relevant or at issue.

For

example, it permits recognition of municipal governments,

administrative offices, professional societies, religious

organizations and trading corporations as having legal
capacities and

a

continuous legal existence which are not

necessarily dependent upon the existence of any specific
human beings.

Of course, many of the legal capacities of

these artificial persons differ from those of natural
persons.

There are acts which artificial persons are

incapable of performing, or which the law does not recognize as their having the capacity to perform, e.g., marrying or authorizing a crime.

Still, the device of ascribing

legal personality to entities or units is a helpful and

accepted legal instrument for handling the legally

'

^
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relevant affairs of non-humans.
What emerges as the most striking feature of the
notion of legal personality is that the existence of
natural persons is neither a test of legal personality,
nor a condition for ascribing legal personality.

Since

the creation of legal persons always is a matter of

positive law and regulation, legal personality can be, and
has been, awarded to non-humans.

The views of Paton,

Holland and W. Markby, respectively, emphasize this point:
It is socially and economically false, as well
as legally untrue, to say that only individual
men can be the bearers of legal rights. 10

An artificial person may, however, also
exist without being supported by any natural
persons.
It may consist merely of a mass of
property, of rights and of duties, to which
the law chooses to give a fictitious unity
by treating it as a universitas bonorum
The most familiar example is a hereditas
before it has been accepted by the heir...
1

.

'

'

A juristic [legal] person is generally an
aggregate of real persons, but there is no
difficulty in creating an imaginary person
which does not contain any real person.-*- 2
The Notion of a Legal Representative
A legal person is a legal right and duty bearing
unit, created or recognized by law, to which the law

ascribes certain legal capacities.

Given that some legal

persons are "artificial persons," how are their legal

affairs conducted?

The answer is the same for all legal
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persons, natural as well as artificial persons.

It is

always and only one or more natural persons who manage the
legal affairs of legal persons.

These natural persons are

the legal person's legal representative or agent.

The doctrine of legal representation

.

What

I

shall refer

to as "the doctrine of legal representation" is the

doctrine that a duly-appointed or authorized agent legally
is empowered to act in the name of,

and on behalf of, the

legal person it represents, and thereby to secure or safe-

guard the property, legal rights or other legal relations
of the represented legal person.

natural person or persons.

This agent is always a

When the agent acts in the

name of, and on behalf of, the entity it represents, its
acts, within limits specified by law, are imputed to the

represented entity itself, and the rights secured or
safeguarded are the rights of the represented entity.
The legal representative or agent

.

Natural persons em-

ployed to do an act or acts for another are called
"agents."

Usually, an agent is employed for the purpose

of bringing the employer into legal relation with a third

party.

A general principle of agency is that the act

of an authorized legal agent done in the name of, and on

behalf of, another (the principal) has the same legal
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effects or results as if the principal had done the act.
This principle holds whether the principal is
an artificial person.

a

natural or

Unless the legal conditions specify

otherwise, the principal is bound directly by the acts of
the agent.

In general,

if the agent acts within the

specified terms of its authority, he/she is not personally
liable for contracts made in the principal's name.
There are many forms of representation or agency.
A familiar one arises for purposes of business convenience.

Paton says of this form of agency,
An agent (in this sense) is one who acts as a
conduit pipe through which legal ralations
flow from his principal to another. Agency is
created by a juristic act by which one person
(the principal) gives to another (the agent)
the power to do something for and in the name
of the principal so as to bind the latter

directly

-*-4
.

The guardianship method of legal representation is

Legal guardians are appointed to

another form of agency.

represent the wills of infants and to take effective steps
In The Law of

in safeguarding their property and wealth.

Guardian and Ward

,

H.

B.

Taylor describes

a

guardian as

person to whom the law has entrusted the
custody and control of the person or estate,
or both, of an infant, whose youth, inexperience,
and mental weakness disqualify him from acting
for himself in the ordinary affairs of life.
.

.

.a

in
Suits brought by and against infant wards are brought

the name of the ward.

The guardian is considered the

7
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"statutory agent of the ward."
In general,

the guardianship method of legal

representation provides for the care, protection or
supervision of persons and their property where the persons

are

unable, for one reason or another, to manage their own
a

^a

^-

rs

*

addition to its use in the case of infants

and minors, the guardianship approach is used to handle
the legal affairs of "legal incompetents," natural persons

who are de jure unable to conduct their ordinary affairs.
Their incapacity may be by reason of old age, disease,

weakness of mind, or other cause ." 16
to appoint someone guardian

(or,

Courts are empowered

"conservator," "committee")

for legal incompetents.

Another form of agency is the trusteeship.

Typi-

cally, a trustee is a natural person to whom property is

committed for the benefit of others.
a

1

For example, when

corporation becomes bankrupt, courts often appoint

a

trustee to oversee the corporation's affairs and to report
on it to the court at the appropriate time.

Legal representatives for non-humans

.

Appeal to the

doctrine of legal representation explains how non-humans
can be said to act as legal right and duty bearing units.

Even theorists who suppose that having a will or having a

capacity to act is

a

necessary condition of having legal

.
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rights typically concede that it is a condition which
non-

humans could be said to satisfy.

As long as there is some

natural person empowered to act as legal agent for the non-

human legal person, the legal person is said to have a
will or to have a capacity to act.
The discussions of legal personality offered by

theorists

J.

Gray and W. Markby serve as illustrations

C.

of this point.

Gray argues that even though only humans

have real wills,

"idiots," horses, steam tugs and corpor-

ations are or could be legal persons, having legal rights:
The step [of attributing a will to an entity]
is as hard to take and no harder, whether he,
she, or it be an idiot, a horse, a steam tug,
or a corporation.
Neither the idiot, the
horse, the steam tug, nor the corporation has
a real will; the first three no more than the
latter

-

Whether the thing to which the will is attributed is an
actual entity (e.g., a man, a ship, a dog) or a "juristic
entity"

(e.g.,

a

corporation), the entity attributed the

will is the legal right-holder.
Similarly, Markby argues that corporations satisfy
the condition of having the capacity to act insofar as

there is a legal representative to perform the acts of
the corporation it represents.

He states,

This is so clear, that when a corporation is
created the capacity to act need not be
specially granted. So far as it is possible
that acts should be done through a representative
it will be presumed that a corporation may do
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those acts, provided that they are consistent
with the purposes for which the corporation
was created.
This account of the doctrine of legal representa-

tion suffices to show that there is nothing bizarre,

unusual or sneaky about speaking of legal representatives

making claims on behalf of, and in the name of, the
entities they represent.

The doctrine provides a familiar,

accepted legal means for protecting, securing or gaining

recognition of rights for entities who/which are not
themselves capable of doing so.

They may be incapable of

actually making demands because of their peculiar circumstances

(e.g.,

infants and mental incompetents); or, they

may be legally ineligible to make demands or inititate
legal transactions

(e.g.,

juveniles); or, they may be

recognized legally as empowered to make demands

conduct

or

legal affairs only through specifiable legal agents

corporations)

.

Whatever the reason for appointing

(e.g.,
a legal

representative for an entity, it is the represented entity

who/which is said to have the rights or duties in question.
Natural Objects as Legal Persons
Could natural objects be legal persons?
a

Obviously,

full defense of the claim that natural objects could be

legal persons requires showing that they could be said to

have legal rights and to bear legal duties.

As such, that
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defense is possible only after the notions of

a

legal

and a legal duty, and the attendant notions of a

legal right-holder and a legal duty-bearer, are discussed.

Still

,

what has been said so far provides

a

prima facie

case for describing natural objects as legal persons.
First, legal persons are entities recognized or

created by positive law; they need not be moral persons,
rational agents or "choosers."

Second, legal precedent

exists for recognizing non-humans as legal persons.

Some

theorists suppose that these two features of the notion of
a legal person

constitute sufficient grounds for awarding

legal personality to at least some natural objects.

For

example, Paton writes,
[The law] says that certain things shall be
units for the purposes of the law, and that
these units shall possess the capacity of
being parties to the claim-duty and powerIt would be absurd,
liability relationship.
but not impossible, for the law to award
legal personality to trees, sticks, or stones.

2q

Paton cautions that the law must adapt the device of legal

personality to the nature of the recipient, whereby
differences between, e.g., natural persons, corporations
and natural objects would be taken into account.

But he

concedes that natural objects could be legal persons.
Legal persons which are "artificial persons" can

perform legal transactions only through their legal

.

:
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representatives; they are not the sort of entity
which,
under any circumstances, could make claims on
their own
behalf.

Appeal to the doctrine of legal representation,

then, provides both an explanation and a legal
justifica-

tion for describing non-moral, non-rational entities
as

genuine legal right-holders.

Extension of that doctrine

to cover the case of natural objects would provide an

acceptable legal means for gaining recognition of natural
objects as legal right-holders.

Christopher Stone argues that the law should
appoint legal guardians for natural objects.

If present

statutes fail to provide sufficient grounds for such a
move, he suggests enacting special environmental legisla-

tion to permit the move. 21
v.

In his dissent in Sierra Club

Morton, Justice Douglas gives Stone's proposal serious

endorsement
Permitting a court to appoint a representative
of an inanimate object would not be significantly
different from customary judicial appointments
of guardians ad litem executors, conservators,
receivers or counsel for indigents
,

Of course,

to say that ascription of legal person-

ality to natural objects is plausible is not to say that
natural objects would or should be awarded the same legal

capacities as humans or as other artificial persons.
is

Nor

it to say that the rights of all natural objects would

or should be the same.

The rights of communal natural
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objects such as lakes may be very different from
the
rights, if any, of natural objects on private land.

Furthermore, as with other legal persons, a natural

object's legal capacities for performing legal acts
through its legal representative would be limited by the

purposes for which its legal existence is recognized.

Recognition of some specific legal rights for natural
objects would not amount to

a

"no holes barred" position

on ascription of legal rights to them.

The legal capa-

cities of natural objects may be much more limited than
those of humans, and may be different in some respects

from those of other artificial persons.

Despite differences between natural objects as
legal persons and other legal persons, presumably many of
the tasks of the appointed legal representatives of

natural objects would be the same as those of legal repre-

sentatives generally.

These would include "protective

tasks," such as representing the natural objects at

administrative hearings on environmental quality standards,
"litigation tasks," such as bringing legal action on
behalf of the natural object, and "administrative tasks,"
such as overseeing any funds created in the name of the

natural objects, particularly where natural objects are

beneficiaries of monetary awards.
Determining whether the guardianship form or some
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other form of legal agency is best suited to the
case of

natural objects involves solving many practical
problems.
Who qualifies as a guardian for natural objects?

What

procedures should be followed in applying for and creating

guardianships for natural objects?

What criteria should

be used for determining when a natural object should be

recognized as a legal person?
are tactical ones.
if so,

But such problems basically

They bear on the question whether, and

how, one should award legal personality to natural

objects.

Solving them is not necessary to showing that

natural objects could be awarded legal personality.

The

possibility of making natural objects legal persons rests
on showing that the notions of a legal person, a legal

representative, a legal right and a legal duty pose no

insurmountable obstacles.
a

What has been said here provides

prima facie case for that view.

Objections
There are three reasonable objections to describing

natural objects as legal persons.

The first is that a

damaging legal fiction is involved in describing them as
legal persons.

The second is that it is incompatible with

theories of legal rights and legal duties to so describe
them.

The third is that the argument for so describing

?

45

them rests on a faulty analogy between natural
objects and

corporations.

Since the first two objections are handled

in subsequent chapters, only the third is discussed
here.

The third objection is that natural objects cannot
be legal persons because ascription of legal personality
to them mistakenly assumes a strict analogy between natural objects and corporations.

plausible objection.

It seems to be a fairly

Is it telling against

(T)

Suppose the argument for saying that natural
objects could be legal persons does assume an analogy

between corporations and natural objects.
analogy fail?

Does the

Certainly there are important differences

between corporations and natural objects.
are comprised of individual humans.

Corporations

They are created by

humans expressly for special purposes, which purposes

allegedly serve human interests.

Unlike natural objects,

their very existence is presumed to be
tive law and regulation.

similarities between them.

a

matter of posi-

But there are also important

Neither corporations nor

natural objects are moral persons, rational agents, entities having an actual will or a capacity to act; they are

not themselves decision-makers, choosers, entities having

actual wants, desires or interests.

23

Corporations are

presumed capable of performing acts, expressing

a

will or
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having interests just

insofar as the acts, will, or

interests of their legal agents or of the individual
humans
which comprise them are attributed to the corporation.
Furthermore, their capacity for performing legal acts is

restricted by the explicit purposes for which their legal
existence is recognized.
One might point out here that corporations and

individual humans are dissimilar in just these respects.
Humans are moral persons, rational agents, decisionmakers, choosers; they are carriers of actual wants,

desires and interests.

Unlike corporations, individual

humans have an independent capacity to act.

Still, both

humans and corporations are or can be legal persons.

Thus,

while there are these important differences between corporations and individual humans, they do not suffice for

withholding ascription of legal personality to corporations,
while awarding legal personality to humans.

Stated differ-

ently, with regard to the question of who or what can be

legal person, they are not legally relevant differences.
The case of natural objects is like that of cor-

porations in this respect.

Like corporations, and unlike

individual humans, natural objects are not, or typically
are not considered to be, moral persons, rational agents,

choosers.

But this alone does not establish that they

cannot be legal persons.

a

,
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Suppose the objection is that, on the balance,
the

legally relevant dissimilarities between corporations
and
natural objects outweigh the legally relevant similarlties. 24

against

In order to provide the strongest possible case
(T)

suppose this is true.

Does this show that

natural objects cannot be legal persons?
think not, for several reasons.

I

For one thing,

ultimately the argument provided in this dissertation for
saying that natural objects could be legal persons does
not rest simply on a presumed analogy between natural

objects and corporations.
arguments.

It involves two quite distinct

The first, already laid out, is that commonly

accepted legal theory on the notions of
a

a legal

person and

legal representative permits the description of natural

objects as possible legal persons.

Since funds, idols and

ships may be or have been legal persons, use of the

example of corporations is an instructive, though not the
only, illustration of non-human legal persons.

The second

argument, laid out in subsequent chapters, is that it is

compatible with American legal theory on legal rights (and
legal right-holders) and legal duties

bearers)

(and legal duty-

to describe natural objects as legal right and

duty bearing units, i.e., as legal persons.
these

two arguments constitute

Taken together,

the case for saying that
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natural objects could be legal persons.

Thus, although

the analogy to corporations may be helpful,
the case for

describing natural objects as legal persons does not
stand
or fall on it.

For another thing, even the most significant

snence between corporations and natural objects does
not constitute sufficient grounds for withholding ascrip-

tion of legal personality to natural objects.

This

difference is that corporations are comprised of individual
humans.

It would constitute sufficient grounds only if it

were true, or accepted as true, that only humans and

aggregates of humans could be legal persons.
view has been advocated.
juristic person,

G.

T.

Indeed, this

In a series of articles on the

Deiser argues that "personality is

an attribute of humans or of groups of humans acting as a

unit for the attainment of

a

common end."

For Deiser,
yc

the juristic person is "the collective will of the group."
But, Deiser'

s

view contrasts markedly with the favored

view that other than individual humans and groups of
humans can be legal persons.

Paton argues that animals

have been legal persons in some systems.

27

outright that animals can be legal persons.

Gray argues
28

0.

W.

Holmes grants that ships in admiralty could sue and be
sued.

2Q

J.

Austin argues that there have been cases where
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land "is erected into a legal or fictitious
person

1,30
.

The commonly accepted view, then, is that a legal
person

need not be an individual human or a group of individual
humans.

Thus, even if there is this difference between

natural objects and corporations, it is not a difference

which determines whether or not natural objects can be
legal persons.

Granting that one important feature of corporations
is that they are created to serve human purposes, does

this generate a legally significant difference between

them and natural objects?

The usefulness of natural

objects for human purposes is a given.

Making natural

objects legal persons need not affect their general usefulness to humans for economic or non-economic activities.
A river may be awarded rights against industrial polluters

yet have only limited rights against canoeists.

A forest

may have specific rights against lumber companies, e.g.,
the right to receive some form of compensation for

lumbering activities, without having a right to disallow
all lumbering whatsoever.

A private landowner may have

a

right to cut down trees on his/her property even though
some trees

(or a stand of trees)

not on privately owned

property have rights against being cut down.
that the use of natural objects

The point is

may continue to serve
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human purposes even though some natural objects
have legal

right-holder status.
Thus, even if one assumes that there are some

legally relevant differences between natural objects and
corporations, this does not show that natural objects

cannot be legal persons.

Furthermore, the argument for

saying that natural objects could be legal persons does
not depend on a strict analogy between them and corporations.

For these reasons, the objection to describing

natural objects as legal persons misses its mark.
Summary
It has been argued that the objection that natural

objects cannot be legal persons because they are not like

corporations fails on three counts.

First, it assumes

incorrectly that the case for so describing natural objects
rests on a strict analogy between natural objects and

corporations.

Second, even if there are legally relevant

differences between natural objects and corporations,
these differences do not establish that natural objects

cannot be legal persons.

Third, there are important,

legally significant, similarities between natural objects
and corporations.
The discussion of the notions of legal personality
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and legal representation in this chapter sets
up the

argument, made repeatedly throughout the dissertation,
that theorists cannot hold the positions they do
hold

regarding these notions and deny the possibility of
awarding legal personality to natural objects.

Therefore,

it provides a pr ima facie case for describing natural

objects as legal persons.

,

CHAPTER

I

V

LEGAL FICTIONS
In all fields of law,
roake

lawyers and legal theorists

statements they know or assume are false but which,

stated as pretenses or conceits, have an undeniable utility.
For example, often it is said that "the plaintiff

deemed

-is

to have knowledge of the law" when, clearly and in fact,

he/she does not, or that "the grantee of a gift is presumed
to have accepted the gift" when it is evident he/she has

not.

These statements are called "fictions."
In this chapter

fiction.
to

(T)

I

what

I

discuss the notion of a legal

then argue against
I

a

rather powerful objection

call "the Legal Fiction Objection."

I

conclude that even if ascription of legal rights to natural objects is or involves a legal fiction, it is or

involves one which is not damaging to the case for

(T)

.

The Notion of a Legal Fiction

Much has been written about the legal fiction.
Perhaps the single, most comprehensive account of legal

fictions is given by Lon Fuller in his book Legal Fictions
There Fuller discusses the notion of a fiction, the motives
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3

.
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which give rise to the legal fiction, and the indispensability of fictions in law.

Citing a wide range of opinions

and providing helpful examples from the sciences and
philosophy, as well as from law.

Fuller provides a well-docu-

mented account of the legal fiction.

The discussion of

the legal fiction provided here is largely a compendium of

Fuller

views,

s

defense of

insofar as those views are relevant to the

(T)

No attempt is made to assess the particu-

lar details of Fuller's account.

What is
a

a

legal fiction?

2

In Legal Fictions

,

Fuller defines

legal fiction as follows:
A fiction is either (1) a statement propounded
with a complete or partial consciousness of its
falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as
having utility.

Fuller distinguishes

a

fiction from a true statement, a

lie and an erroneous conclusion.

A statement which is

literally true, or which the author believes to be true,
is not a fiction.

and, hence,

A fiction is not intended to deceive

is not a lie.

Since a fiction is adopted by

its author with at least partial knowledge of its falsity,
it is not an erroneous conclusion.

A fiction is an expe-

dient but "consciously false" assumption.

According to Fuller, in actions of trover,
ment alleging that

a

a

state-

defendant found a chattel which he/

she actually took by force is a fiction.

So,

too,

in
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actions arising under the "attractive nuissance
doctrine,"
the statement that a defendant invited children to
visit

his/her premises when he actually was ignorant of their

presence and activities is a fiction.

^

They are literally

false statements which treat certain facts as present (e.g.,
that a defendant found a chattel or invited children onto

his/her premises) when, in fact, they are not present.
The form of the legal fiction

construes

a

The ordinary legal fiction

.

fact or event A as present when it is not.

It

has two forms, the "assumptive" and the "assertive" forms.

The "assumptive" or "as if" form is the construction that

event or fact A is treated as if it were B when, in fact,
it is not B.

tic persons

For example, a typical description of juris(e.g., corporations)

is that the law treats

them as if they had wills of their own, or as if they had
an independent capacity to act, when, in fact, they do not.

The acts of a corporation's legal representatives are

treated as if they were the will of the corporation itself,
The "assertive" or "is" form

when, in fact, they are not.

of the fiction is the construction that event or fact A is
B when,

in fact,

it is not B.

This is the form used when

the description of the corporation is simply that it has a

will or a capacity to act.

Here, the view is not that

corporations actually have human wills or have an independent capacity to act, but that

a

will or capacity to act
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has been attributed to them.

The distinction between these two forms of
the fic-

tion is a structural or grammatical one.

stantive difference whether

it makes no sub-

fiction is of the assumptive

a

or the assertive form.

Generally the pretenses involved in legal fictions
are about non-legal facts and events which are regarded
as

having legal consequences.
Fuller calls

modern law

An illustration is from what

probably the boldest fiction to be found in

— the

'attractive nuissance doctrine '." 5

A land-

owner generally is liable for failure to use due care to-

ward

'invitees," those whom he/she has permitted, expressly

or impliedly, to come on his/her land.
no duty to "trespassers."

A landowner owes

This fact is stated by saying

that a landowner has a duty of care to "invitees," though

not to "trespassers."

Where

a

court decides that a defen-

dant "is deemed to have invited" a plaintiff to use his/
her premises, even though the defendant may be ignorant of
the plaintiff's presence,

it treats the plaintiff as an

"invitee" rather than as a trespasser.

Here a pretense is

made concerning the actual facts and events, making the

defendant liable for failure to use due care.
Could there be pretenses about legal relations,
e.g., about legal rights and legal duties?

about them be legal fictions?

Could statements

Fuller's answer is fairly

^
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clear.

If,

when treated by the courts, an alleged
(or,

’pretended," "assumed")
is enforced,

then it is a real right or duty.

general terms,

"a legal relation,

a ctually enforced

fiction

.

legal right or legal duty actually

,

Stated in

accurately described and

cannot with utility, be regarded as

a

"

Suppose a legal representative, Brown, signs

a

con-

tract in the name of the Starship Corporation, according to

which Smith owes the corporation $1,000 for services rendered.

If,

on action brought by the corporation against

Smith, a court upholds the corporation's claim to $1,000,

then the corporation has a legal right against Smith and

Smith has

a

legal duty to the corporation.

If the state-

ment 'Smith owes the Starship Corporation $1,000' accurately describes the legal situation, and if the courts

actually enforce the corporation's right to receive $1,000
from Smith, then the statement is not a fiction.

However,

if the statement fails to describe accurately the situation
(e.g.,

if the acts performed by Brown were performed in an

unofficial capacity) and courts fail to recognize the cor-

poration as right-holder, then the statement is false.

Ac-

cording to Fuller, some such false statements deserve to be
called fictions, viz., those which are misleading or inaccurate descriptions of legal relations.
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T he purp oses for which legal fictions
are used

.

Fuller

discusses the purposes or functions of the legal
fiction in
terms of the motives from which they proceed.
The general
purpose of any legal fiction is "to reconcile a
specific
legal result with some premise or postulate ." 7
According
to Fuller,

the legal fiction of corporate personality basi-

cally is intended to preserve the premise that only persons
can have legal rights.

The legal result of allocating

legal capacities to corporations is reconciled with that

premise by treating corporations, for certain purposes, as
if they were natural persons.

Sometimes the use of

a

legal fiction is aimed at

escaping the consequences of

a

specific legal rule.^

In

attractive nuissance doctrine, the rule that landowners
have no duty to use care toward trespassers is circumvented
by adopting the fiction that a plaintiff was invited onto
the landowner's property.
A legal fiction may have a persuasive or an exposi-

tory function.

The "persuasive" or "emotive" function is

intended to induce

a

conviction that

is appropriate, desirable or just.

a given legal

result

The "expository" or

"descriptive" function is intended as

a

"convenient short-

describing in fictitious terms

a

legal situation

hand,

"

which allegedly could be described, however awkwardly, in
non-f ictitious terms.

In some cases,

a

fiction may waiver

"
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between a purely expository and a purely
persuasive function.
A fiction which was intended originally
to persuade
may be retained for its expository
function.
One way to distinguish between the
persuasive and

expository functions of fictions is in terms of
whether or
not changes have occurred in the meaning
of the relevant

expressions used in the fiction.

With persuasive fictions,

the linguistic change has not occurred; with
expository

fictions, it almost always has occurred.

Since "finding"

does not mean "taking," and "inviting" does not mean
"attracting,

the fictions that a defendant is presumed to

have found, or is deemed to have invited, a plaintiff are

persuasive fictions.
Types of legal fictions

.

Fuller discusses two basic types

of fictions, the "historical" and the "non-historical

fictions.

He describes these,

just as he describes the

functions or purposes of fictions, in terms of the motives
from which they arise.
The "historical" or "creative" fiction is intended
to introduce a change into the law.
is persuasive.

Its function basically

Fuller gives four specific motives from

which it arises, only one of which is discussed here.

9

It

is what Fuller calls "the motive of intellectual consider-

ations."

In a particular case, often a judge or legislator

may want to introduce a change or reform into the law

"
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and yet feel unable to explain the principle
or concept on

which the change is based in non— fictitious terms.
Fuller’s example of an historical fiction adopted
because of intellectual considerations again is from
attractive nuissance doctrine.

Suppose a young girl is in-

jured while playing on a turntable maintained by a railway
on an unfenced lot.

A suit is brought on her behalf a-

gainst the railway.

Is the railway legally responsible

for the injury?

For any number of reasons, the presiding

judge may feel the case is more like that of the "invitee"

than that of the trespasser, even though, in Fuller's
words,

"it is clear that this child was legally a

’tres-

On what principle should the judge's opinion

passer'."

be based?

The judge may be unable to settle on a clear

principle stated in non-f ictitious terms.

Instead, the

judge may state simply that the defendant is deemed to

have invited the plaintiff onto the land.

The judge's in-

tent is not to conceal the fact that he/she is making law;
nor is it to prevent discommoding current notions.

The

judge simply may know no other personally acceptable way
to resolve the case.

According to Fuller, this is an exam-

ple of an historical fiction adopted out of intellectual

considerations.

It illustrates how a new situation is

made "thinkable" by converting it into familiar terms.
Unlike the historical fiction, the "non-historical
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or

abbreviatory " fiction is not adopted in order to
intro-

duce a change into the law.

Sometimes it is adopted for

purposes of expounding already existent doctrine; sometimes
it is adopted as a vestige of an earlier historical
fiction

which retains its expository function.
function basically is expository.

in either case,

its

They are called "abbre-

viatory fictions" because their general purpose is "to

inconvenient circumlocution" which would be necessary
if the fiction were abandoned. 11

Fuller's example of a non-historical or abbreviatory fiction concerns the legal capacities of ships.

In

several court cases, legal proceedings against ships have

been construed as proceedings "against the vessel for an

offense committed by the vessel."

Citing the following

quote from Justice Holmes, Fuller attributes to Holmes an

appreciation of the function of the abbreviatory fiction:
A ship is not a person.
It cannot do a wrong or
make a contract.
To say that a ship has committed
a tort is merely a shorthand way of saying that
you have decided to deal with it as if it had
committed one, because some man has committed
one in fact... The contrary view would indicate
that you really believed the fiction that a
vessel had an independent personality as a
fact behind the law. 13
By treating the ship as if it were a person, one can speak
of offenses "committed by the ship," even though, properly

speaking, it is natural persons who actually have committed
the offenses.

Presumably (Fuller is not clear here) the

.
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abbreviatory fiction is treating the ship as
able of committing a tort.

with the need "for

a

a person,

Use of the fiction dispenses

lengthy repetition of the legal conse-

quences" of natural persons committing torts. 14
a ^ly

r

power

cap-

Presum-

it is a fiction retained basically for its expository
1^

Live and dead fictions

.

live and dead fictions.

According to Fuller, there are
He writes:

A fiction dies when a compensatory change takes
place in the meaning of the words or phrases
involved, which operates to bridge the gap that
previously existed between the fiction and the
reality. 1°
In a live fiction,

this change in the meaning of key ex-

pressions in a fiction has not occurred.
One way to test whether a fiction is alive or dead
is to determine whether or not the relevant statement in-

volves a pretense.

Live fictions, unlike dead ones, still

contain the element of pretense.

mulated, a statement is of the form
as if it were B' when,
live;

if,

'A is

fiction is dead.

'In a

legally treated

in fact, A is not B,

when correctly formulated,

form 'A is B' or

when correctly for-

If,

a

the fiction is

statement is of the

technical legal sense,

'A is B,'

To use one of Fuller's examples,

then the
in the

action of trover, if "taking" just meant "finding" in some
technical legal sense, then, where

a

defendant takes

a

chattel by force, the statement 'The defendant found the

"
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chattel' would be a dead fiction.

Since 'finding' does not

mean "taking," the statement remains a live
fiction.

(yet)

According to Fuller, the death of
process which is going on all the time.

whereby

a

a

fiction is

a

it is the process

change in the meaning of key expressions in-

volved in the fiction occurs; the expressions acquire
a new,
non-f ictional meaning.
the law.

This process is not confined to

It takes place "in the whole of our language ." 17

It occurs wherever metaphorical language is used.

In

ordinary language or in literature, some metaphors are
alive (i.e., are used and accepted with an awareness that
they are substitutes for their literal equivalents)

;

others are dead (i.e., have been used so often that they
are used and accepted without awareness that the words

used are not literal)

.

As such, diminution of the fiction

from law often means only substituting dead metaphors
-

,

.

for live ones.

18

Recall that Fuller describes the "non-historical
and "historical" fictions in terms of the motives from

which they arise.

The non-historical fiction basically

has an expository function, and typically is adopted for

purposes of expounding existent legal doctrine.
torical fiction basically has

a

The his-

persuasive or emotive

function, and is adopted in order to introduce a change
into the law.

These two basic types of fictions also could
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be described in terms of the purpose of any
metaphors in-

their use

.

Metaphors may be used for their ex-

pository purpose only, as "convenient shorthand" for what

might be expressed, however cumbersomely
as a plain statement of fact.

,

in literal terms,

Metaphors also may be used

for the sake of their emotive powers only; their function
is persuasive.

Any metaphor involved in the non-histori-

ca l fiction basically has an expository function, while

any metaphor involved in the historical fiction basically
has an emotive or persuasive function.

According to Fuller, use of metaphors having
emotive power is desirable.

Their use helps

...to keep the form of the law persuasive.
Metaphor is a traditional device of persuasion.
Eliminate metaphor from the law and you have
reduced its power to convince and convert. ^
In particular,

use of metaphor as a persuasive device be-

fits the historical or "creative" fiction; it is a fiction

intended to induce a conviction that a given legal result
is desirable or just.

This discussion suggests that fictions are not

simply false statements; rather, they are literally false
statements.

Fuller actually concedes this when he states

that "a fiction is frequently a metaphorical way of ex-

pressing a truth."

His discussion of the types and

functions of legal fictions is further evidence that he
thinks fictions often are true statements, on a

64

metaphorical or figurative reading.

Thus,

it seems fit-

ting to construe Fuller as maintaining that legal
fictions
are literally false statements, and not, simply,
false

statements, as he suggests initially.
Is the use of legal fictions inevitable, desirable,
or

justified ?

Fuller argues that there are two distinct

methods for accomplishing a wholesale elimination of fic—
tion from the law,

"rejection" and "redefinition."

A

fiction is rejected when its use is discarded entirely,
statute or court decision declaring that hence-

e.g., by a

forth certain actions shall be allowed without the allegations which formerly involved making pretenses.

Suppose corporate personality is (still)
fiction.

a

legal

The fiction could be eliminated in either of

two ways.

It could be rejected by a ruling that, hence-

forth, actions brought by corporations shall be allowed

without the pretense of corporate personality.

Or, it

could be

redefined if a change in the meaning of 'person' occurred
such that, in a technical legal sense, the meaning of
'person'

includes the designation of other than individual

human beings as persons.

Both methods provide

a

eliminating the fiction of corporate personality.

way of

Stated

differently, both would make the fiction of corporate

personality

a

dead fiction.
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Fuller argues that it is neither possible nor desirable to eliminate fictions from law by a wholesale
process of rejection or redefinition.

He grants that it is

conceivable that fictions could be redefined so that statements of the form

'A is B'

are substituted for statements

of the form 'A is treated as if it were B.'

But he argues

that
...such a wholesale process of redefinition could
not be carried out.
One cannot introduce sweeping
changes in linguistic usage by an arbitrary fiat;
.And even if it were possible, the proposal
ought not to be carried out because it would only
result in encumbering the language of the law
with a grotesque assemblage of technical concepts
lacking the slightest utility. 21
.

.

His verdict is the same for the proposal to reject all

legal fictions:

This is also impossible, and inadvisable if it
were possible.
It is inadvisable because to
reject all of our fictions would be to put legal
terminology in a straight jacket--f ictions are,
to a certain extent, simply the growing pains
of the language of the law.
It is impossible
because fiction, in the sense of a "strained
use of old linguistic material," is an inevitable accompaniment of progress in the law
itself and this progress can scarcely be expected to wait out of deference for the tastes
of those who experience an unpleasant sensation
at the sight of words browsing beyond their
traditional pastures. ^2
By fitting new law into existent legal categories, by pro-

ceeding analogically from old cases to new cases, use of
the legal fiction helps to account for and facilitate what

legal theorists often call "the growth of the law."

To

.
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discard them all would be "to put legal
terminology into a
straight jacket " and prevent that growth.
The proper solution, according to Fuller, is to reject
some and redefine

others
If the use of legal fictions is inevitable
and

desirable, how is it justified?

For many legal theorists

that use of the legal fiction is expedient and necessary
for the growth of the law is sufficient justification.

For

example, Jhering writes:
.the fiction can have a certain justification
as the first step toward the mastery of a new
thought, in a situation of theoretic necessity.
Better order and easy mobility with the fiction,
than disorder and stagnation without it! 22
.

.

It is easy to say, 'Fictions are makeshifts,
crutches to which science ought not to resort.'
So soon as science can get along without them,
certainly not! But it is better that science
should go on crutches than to slip without them,
or not to venture to move at all. 2 ^

However, Fuller's account is different.

He locates the

justification for using legal fictions in social and economic policy considerations:
A doctrine that is plainly fictitious must seek
its justification in considerations of social
and economic policy; a doctrine that is nonfictitious often has a spurious self-evidence
about it. 2 5
If legal fictions are here to stay,

precept or test for their proper use?
by way of a quote from Vaihinger:

out of the final reckoning."

26

"

is there any

Fuller's answer is

The fiction must drop

The dropping of the fiction
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amounts to a rejection or redefinition of
a legal fiction.
Likened to a scaffolding, Fuller describes
a fiction as a
helpful, necessary device ensuring the growth
of the law
which, ultimately, must be removed 27
.

While at any time

use of a particular fiction may be unavoidable,
desirable
and justified, its proper use requires recognition
that,

ultimately, it could be eliminated.

Summary

.

To review, a fiction is a literally false state-

ment which either has a certain utility, or is propounded

with awareness of its falsity.
assertive or assumptive form.
dead.

Fictions may be stated in
They may be live or

Their function may be persuasive or expository.

In

general, the purpose of the legal fiction is to reconcile
a legal result

with some premise.

In particular,

the pur-

pose of the historical fiction is to introduce some change
into the law; the purposes of the non-histor ical fiction

are to expound an already existent legal doctrine, or to

avoid an inconvenient circumlocution.

The historical legal

fiction proceeding from intellectual considerations attempts
to make new law "thinkable" by converting it into familiar

terms.

The use of the legal fiction is considered neces-

sary, desirable and justified.
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The Legal Fiction Objection to
The Legal Fiction Objection to

(T)

(T)

is that

(T)

is

false because the statement that natural objects
have or

could have legal rights either is itself a legal
fiction or
involves a legal fiction.

In this section

I

show that if

there is a legal fiction involved in ascribing legal
rights
to natural objects,

the argument for

(T)

is not damaged by

it.

Suppose, as one disjunct of the objection claims,
it is a legal fiction to say that natural objects have or

could have legal rights.

What does this mean?

One interpretation of the claim is that there are
no such things as rights, and, hence, no such things as

rights which natural objects could be said to have.

The

fiction is treating rights as if they were real things,

when they are not.

The pretense involved in the legal

fiction is about the legal rights attributed to natural
objects, and not about the non-legal facts and events which

give rise to those rights.
However, if this is all that is meant by saying

that the statement 'Natural objects have or could have
legal rights' is
cure.

a

legal fiction, the case for

(T)

is se-

It amounts to saying that the case for ascribing

rights to natural objects is no better, but no worse, off
than a case for ascribing legal rights to any entity

.
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whatsoever.

It generates no objection to

(T)

in particular.

Furthermore, it conflicts with the widely accepted
view
that there are non-f ictitious legal rights,
viz., those

which courts actually enforce.

Finally, it departs from

the standard view that the pretenses involved in
legal fic-

tions concern non-legal facts and events.

For these three

reasons, the first interpretation of the claim that it is
a
legal fiction to ascribe legal rights to natural objects

does not pose any reasonable objection to

(T)

A second interpretation of the claim that it is a

legal fiction to ascribe legal rights to natural objects is

more likely.

It is that ascription of legal rights to

natural objects is merely a convenient shorthand for des-

cribing

a

legal situation which, when filled out properly,

describes some humans as having the rights at issue.

This

interpretation could be expanded along either of two lines,
one suggested by Fuller and one suggested by Markby.

The

line suggested by Fuller is that the fiction is an "abbre-

viatory fiction."
ships,

Like the fiction of the personality of

it is a shorthand way of saying that the law treats

natural objects as if they had legal rights when, in fact,
they do not.

The pretense involved is the assumption that

natural objects themselves have or could have legal rights;
it is actually only humans who have or could have legal

rights.

The line suggested by Markby is that the
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description of natural objects as legal
right-holders is
figurative language only; it fails to describe
the legal

situation accurately.

The rights spoken of as "belonging

to natural objects" really attach to natural
persons who

successively are owners of the natural objects, or who
have
a legally recognized interest in them.
Is

this interpretation of the first Legal Fiction

Objection disjunct, whether along the lines suggested by
Fuller or those suggested by Markby, damaging to

think not.

Consider the Markby line first.

sion of an estate which is held liable for

(T) ?

I

In his discusa

debt, Markby

makes clear what it is to describe the legal situation

figuratively or literally.

The language is figurative if

the statement that the estate is liable is intended to as-

sert and define the liability of any natural persons who

successively are owners of the estate.

There is no legal

person "the estate" to which the liability attaches.

The

language is literal if the statement is intended to identify the status of the estate itself as a legal right or

duty bearing unit.

There is a legal person "the estate" to

which the liability attaches.
may be

a

By allowing that an estate

legal right-holder, Markby allows that not all

talk of legal rights for non-humans is mere figurative

language.

Thus, on the Markby view, one can speak liter-

ally and correctly of legal rights for non-humans.
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The line suggested by Fuller is that the
statement

Natural objects have or could have legal rights'
is an

abbreviatory or non-historical fiction.

Recall that the

non-his tor ical fiction, unlike the historical fiction,
is
not used to introduce a change into the law.

Typically,

it is used to expand existent doctrine in terms
which,

however awkwardly, could be stated in non-f ictitious language.

But,

if the personality of natural objects is a

legal fiction, it is an historical legal fiction.

Its

adoption would be intended to reform the law such that natural objects could be recognized as legal right-holders.
Thus, according to Fuller's account of abbreviatory fic-

tions,

it is false that the statement

have or could have legal rights
tion;

it is not a

'

'Natural objects

is an abbreviatory fic-

"convenient shorthand" for describing an

existent legal situation.
What about the other Legal Fiction Objection claim,
viz., that ascription of legal rights to natural objects

involves a legal fiction?

Is it damaging to

(T) ?

Recall that, according to Fuller, the general purpose of any legal fiction is to reconcile a specific legal

result with some premise.

personality was

(is)

The legal fiction of corporate

intended to reconcile ascription of

legal rights to corporations with the premise that only

"persons" can have legal rights.

Presumably, the legal

"

.
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fiction involved in ascription of legal
rights to natural
objects would be treating them as if they were
humans,

natural persons, when they are not.

if any pretense is

involved, it is to reconcile ascription of legal
rights to

non-humans with the assumption that only persons can
have
legal rights.

I

shall call the alleged fiction of the

personality of natural objects the "fiction of environmental personality.

Suppose, then, that ascription of legal rights to

natural objects involves the fiction of environmental personality.
(T)

Still, this does not furnish an argument against

The five point discussion which follows shows that

what is involved in saying that environmental personality
is a legal fiction is compatible with accepted legal theory

on the nature, purposes and justification for correctly

using legal fictions.

It shows that,

even if there is a

legal fiction involved in ascription of legal rights to

natural objects, the case for

(T)

is not damaged by it.

First, a legal fiction is a literally false state-

ment, either propounded with awareness of its falsity, or

recognized as having

a

certain utility.

The statement that

natural objects are humans, natural persons, is false, known
to be false and not propounded with the intention of de-

ceiving anyone into thinking otherwise.

Its utility is

that its adoption would permit one to construe natural

,
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objects as having certain legal capacities.

Thus,

there

is nothing unusual about describing the
personality of nat-

ural objects as a legal fiction.
Second, the function of the alleged fiction of

environmental personality basically is persuasive, viz.
to convince that ascription of legal rights

(or of legal

capacities generally) to natural objects is appropriate,

desirable or just.

Its function is neither to describe

an existent legal situation, nor to provide a convenient

shorthand for delimiting the rights of humans.

function is not expository.

Thus, its

The persuasive function of the

fiction of environmental personality is an instance of a

legitimate and important function of legal fictions.

Its

use is consistent with accepted purposes for proper use
of legal fictions.
It is important to note that while the fiction of

environmental personality may contain or imply the literally false proposition that natural objects are humans
(natural persons)

,

it does not follow straightway

natural objects cannot have legal rights.

that

This is because

it is not a necessary condition of having rights that an

entity is an individual human

(a

natural person)

.

Further-

more, the fiction of environmental personality does not

by itself

imply the proposition that natural objects can-

not be legal persons.

In fact,

the main reason to adopt

.

,
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the legal fiction of environmental personality
would be to

award natural objects legal personality.

Thus, while it

may be literally false that natural objects are
persons
(i.e., humans, natural persons)

hope to show that it is

I

,

literally true that natural objects can be legal persons.
Use of the fiction of environmental personality may be

construed as
a truth,

viz.

a
,

metaphorical or figurative expression of
that natural objects can be persons (i.e.

legal persons)
Third, the fiction of environmental personality is
an example of an important kind of fiction, viz.,

"historical" or "creative" fiction.
tions are intended to introduce

a

the

Since historical fic-

change into the law,

there is nothing objectionable about invoking the fiction
of environmental personality for that purpose.

The adoption of the fiction of environmental per-

sonality most likely would proceed from what Fuller calls
"motives of intellectual considerations."

A judge or

legislator may want to award certain legal rights to natural objects yet be hard-pressed to base a decision to do
so on any principle stated in non-f ictitious terms.

The

judge or legislator may assert simply that, for certain

purposes, the law deems natural objects to be persons, or

treats them as if they were persons, when they are not.
Like other historical fictions proceeding from intellectual

75

considerations, adoption of the fiction of environmental

personality would allow
thinkable

a

new legal situation to be made

by construing it in familiar terms.

In Should Trees Have Standing ? Christopher Stone

points out that it once was unthinkable to construe corporate bodies
tions)

(e.g.,

as persons.

the church, the state, modern corporaSo,

too,

it may seem unthinkable to

construe natural objects as persons.

Use of the historical

legal fiction provides an expedient, accepted legal device
for fitting new cases to old doctrines and thereby making

them "thinkable."

As an example of an historical fiction,

use of the fiction of environmental personality would be
an acceptable way to introduce new law in the guise of old
law, making the new law "thinkable," without altering the

form of existent legal doctrine.
Fourth, ultimately the fiction of environmental

personality could be eliminated either by the method of
rejection, whereby the pretense of personality would be

discarded altogether, or by the method of redefinition,

whereby it would be allowed that in
sense, natural objects are persons.
able,

a

technical legal
Since it is elimin-

its use need not obstruct later development of dif-

ferent legal concepts and principles to handle legal pro-

tection of natural objects.

Furthermore, its eliminability

ensures that the precept "The fiction must drop out of the
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final reckoning" is preserved.

Therefore, use of the fic-

tion of environmental personality satisfies
the test for
proper use of a legal fiction.

One might object that the definition of

'person'

never could allow for natural objects as persons,
and,
hence, that the legal fiction of environmental
personality

may not be eliminable.

In this connection it is interest-

ing to point out that to early jurists, the notion that
an

artificial entity which exists only in law could have "its"
own rights was bizarre.

tending the notion of

a

Many theorists objected to experson to corporations.

Fuller

argues that those who hold that the notion of corporate

personality necessarily is or involves

a

legal fiction

must assume that a future change in the meaning of 'person'
is impossible,

that the meaning of 'person' in a techni-

cal legal sense never could include artificial persons.

Presumably, the same assumption underlies the objection
that the fiction of environmental personality may not be

eliminable.

The assumption simply is untenable.

It is at

least conceivable that a linguistic change in the meaning
of

'person' could occur such that the notions of corporate

and environmental personality are not fictions.

30

Fifth, legal fictions are considered necessary

legal devices for ensuring the growth of the law.
some,

For

this feature of the legal fiction provides sufficient

.
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justification for its use.

For these theorists, an argu-

ment justifying adoption of the fiction of environmental

personality could be framed along the same lines as those
used for justifying adoption of legal fictions generally.
For others, most notably Fuller, the justification must
be

found in considerations of social and economic policy.

was shown earlier

(in

It

Chapter II) that many defenders of

the natural object move, NOM,

suppose that just such con-

siderations justify ascription of legal rights to natural
objects.

The same considerations could be offered for

justifying adoption of the fiction of environmental

personal ity
These five reasons establish that adoption of the

fiction of environmental personality would be compatible

with legal theory on what

a

legal fiction is, the purposes

for which legal fictions are used, and the justification
for using them.
(T)

Taken together they show that the case for

is not damaged by the Legal Fiction Objection.

However, another, different reason for saying that
(T)

withstands the Legal Fiction Objection deserves men-

tion.

One might argue that it makes no substantive differ-

ence to the legal right-holder status of natural objects

whether or not attribution of personality to them is or involves

a

legal fiction.

The notion of corporate personal-

ity provides a case in point.

Some theorists defer from

,
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arguing whether or not a corporation is
the grounds that,

J.

C.

a

real entity on

for purposes of ascribing legal capa-

cities to corporations, it makes no

corporation is

a

difference whether

real or a fictitious entity.

a

For example,

Gray writes:

...I shall not attempt to answer the question
whether corporations are realities or fictions,
because to do so is unnecessary for my purposes
...Whether the corporation be real or" fictitious
the duties of other persons towards it and the
wills which enforce the rights correlative to
those duties are the same.
The law is administered, and society is carried on in precisely
the same way on either theory. 31
M.

Wolff agrees:
If all juristic persons are treated as if they
have wills of their own and are capable of
acting, it makes no material difference whether
you say, "they are real animate beings with
wills of their own, and so on," or whether you
say, "some of them may be and some certainly
are not, but the law treats them all as if
they were " 32
.

Presumably these theorists would say something similar about environmental personality.

If,

for specific

purposes, the law treats natural objects as if they were
persons, then, even if "fictitious persons," they are still

endowed with certain legal capacities, including legal
rights.

They would argue that

it makes no substantive

difference to the legal right-holder status of natural objects whether they are moral persons, or whether the law

merely treats them as if they were moral persons.

.

.

79

Summary
It has been shown that,

if the notion of environ-

mental personality either is itself

a

legal fiction, or in

volves a legal fiction, it is or involves
one which poses
no special problem for the case for (T)
Use
of the al-

leged fiction of environmental personality is
compatible

with accepted legal theory in the nature, purposes,
and
justification for correctly using legal fictions.

Conse-

quently, the Legal Fiction Objection is not damaging

against

(T)

.

.

CHAPTER

V

THE AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION
This dissertation is a defense of the thesis
that

ascription of legal rights to natural objects is
compatible
with American legal theory on legal rights, thesis
(T)

establish

(T)

.

To

one must show that none of the prima facie

exhaustive positions on legal rights and legal right-holders
within the American legal tradition presents a satisfactory

objection to

(T)

As such, a discussion of the American

legal tradition is relevant to the defense of

(T)

only in-

sofar as it is helpful in identifying and clarifying the

various positions in American legal theory on legal rights
and legal right-holders.
The aim of this chapter is twofold: first, to por-

tray the American legal tradition as a tension between natural law and legal positivist theories of the nature of
law;

second, to determine whether an analogous natural law-

legal positivist tension characterizes theories of legal

rights.

Not only does the discussion provided here clarify

the extent to which theories of law correlate with theories
of legal rights;

it also helps to carve out the area of

relevant objections to

(T)

Specifically, those theories
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of law which do not figure in any theory of
legal rights do

not generate any pertinent objections to

(T)

The Two Positions on Law

There are two competing positions on the nature of
law within the American legal tradition: natural law and
legal positivism.

1

The central controversy between natural

law theorists and legal positivists is the nature of the
^-®l3.tion

between positive law and morality.

While they

agree that the development of American law has been influenced profoundly by conventional morality, they disagree

about the nature of the connection between positive law
and morality generally.

Is positive law which fails to

satisfy some moral criterion binding?

valid?

Can unjust laws be

Is there a sharp distinction between the moral and

legal spheres?

There is

a

clear split between natural law

theorists and legal positivists on these issues.
As used here, a theory is a "natural law theory"
if,

and only if, it affirms that the relation between pos-

itive law and natural or moral law is a necessary, and not

merely contingent or accidental, one and that the nature
of that connection is given by appeal to moral principles.

A theory is a "legal positivist theory" if, and only if, it

denies that there is a necessary connection between positive law and morality.

Thus, all and only natural law

.

:

:
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theorists affirm, and all and only legal
positivists deny,
(1)
the Law Necessity Thesis given at
(1)
There is a necessary connection between
positive law (or, law as it is) and
morality (or law as it ought to be) and
the nature of what connection is given
by appeal to natural law or moral principles.
(The Law Necessity Thesis)
,

There is some disagreement among natural law

theorists about what

(1)

means.

Sometimes

(1)

is inter-

preted as a thesis about the validation of positive law,
(

2

)

:

All and only positive law which conforms
to natural or moral law is valid.
(The Law Validation Thesis)

(2)

Sometimes

(1)

is interpreted as a thesis about the non-

autonomy of the legal and moral realms,

(3)

There is no strict separation between
positive law and morality.
(The Law Non-Separation Thesis)

(3)

Natural law theorists who hold

(2)

hold that positive law

which violates certain natural law or moral conditions is
invalid.

Those who hold

(3)

hold that positive law is

a

species of morality.
There also is some disagreement among natural law

theorists about which entailment relations hold between
theses

(1)

,

(2)

,

and

(3)

What they agree upon is that

only natural law theorists hold

(2)

and

natural law theorist's endorsement of

(3),

(2)

and that a

or of

(3)

is

.
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taken to be an endorsement of (1).

accepted view is that each of

(2)

Thus, the commonly

and

(3)

provides a suffi-

cient condition of a natural law theory, and
that each
implies

(1)

The characterization of natural law and legal posi-

tivism provided here is in terms of
natural law theorists affirm

positivists deny

(1)

(1)

,

(1)

only: all and only

while all and only legal

Three features of this characteri-

.

zation deserve mention.

First, this characterization is a

minimal condition account of natural law and legal positivist.

It captures what is agreed upon by theorists of

both camps as the central issue of their controversy.
Second, it leaves open the states of

(2)

sary conditions of a natural law theory.

and

(3)

as neces-

While it is non-

controversial whether only natural law theorists affirm
and

(3),

(2)

it is controversial whether all natural law

theorists affirm
.

here allows that

(2)

a

and

(3).

2

The characterization given

natural law theorist might concede the

validity of "bad law" or grant some sort of distinction
between positive law and morality.

Third, the characteri-

zation of these two theories in terms of

(1)

only permits

the inclusion of two distinctively American positions within the traditional,

law.

dichotomous division of theories of

They are American legal realism and American socio-

logical jurisprudence.

Although acknowledged

as having a
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positivist bent, these two positions typically
are not included in discussions of the natural law-legal
positivist
controversy on the nature of law.
Notice that

vism as

a

denial of

the
(1)

characterization of legal positidoes not mean that legal positi-

vists hold that laws cannot be morally evaluated
or that
one should frame positive law without concern
for moral

considerations.

Nothing intrinsic to the legal positivist

position prevents

a

positivist from advocating the use of

moral principles to resolve such questions as "What are
tests of the moral value of law?" and "Why ought people

obey the law?"

Their view simply is that is the province

— law conceived
terms — to answer the

of jurisprudence

in factual, and not in

normative,

questions "What makes a

law valid?" and "What is law?"

view that

a

A positivist rejects the

law which conflicts with some natural law or

moral principle is invalid and, thus, not really law.
To illustrate this point, consider the issue

whether the laws of the Nazi regime were genuine laws.
suming Nazi law was "bad law,"

a

As-

legal positivist would

maintain that it was law nonetheless.

On the other hand,

most natural law theorists would maintain that Nazi law
so deviated from the standards of morality that it failed

to achieve the status of law.

3

Could a legal positivist ever accept conformity to
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natural law or moral condition as a
condition of validity
of positive law? Suppose that in a
particular legal system,
conformity to a natural law or moral principle
is itself
one of a set of necessary legal conditions
of validity
a

acknowledged by that system

4
.

in such a case, natural law

theorists and legal positivists need not hold
different
views on the status of positive law which fails
to conform
to one of the natural law conditions.

If a natural law

condition is itself one of the legal conditions of validity
of positive law,

then a law failing to satisfy this condi-

tion is, in virtue of its failure to satisfy one of the

necessary conditions of legal validity, not really law.
Now take a different case.

Suppose that in addition to all

legal conditions of validity there is added

natural law or moral condition.

a

non-legal,

Then a natural law theo-

rist might hold that a putative law which satisfies all
the legal conditions of validity but not the additional

natural law or moral condition is invalid, not really law.
This position would be unacceptable to a legal positivist.

What is suggested here is that the general issue of
the relation between descriptive and normative propositions
is at the core of the natural law-legal positivist contro-

versy.

The positions of A. P. d'Entreves and J. S. Mill

nicely illustrate this point.

Natural law theorist

d'Entreves defines natural law as "the attempt to bridge
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the chasm between is and ought

'value'."

,

between 'fact' and

5

According to d'Entreves, natural law is
the
doctrine that law is a part of ethics; they
are not

auto-

nomous spheres.

6

He argues that "Perhaps the best des-

cription of natural law is that it provides

a

name for the

point of intersection between law and morals." 7
The early utilitarian J. s. Mill attacked
natural

law for confusing the descriptive and
of

'law'

prescriptive senses

and for making the fundamental mistake of deriving

prescriptive statements about what law ought to be from

descriptive statements about what law actually is.^

it is

precisely this blurring of the distinction between "is" and
ought

in law that is unacceptable to legal positivists.

The positions of d'Entreves and Mill point out that the

issue of the relation between descriptive and normative

propositions underlies the natural law-legal positivist

controversy on the nature of law.
The natural law-legal positivist split on the na-

ture of law turns on the issue of the relation between

positive law and morality. The Law Necessity Thesis,

(1).

Take a look now at what some natural law theorists and
legal positivists actually say.
The natural law position

.

The most famous expression of

the classical natural law view is given by St. Thomas
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Aquinas.

Aquinas writes:

As Augustine says, that which is
not just seems
to be no law at all.
Hence the force of a" law
°n
he exte
of its justice. .Every human
^ so much of
law has just
a nature of law as it is
derived from the law of nature. But if
in any
ut departs from the law of nature,
it is
no longer a law but a perversion of
law. 9

^

.

Aquinas' endorsement of the Law Necessity
Thesis,

(1),

based on his endorsement of the Law Validation
Thesis,

is
(2).

Contemporary non-Thomist natural law theorists such
as A. P. d'Entreves, Philip Selznick and Lon
Fuller each

endorse the Law Necessity Thesis,
sider Fuller's position.

law'

(3)

and

For example, con-

Fuller's endorsement of

based on an endorsement of (3).
ment of

(1).

is

In fact, Fuller's endorse

is the backbone of his definition of

'legal positivism'.

(1)

'natural

He writes:

By legal positivism I mean that direction of
legal thought which insists on drawing a
sharp distinction between the law that is
and the law that ought to be. .Natural law,
on the other hand, is the view which denies
the possibility of a rigid separation of
the ij; and the ought and which tolerates a
confusion of them in legal discussion. There
are, of course, many 'systems' of the natural
law.
But what unites the various schools of
natural law, and justifies bringing them under
a common rubric, is the fact that in all of
them a certain coalescence of the is_ and the
ought will be found.-*- 9
.

,

It is in terms of his endorsement of

dorses

(1)

.

(3)

that Fuller en-

.
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The legal positivist position

.

The British legal philoso-

pher John Austin denies each of (1),

argues that there is

(2)

and

(3).

Austin

sharp distinction between law and

a

morality, between law as it is and law as it ought
to be.
He writes:
The existence of law is one thing; its merit or
demerit is another
Whether it be or be not is
inquiry whether it be or be not conformable
to an assumed standard, is a different inquiry. ii
.

;

Neither the existence nor the validity of positive law is
in any way dependent on the existence of natural law or on

conformity to natural law or moral principles.
proposes

a

Austin

criterion of validity of positive law in terms

of a law's derivation, explicitly or implicitly, from the

sovereign.
a

His "command" or "imperative" theory of law is

rejection of both the Law Validation and the Law Non-

Separation Theses, and, ultimately, of the Law Necessity
Thesis,

(1)

A more recent formulation of the legal positivist

position is given by Hans Kelsen.

Kelsen writes:

Much traditional jurisprudence is characterized by a tendency to confuse the theory of
positive law with political ideologies disguised
either as metaphysical speculation about justice
It confounds the
or as natural-law doctrine.
question of the essense of law that is, the
question of what the law actually is with the
It is included
question of what it should be.
more or less to identify law and justice.

—

Kelsen'

s

—

"pure theory of law" presumes a clear distinction
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between questions of empirical law,
or law as it actually
is, and questions of "transcendental
justice,"
or law as

it ought to be.

13

Kelsen's view is that the validation
of

positive law is given by proper enactment,
and that the
concept of law has no moral connotation
whatsoever. 14 His

rejection of natural law is
ural law theses,

Austin

s

(1),

(2),

a

and

rejection of all three nat(3).

and Kelsen's views are representative of

the mainstream legal positivist position,
often identified
as "analytical" or "mechanical" jurisprudence.

The two

distinctively American positions, American legal realism
and American sociological jurisprudence, also fit into
the

legal positivist camp, although there are grounds for

distinguishing them from the analytical jurisprudence of

Austin and Kelsen.

For one thing, American legal realism

and sociological jurisprudence arose largely as a reaction

against both the formalist approach of analytical legal
positivists and the metaphysically riddled theories of
natural law.

Legal realists and sociological jurists were

concerned with discussing law by reference to publically

discernible patterns of behavior and to practices of
judges and other public officials, rather than

by refer-

ence to abstract principles, whether moral or legal principles.

For another thing, the intent of American legal

realists and sociological jurists was neither to eliminate
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ethical considerations from discussions
of positive law, as
the analytical legal positivists
tended to do, nor necessarily to include them, as natural law
theorists did.
Their
intent was to remove ethical considerations
from what they
viewed as factual concerns only— for legal
realists, what
courts are likely to do; for sociological
jurists, what

interconnections actually hold between legal institutions,
precepts and decisions, and other social phenomena.
Still, like mainstream legal positivists, American

legal realists and sociological jurists insist upon
the

elimination of ethical considerations from factual legal
concerns.

They view law and morality as autonomous realms.

Furthermore, they agree with mainstream legal positivists
that while the justification of positive law may fall

strictly within the realm of morality, the validation and

existence of positive law does not.

Their view is that

the relations which hold between positive law and morality

are contingent merely.

For these reasons, American legal

realism and American sociological jurisprudence here are
taken to be legal positivist positions.

American legal realism and American sociological
jurisprudence are two closely aligned positions.

Theorists

identified with one school often are identified with the
other as well.

For example, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Walter

Wheeler Cook, Jerome Frank, Herman Oliphant and Benjamin

:
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Cardozo have been referred to both
as legal realists and
as sociological jurists.
Some theorists even describe
sociological jurisprudence as a form
of
legal realism.

Hermann Kantorowicz, for example,
characterizes "the sociological school of law" as the school
which adopts the
formal postulate of legal realism that
"legal science is
ftot

a.

rational but an empirical science

1,16
.

Despite similarities between them, however,
the

emphasis of the two positions differs.

American legal

realists explain the nature and function of law in
terms
of generalizations about the way certain people

legislators, public officials) act.

(judges,

They view law as con-

cerned with descriptive statements of what courts do or
are likely to do.

The following smattering of quotations

from 0. W. Holmes, W. W. Cook and
tively,

K.

N.

Llewellyn, respec-

illustrates the basic American legal realist

position
What constitutes the law?... The prophecies of
what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law. 16
...lawyers, like the physical scientists, are
engaged in the study of objective physical
phenomena
As lawyers we are interested in
knowing how certain officials of society-judges, legislators, and others have behaved
in the past, in order that we may make a
prediction of their probably behavior in the
future I"7

—

.

What these officials [officials of the law]
do about disputes is
to my mind
the law itself ?
,

,
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The legal realist's emphasis on
"behavior analysis" and on
laws as "judicial decisions" reflects
their view that the

proper description of law, legal relations
and legal systems is stated in factual, descriptive
terms.

American sociological jurisprudence attempts
"to
infuse legal policy and decision making with
the perspectives,

thoughts and specific knowledge of the social dis-

ciplines, including history, psychology, sociology,
and

economics."

9

The sociological jurist's approach to the

study of the nature of

lav;

is to describe the interactions

which occur between law and legal institutions, as social
phenomena, and other social phenomena.

They hold that the

proper method of legal study is the social scientific
method, a method alleged to be evaluatively neutral.

cording to natural law theorist Philip Selznick, this
scientific method assumes an empirical, rather than a
normative, concept of law:
Social scientists are accustomed to treating
norms and ideals as facts.
But they are disinclined to evaluate those facts.
To engage
in evaluation, it is thought, will inevitably
involve the social scientist in the preconceptions of his own society and his own time;
moreover, any tendency to break down the wall
of separation between fact and value is intellectually dangerous. This point of view
has created a mood favorable to legal positivism
and opposed to a normative concept of law.
For
the latter the legal system is more than a set
of related norms to be treated as inassessable
factual givens 21
-1

.

Ac-

^
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According to Selznick, reliance on the
scientific
method is what sets sociological jurists
against natural
law theorists.
Fuller makes even a stronger claim.
He

argues that the popularity of legal positivism
generally,
and not just of sociological jurisprudence,
is owed largely
to the popularity of the scientific method.

Among the names frequently associated with American
sociological jurisprudence are those of Roscoe Pound and

Benjamin Cardozo.

The following quotes by Pound and

Cardozo, respectively, reveal the sociological jurist's

emphasis on viewing law in its social context:
Sociological jurists now insist on the unity of
the social sciences, and the impossibility of
a wholly detached, self-centered, self-sufficing
science of law.
They insist that the legal order
is a phase of social control and that it cannot
be understood unless
taken in its whole setting
among social phenomena. 22
Courts know today that statutes are to be
viewed, not in isolation or in vacuo as pronouncements of abstract principles for the
guidance of an ideal community, but in the
setting and the framework of present-day conditions, as revealed by the labor of economists and students of the social sciences
in our own country and abroad. 23
,

Thus, there is a clearly identifiable natural law-

legal positivist controversy on the question of the relation between law and morality.

Is there an analogous

split among legal theorists on the question of the relation

,

:

.
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between legal rights and non-legal,
natural or moral
rights?
The Two Positions on Legal Rights

All and only natural law theorists affirm
the Law

Necessity Thesis,

(1).

Do all and only natural law the-

orists also affirm a rights thesis corollary
to

(1)

,

the

Rights Necessity Thesis given at (4)?
(4)

Suppose

There is a necessary connection between
legal rights and non-legal rights (natural
or moral rights) and the nature of that
connection is given by appeal to natural
law or moral principles.
(The Rights Necessity Thesis)
(4)

is interpreted either as a thesis about the

validity of legal rights,

(5)

nonautonomy of legal rights,

or as a thesis about the
(6)

(5)

All and only legal rights which are based
on natural or moral law are valid.
(The Rights Validation Thesis)

(6)

There is no strict separation between
legal rights and non-legal rights
(natural or moral rights)
(The Rights Non-Separation Thesis)

Do all natural law theorists affirm, and all legal positi-

vists deny,

(5)

and

(6)?

If there is a clear natural law-legal positivist

split on the nature of rights analogous to the natural lawlegal positivist split on the nature of law, then American

theories of legal rights can be characterized as either

,

,

.
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natural law or legal positivist
theories, depending on
whether or not they affirm (4).
Furthermore, if there is
a natural law-legal positivist
split on the nature
of

rights, an adequate defense of the
main thesis,

would
require exploring the interconnections
between the theories of law and the theories of rights
to determine
whether, directly or indirectly, a theory
of law generates
a reasonable objection to (T)
a thesis about legal rights.
(T)

Thus, the question whether all and only
natural law theo-

rists affirm

(4)

is significant here.

Counter to what one might expect, theories of legal
rights do not separate neatly into two dichotomous groups--

natural law theories, accepted by all and only natural law
theorists, and legal positivist theories, accepted by all
and only legal positivists.

This is because not all nat-

ural law theorists accept the Rights Necessity Thesis,

(4)

Although all natural law theorists accept the Law Necessity
Thesis,

(1)

,

and, hence, all construe the connection be-

tween law and morality as a necessary one, not all accept
the Rights Necessity Thesis,

(4),

and, hence, not all con-

strue the connection between legal and non-legal rights as
a

necessary one.

On the issue of rights, then, there is

not the sharp division between natural law theorists and
legal positivists that there is on the issue of law.

"
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The emergence of theories of
human or moral rights
in the twentieth century which
bear little, if any, resemblance to the eighteenth century theories
of natural rights

illustrates this point.

So-called natural rights theories

gained prominence in the eighteenth century.

They posited

that "all men" have certain inherent
rights of which they
cannot be deprived upon entering civil society.
Included

among these alleged inalienable rights were
the rights to
life, liberty, happiness, and property.

These "natural

rights" were described as rights which a human has
in virtue of those characteristics that are specifically
and

universally human.

As Jacques Maritain puts it,

"the

human person possesses rights because of the very fact that
.

.

it is a person.
,

24

The eighteenth century natural rights tradition af-

firmed that there are rights ("natural rights")

humans have

because they are persons, and that the nature of the relation between them and legal rights is given by appeal to

natural law principles.

Sometimes the claim was that only

legal rights based on natural law were valid.

Sometimes

the claim was that legal rights and non-legal rights are

not distinct kinds of rights.

In any case,

century natural rights tradition was

a

the eighteenth

natural law tradi-

tion which endorsed the Rights Necessity Thesis,

well as the Law Necessity Thesis,

(1).

(4),

as
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Modern theories of human or moral
rights are strikingly different.
Unlike the theories of natural
rights of
the eighteenth centry, they are
endorsed by legal positivists and natural law theorists alike.
This is because
they, unlike their eighteenth century
counterparts,

are not

coupled with theses about the natural law
basis of all
rights.
Natural law theorist Lon Fuller, for example,
rejects the enghteenth century theories of
natural rights
and suggests that his natural law position
on law does not

presuppose any such theory of natural rights:
...I should like to have it understood at the
outset that any compliments which may here be
cast in the direction of natural law are not
addressed to the doctrine of natural and
inalienable rights.
This warning would
probably be unnecessary if it were not for
the fact that we have got into the habit of
identifying these two notions and assuming
that some conception of the natural rights
of man must lie at the heart of every system
of natural law... I am not advocating the
doctrine of natural rights,.... 25
It is because a natural law theorist may advocate a modern

theory of moral rights without thereby advocating an

eighteenth century version of natural rights that one cannot describe all natural law theorists as maintaining the

Rights Necessity Thesis,

(4).

This does not mean that theories of legal rights,

unlike theories of law, cannot be characterized at all
among natural law-legal positivist lines.

All legal

.

.
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positivists deny
theorists.

(4)

and all who affirm

(4)

are natural law

what is not the case is that only legal
positi-

vists deny (4), or equivalently, that all
natural law theorists affirm (4)
Thus, although there is not the clearcut split between natural law theorists and legal
positi-

vists on legal rights that there is on law, one can capture what split there is by separating those theories which

endorse

(4)

terms, a

from those which do not.

As

I

shall use the

strictly natural law theory of legal rights" is

one which endorses the Rights Necessity Thesis given at
(4);

a

"non-stric tly natural law theory of legal rights"

is one which denies

Thus, only natural law theorists

(4).

subscribe to strictly natural law theories of legal rights,

while both natural law theorists and legal positivists
subscribe to non-strictly natural law theories.
Summary
Insofar as there is a natural law-legal positivist

controversy on legal rights analogous to the natural lawlegal positivist controversy on law, it centers on the

Rights Necessity Thesis,

(4).

Only natural law theorists

subscribe to (4), while both natural law theorists and
legal positivists deny

(4)

"Strictly natural law theories"

affirm (4), and, hence, are held by natural law theorists
only;

"non-strictly natural law theories" deny (4), and,

,

.

99

hence, are held by both natural law
theorists and legal
positivists.
The distinction between strictly and
non-

strictly natural law theories of rights
captures what
there is of a natural law-legal positivist
split on the

nature of legal rights.

main thesis,

(T)

which is not also

As such, any objection to the

based on
a

a

natural law theory of law

strictly natural law theory of legal

rights can be dismissed at the outset as not pertinent
to
the defense of

(T)

,

CHAPTER

V

I

THEORIES OF LEGAL RIGHTS AND LEGAL
RIGHT-HOLDERS: THE POSITIONS
In this chapter

I

discuss the pr ima facie exhaus-

tive positions in American legal theory on legal
rights
and legal right-holders.

The programme is to describe

each position and then, after offering comments or criticisms of each, to pinpoint just what is asserted by each
position.

This provides the basis for determining, in

subsequent chapters, what the objections to the main
thesis,

(T)

,

based on each position are, and whether any

is successful.

The Theories of Legal Rights

Strictly natural law theories
a

.

In the previous chapter,

"strictly natural law theory of legal rights" was charac-

terized as one which endorses the Rights Necessity Thesis,
(4)

.

It affirms that there is a necessary connection be-

tween legal and non-legal rights, the nature of which is

given by appeal to non-positive law principles.

Basically,

there are two strictly natural law theories of legal rights.
One is a definitional position; the other is not.

though each affirms

(4)

Al-

only the definitional position
100
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involves claims about the meaning of 'legal
right.'
The Mor al Sense Position

.

What

Moral Sense Position" on legal rights

is a strictly natural

law theory of legal rights which defines

moral terms.
(7)

It endorses proposition

shall call "the

I

'legal right'

in

(7):

The meaning of 'legal right' is given in
moral terms.

It fits squarely in the camp of strictly natural
law theo-

ries because it unpacks the necessary connection between
legal rights and non-legal rights alleged at
of a univocal, moral sense of 'right.'

(4)

in terms

Moral Sense Posi-

tion advocates argue that legal rights and non-legal rights

both are rights in a moral sense.

Traditionally, strictly natural law definitions of
'legal right' are associated with the views of the seven-

teenth century jurists Grotius and Pufendorf.
to Grotius,

a

1

According

right is:

A moral quality of a person making it possible
to have or to do something lawfully [justly]. 2

Pufendorf offers

a

similar definition:

[Right is] an active moral power, belonging to
person, to receive something from another as
matter of necessity. 2

a
a

For Grotius and Pufendorf, legal rights are moral qualities
or powers recognized and secured by a politically organized

society.

Because they define 'right' generically in moral

terms, they are Moral Sense Position theorists.

"

.
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The Thomists Ryan and Boland are
contemporary advocates of the Moral Sense Position.
They argue:

right in the moral sense of the term may be
defined as an inviolable moral claim to some
personal good
When this claim is created, as
it sometimes is, by civil society it is
a positive or legal right; when it is derived from
man's rational nature it is a natural right. 4
.

.

For them, all rights are moral claims.

Legal rights

and "natural rights" are rights "in the moral
sense of the
term.

Whether legal rights are defined as moral qualities, moral powers, or moral claims,

'legal right'

the definition of

is given in moral terms.

Both legal and

non-legal rights are rights in a generic, moral sense of
"rights."

This is the Moral Sense Position on legal

rights
The Moral Validation Position

.

The other strictly

natural law theory of legal rights is what
"the Moral Validation Position."

Validation Thesis given at

(5)

:

I

shall call

It affirms the Rights

All and only legal rights

which are based on natural or moral law are valid.

It

seldom is made clear by advocates of this position just

what it means to say that rights are "based on" natural or
moral law.

Presumably, the view is that natural or moral

law principles either provide the test for identifying, or
the mark of, a valid legal right, or provide the justifi-

cation for proper ascription of rights.

As such,

the Moral

.

.
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Law Validation Position is a position on valid
legal
rights, rather than a position on legal rights per
se

Nearly all, if not all, Moral Law Validation Position theorists concede that legal rights formally "originate in the state," i.e.,

actment.

in legislative and judicial en-

What they deny is that positive law provides the

criterion of validity of rights, legal or otherwise.

This

distinction between the source and the validity of rights
is found in the discussion by natural law theorists Neill

and Rommen of "human rights" which also are legal or posi-

tive rights:

Human rights can have no foundation other than
natural law.
Legally, of course, they come from
the state, but if a legal 'right' is truly to be
a right it must be based on natural law
which
is only another way of saying that it must be
based on man's very nature ... Thus the soundest,
the only foundation of those human rights so
flagrantly violated today is natural law.^

—

Thus,

the Moral Validation Position defends the

Right Necessity Thesis,

dation Thesis,

(5)

(4),

by appeal to the Rights Vali-

It is the view that natural or moral

law provides the criterion of validity of both legal and

non-legal rights.
I

have stated that there are two strictly natural

law theories of legal rights, the Moral Sense and the

Moral Validation Positions.

Defenders of these two posi-

tions typically invoke a two- (or more) kind doctrine of

rights for distinguishing between legal rights and non-legal

.
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rights.

However, occasionally a theorist argues that
there

really is only one kind of right, namely
moral rights.
This is the position of natural law theorist
G.

H.

Smith,

for example:

But obviously the distinction between moral and
le ? al rights cannot be sustained; for ex
vi
termini all rights are moral rights, and~here
cannot be a right of any other kind.®
,

Smith's view is a clear endorsement of the Rights Non-Sep-

aration Thesis,

(6).

Does it represent a third strictly

natural law position on legal rights?
think not, on any of three reasonable construals

I

of his view.

On one construal, Smith's position is that,

properly speaking, there are not legal rights.

But then

Smith's position is not a strictly natural law position on
legal rights, since it fails to affirm the Rights Necessity
Thesis,

(4

)

On a second contrual, Smith's position is that

there are legal rights, but that 'legal right' is defined
in terms of moral rights.

What would it mean, then, to

say that all rights are moral rights?

Usually the expres-

sion 'moral right' is used to pick out

a

different from legal rights.
view since he does not endorse
rights.

kind of right

But this cannot be Smith's
a

two-kind doctrine of

Apparently, on this construal his view is that to

say "all rights are moral rights" is to say "all rights are

.
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rights in a moral sense."

m

a

moral sense.

Legal rights, then, are rights

But on this contrual of Smith's
view,

it simply reduces to the Moral Sense
Position, and does not

constitute

a

separate, third position on legal rights.

On a third construal of Smith's position,
to say

that legal rights are a kind of moral right

is to specify

that a necessary condition of an entity's having
legal

rights is that it have, or be capable of having,
moral
rights.

However, so construed, Smith's position is not

a

strictly natural law position on legal rights, since it
is

consistent with this position to deny the Rights Necessity
Thesis,

(4)

It is a position on legal right-holders

which could be endorsed by both natural law theorists and
legal positivists.
Thus, none of these three construals of Smith's

position renders it an alternative, third strictly natural
law position on legal rights.

jections to the main thesis

(T)

If there are plausible ob-

based on the view that

there are only moral rights, they are handled properly as

objections issuing from either the Moral Sense Position or
a

non-strictly natural law position on legal right-holders.

They do not require separate treatment.

Non-strictly natural law theories

.

A non-strictly natural

law theory of legal rights is one which denies the Rights

.

'
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Necessity Thesis,

(4)

As

I

contrue the American legal

tradition, there are six non-strictly natural
law positions
on legal rights.
Stated in the order in which they are
discussed here, they are the Interest, Power, Claim,
Corre-

lativity

,

Rules, and Prediction Positions.

The Interest Position

.

The Interest Position on

legal rights was made famous by Jhering, who defined
a
legal right as a legally protected interest.

A more recent

defense of the Interest Position has been offered by
H.

Maher.

F.

K.

He argues that all rights, and not just legal

rights, are interests:

We recognize that right is an 'umbrella word.
Therefore we should not use it except in its
most general sense of any interest or advantage recognized by law. 7

Maher's position might be described alternatively
as an Advantages Position view,

of

'right'

in its most general sense to "the interest or

advantages recognized by law."
J.

since he restricts the use

Another legal theorist,

Stone, also describes rights as advantages, viz., ad-

vantages conferred by law in order to protect de facto
interests.

g

For our purposes, the Interest Position is

taken to include the view that legal rights are advantages.
The Power Position.
J.

C.

The American legal realist

Gray argues that a right is not an interest, as

Jhering and others had thought; rather, it is the means by

7

.
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which an interest is secnrpH
secured.
^-icfhts

are powers.

Gray

s

own view is that legal

He states:

The full definition of a man's
legal right is
this.
that power which he has to make
a person
or persons do or refrain from doing
a certain
act or certain acts, so far as the
power arises
from society imposing a legal duty
upon a person
or persons 3
C.

K.

Allen's

definition of 'legal right'

merges the two notions of an interest and
a power.

He

argues that both notions are "inherent in
the notion of
right and are in no sense mutually exclusive."'^
Allen's

view is an amended version of Gray's position:
The essence of legal right seems to me to be
not legally guaranteed power by itself, nor
legally protected interest by itself, but
the legally guaranteed power to realize an
interest 11
.

The Power Position on legal rights has been attri-

buted variously to Hobbes, Spinoza, Winscheid, Savigny
and T. H. Green.
a

general

Often it is advanced as

view of rights as powers.

a

corollary to

For example, Green

argues that a right generally is "a power claimed and re-

cognized as contributing to

a

common good."

He argues

that legal rights are powers actually recognized by civil
society, and natural rights are powers which should be

recognized by civil society.
.

1

Sometimes the Power Position is advanced as

a

view

about the derivation of all other legal concepts, including
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the concept of a legal right.
G.

The contemporary theorist

Goble, for example, argues that since the basic legal

concept is power

,

all other legal concepts are derived from

and defined in terms of the concept power.
of

'legal right'

tion

His definition

is a clear statement of the Power Posi-

:

Right is, by definition] the power of a person
to initiate that sequential combination of powers
and acts involved in obtaining a judgment against
1

[

'

another person. 14

Some theorists argue that legal rights are the

"capabilities to claim an act from another," 15 or the "cap-

acity in one man of controlling, with the assent and assistance of the State, the acts of others."

1

The view of

legal rights as capabilities or capacities is considered

here to be a Power Position view.
The Claim Position

.

J.

Feinberg offers

sentative view of legal rights as claims.

a

repre-

He defends a

two-kind doctrine of rights according to which legal rights
and moral rights are rights in the generic sense of "valid

Arguing that validity is justification within

claims."

a

system of rules or principles, Feinberg describes legal
rights as claims justified by appeal to civil rules, and
moral rights as claims justified by appeal to moral rules
or the principles of an enlightened conscience.
H.

J.

17

McCloskey offers what he takes to be an

.

;
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alternative to the Claim Position on legal rights.

His

view is that rights are entitlements, "entitlements
to do,
have, enjoy or have done." 18

Whether legal, moral, social

institutional or in games, rights are entitlements of some
kind

However, for our purposes, the Entitlement Position
is included within the Claim Position on legal rights.

There are two reasons for this inclusion, one positive and
one negative.

The "positive" reason is that claim theo-

rists sometimes describe the Entitlement Position as a

version of their own position.

For example, Feinberg ar-

gues that the view of rights an entitlements is accomo-

dated by the view of rights as claims:
All rights seem to merge entitlements to do,
have, omit, or be something with claims against
others to act or refrain from acting in certain
ways.
In some statements of rights the entitlement is perfectly determinate (e.g., to play
tennis) and the claim vague (e.g., against some
vague group of potential or possible obstructors)
but in other cases the object of the claim is
clear and determinate (e.g., against one's
parents)
and the entitlement general and indeterminate (e.g., to be given a proper upbringing)
If we mean by "entitlement" that
to which one has a right and by "claim" something directed at those against whom the right
then we
holds (as McCloskey apparently does)
can say that all claim-rights necessarily involve both, though in individual cases the one
element or the other may be in sharper focus. 19
,

.

,

According to Feinberg, entitlements to do, have, enjoy or
have done are, or entail,

"claims to."

Arguing that claims
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are both "claims to" and "claims against,"
Feinberg con-

cludes that the Entitlement Position is subsumed
under the
Claim Position on legal rights.
Of course, McCloskey would not be happy with
this

classification of the entitlement view.

Arguing that rights

are rights to and not rights against, and that claims
es-

sentially are claims against, McCloskey denies that rights
are claims.

A legal right may provide the grounds for a

claim, or indirectly may give rise to claims, but it does

not consist primarily in such claims 20
.

Suppose one allows that claims may be either "to"
or "against," as Feinberg argues.

Then,

other difficulties with McCloskey'
a

s

setting aside

account, an appeal to

distinction between "claims against" and "entitlements

to" does not establish that rights are not claims, as

McCloskey assumes.

If anything,

it helps to substantiate

the view that rights are claims.
The "negative reason" for including the Entitlement

Position within the Claim Position on legal rights is that,
for our purposes, nothing relevant to a defense of

sacrificed by doing so.

against objections based on them.
s

view,

is

The rationale for considering

these positions on legal rights at all is to defend

on McCloskey'

(T)

(T)

But, as will be shown,

the main objection to giving non-

,

Ill

humans legal rights is that they
cannot have interests or
possess anything, since this objection
is handled appropriately with other Interest Position
Objections
to

(T)

one need not treat his Entitlement
Position separately in
order to provide a thorough defense
of

T he Correlativity P osition

.

(T)

Very often a position

on legal rights is advanced in conjunction
with the view

that legal rights and duties are correlative,
the main tenet
of the Correlativity Position.
For example, the famous

twentieth century jurist Wesley Hohfeld suggests
that the
word 'claim' be substituted as

a

then argues that a "claim-right"
and proper meaning")

synonym for 'right' and
(a

right in its "limited

is the correlative of a legal duty 21
.

Hohfeld

when
as A

s

version of the Correlativity Position is that

legal right'
s

is used properly,

the relation expressed

legal right against B is, without loss of meaning,

expressed alternatively as B's legal duty to
"

str ictu sensu

,

"

of legal duties.

A.

Rights

i.e., claim-rights, are the correlatives

Hohfeld distinguishes them from other so-

called "rights"--privileges

,

powers and immunities--in terms

of his now well-known schema of jural opposites and correla-

tives

:

Jural
Opposites

(right
privilege power
immunity
(no-right duty
disability liability

Jural
Correlatives

(right
(duty

privilege power
no-right liability

immunity
disability
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Hohfeld's description of rights as the
correlatives
of duties follows the positivist tradition
of Austin.

Austin's view is that

a

person has a legal right when some-

one else is obliged by law to do or forbear
toward that
person.

22

Austin endorsed the Correlativity Position view

that legal rights properly so-called are the
correlatives
or legal duties:

Every legal right supposes a duty incumbent on
party or parties other than the party entitled...
If that corresponding duty be the creature of a
law imperative, then the right is a right properly so called 23
a

.

The Rules position

.

The position that an adequate

account of legal rights must involve the notion of
rule is the Rules Position.

a

legal

Sometimes, it is advocated in

conjunction with another position on legal rights.

For

example, Feinberg links the notion of a legal right with
legal rules in his characterization of rights as valid

claims.

Since validity is justification within a system of

rules or principles, and rights are valid claims, legal

rights are claims justified within
or principles.

By extension,

a

system of legal rules

to have a legal rights is to

have a claim against someone, where the recognition of the

claim as valid is called for by some set of government le,

,

.

,

gal rules or principles.

24

Sometimes the Rules Position is advocated by itself.

For example, Benn and Peters argue that statements
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including the expressions 'rights' and 'duties'
prescribe,

within

a

system of rules, how persons shall behave in re-

lation to one another:
To say that X has a right to

£ 5 is to imply that
there is a rule which, when applied to the case
of X and some other person Y, imposes on Y a
duty to pay X £ 5 if X so chooses. 25

Statements attributing legal rights are treated as stating
or applying legal rules.
is that

The position of Benn and Peters

'right' has meaning only in the context of rules. 26

Sometimes the Rules Position is offered as an alternative to any position which attempts to define 'legal
right.'

For example, H. L. A. Hart argues that "legal

words can only be illustrated by considering the conditions

under which statements in which they have their characteris tic use are true."

27

Insisting on the futility of at-

tempting to define 'legal right,' Hart's approach is to

explain what a legal right is by giving the sufficient con-

ditions for the truth of statements of the form
legal right'
(a)
(b)

(c)

in terms of rules:

There is in existence a legal system;
Under a rule or rules of the system some
other person Y is, in the events which
have happened, obliged to do or abstain
from some action;
This obligation is made by law dependent
on the choice either of X or of some
other person authorized to act on his
behalf so that either Y is bound to do
or abstain from some action only if X
(or some authorized person) so chooses

'X

has a

^

:
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or alternatively only until X (or such
person) chooses otherwise. 28

Hart adds that a statement of the form
right'

'X has a

legal

is used to draw a conclusion of law in a
particular

case which falls under such rules.
_fr e

Prediction Position

.

The Prediction Position

is a distinctively American legal realist-sociological
jur-

ist position.
a

legal duty

,

0.

W.

Holmes argues that a legal right, like

is

nothing but a prediction that if a man does or
omits certain things, he will be made to suffer
in this or that way by the judgment of the court.
To determine what a right is, Holmes would have us ask two

questions:

What are the facts about the group in question?

What are the consequences attached by the law to the group?
A right is just "a consequence attached by the law to one
or more facts which the law defines.

Like Holmes, Llewellyn argues that statements as-

cribing rights are factual statements that in
ation certain court action is likely.

a

given situ-

He writes:

should like to begin by distinguishing real
"rules" and rights from paper rules and rights.
The former are conceived in terms of behavior;
they are but other names, convenient shorthand
symbols, for the remedies, the actions of the
courts.
They are descriptive, not prescriptive,
except insofar as there may occasionally be
implied that court ought to continue in their
practices.
"Real rules," then, if I had my
way with words, would by legal scientists be
called the practices of the courts, and not
I
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"rules" at all.
And statements of "rights"
would be statements of likelihood that in a
given situation a certain type of court action
loomed in the offing.
Factual terms.
No more 31
.

The Prediction Position, then, is that rights
are conceived
in terms of behavior,

and that statements about rights are

predictive statements about judicial or official behavior.
other views about legal rights
legal rights deserve mention.

Two other views about

.

The first, encountered al-

ready in connection with Hart's view, is that the attempt
to define

'legal right'

is misguided or futile.

Hohfeld,

for example, maintains that since definitions of fundamental legal terms such as

'right' are

"

sui generis

,"

attempts

at formal definitions of them always are unsatisfactory,

not totally useless.

if

He assumes that his procedure of ex-

plaining legal relations by organizing legal concepts in

a

scheme of jural opposites and correlatives replaced the
need for definition.
The second view is that rights have no independent

reality.

For some, this amounts to describing rights and

duties as "fictitious entities."

For example, Bentham

argues that:
A
An act is a real entity; a law is another.
duty or obligation is a fictitious entity conceived as resulting from the union of the two
former.
A law commanding or forbidding an act
thereby creates a duty or obligation. A right
is another fictitious entity, resulting out of
a duty.
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For others, this amounts to describing rights
as represen-

tations of the mind, purely psychological phenomena
lacking objective reality.

Talk of rights is not to be taken

I

literally.
This second view is associated most often with the

Scandinavian legal realists Hagerstrom, Olivecrona and
Lundstedt.

But sometimes it is associated with American

realists, particularly with Holmes and Llewellyn.

Their position that the notion of a right is analyzed in
terms of facts and behavior sometimes is construed as a

position which denies the independent reality of entities
called "rights."

If the entities cannot be analyzed in

terms of facts and behavior, then "they" are not rights

at all.

These two views, the "no definition view" and the
"no such thing as rights" views, may have been maintained

within the American legal tradition.

Since if they have

been, the views of those theorists who endorse them are re-

presented adequately in terms of the six non-strictly natural law positions on legal rights already discussed,

there is no need to treat them here as separate positions.

Theories of Legal Right-Holders
Two basic approaches in legal theory are used to

analyze the notion of

a legal

right-holder.

One is to ana-

lyze it in terms of one of the eight historical positions
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on legal rights.

The other is to analyse it in terms
which,

though compatible with some of those
positions, do not presuppose any specific one.

Theories of legal right-holders based on the
first

approach unpack the notion of

a legal

right-holder by in-

voking one of the eight historical positions on
legal
rights.
right,'

Where

a

position offers

a

definition of 'legal

this is done by substituting the definition or some

equivalent expression for all occurrences of 'legal right'
in statements of the form 'X has a legal right.'

For in-

stance, if the definition proposed is "a legally protected

interest,

valent to
right'

then

'X

'X has a

has a legal right' is logically equi-

legally protected interest.'

If

'legal

is defined as "power," then to have a legal right

is to have a power.

Where a position on legal rights is not

a

defini-

tional position, or where the proposed analysis of 'legal
right' does not substitute directly into statements of the

form 'X has a legal right,

dering the notion of
notion of

a

a

'

there is more leeway in ren-

legal right-holder in terms of the

legal right.

For example, on Feinberg's ver-

sion of the Rules Position, to say that X has a legal right
is to say that there is a governing legal rule or set of

legal rules such that official recognition of X's claim as

valid is called for by that rule or set of rules.

On
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Holmes's Prediction Position view, to say
that X has a legal

right is to predict that, if certain facts which
the law

defines transpire, then certain consequences (e.g.,
remedies, sanctions) determined by the courts which
affect X

will follow.
The second approach to unpacking the notion of a

legal right-holder does not presuppose any particular his-

torical position

on legal rights.

Typically it involves

an independent set of necessary conditions for an entity,
X,

correctly to be said to have legal rights.

most familiar of these are what

I

The two

call the "Moral Person

Position" and the "Moral Rights Position."

According to

the Moral Person Position, to have legal rights an entity
.

must be

a

.

moral person, i.e., be subject to moral law, be

rational, be capable of choice, or have

a

will.

According

to the Moral Rights Position,

to have legal rights an en-

tity must have moral rights.

The first position empha-

sizes the nature of the right-holder; the second emphasizes the nature of the rights which legal right-holders
have.

Although sometimes the Moral Rights Position is

assumed to be a version of the Moral Person Position, for
our purposes they are treated as separate positions.

Other less frequently advanced positions cite as

necessary conditions for X's having legal rights any of

*
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the following: X is capable of possessing
things; X is

capable of movement; X is

a

member of a community; X has

soul; X is capable of being party to
a lawsuit.

a

Each of

these views is a non-historical position on
legal rightholders.
The Historical Positions on Legal Rights

and Legal Right-Holders
In this section

I

offer comments and criticisms of

the eight historical positions on legal rights and legal

right-holders.

The discussion attempts to clarify just

what is asserted by each position and to identify those
theses which generate reasonable objections to the main
thesis,

(T)

.

Some positions

(e.g.,

the Claim Position)

are

discussed in detail; others (e.g., the Moral Sense Position)

are not.

In general,

the more detailed discussions

are of those positions which are most widely accepted in

American legal theory.
The strictly natural law theories
The Moral Sense Position

.

.

The Moral Sense Position

endorses the Rights Necessity Thesis,

(4),

by construing

the connection between legal rights and non-legal rights
as a conceptual one.

'rights.'

Both are rights in

a

moral sense of

It is a rock-bottom position, not accomodated

,
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by any of the other historical positions on legal
rights.
It is the only distinctively natural law
definitional pos-

ition on legal rights.
The Moral Sense Position is an unpopular position.
It has been the target of unwaivering criticism by
both

legal positivists and natural law theorists.

Legal positi-

vists criticize it for its failure to keep separate the factual and moral realms.

Natural law theorists criticize it

for its failure to recognize non-moral senses of 'right.'

Both legal positivists and natural law theorists object to
the suspicious metaphysics typically adduced to support

arguments for

a

univocal, moral sense of 'right.'

As a

consequence, very few theorists would take seriously objections to

(T)

based on the Moral Sense Position, even

if

it

could be shown that natural objects cannot meaningfully be
said to have rights in any moral sense of the term.
In order to be clear about what counts as a Moral

Sense Position Objection to

(T)

this position must be dis-

tinguished clearly from the Moral Person and Moral Rights
Positions.

The latter are not strictly natural law posi-

tions; nor do they provide an analysis of 'legal right.'

While Moral Sense Position theorists may endorse both the
Moral Person and the Moral Rights Positions, their view

neither entails, nor is entailed by, those positions.

.

121

Th_e

Moral Validation Position

.

The Moral Validation

Position is that all valid legal rights are based
on natural
or moral law.
it is a "validation" position because it
as-

serts that the mark, test, or justification for
ascription
of valid rights is given by natural law or moral
principles.

The distinctive feature of this position is that it is
a

view on the validity of rights, and not on the nature or
analysis of rights per se

.

Unlike the other positions, it

does not presuppose any particular theses about the analysis
of

'legal right' or the conditions under which statements of

the form 'X has a legal right' are true.

It remains to be

seen whether it generates any objection to the main thesis,
(T)

.

The non-strictly natural law theories

The Interest Position

.

.

Critics have argued per-

suasively that the Interest Position is unacceptable because
it fails to distinguish between the means of securing a

thing and the thing secured.
selves interests,

Legal rights are not them-

as Jhering and others have argued, but

are among the devices of a legal order for securing

interests

Distinctions between different meanings of 'interest'

or different kinds of interests have surfaced in

attempts to salvage the Interest Position.

Defenders

distinguish between "de facto interests," what
an entity,
X, actually desires, wants or
likes, "prudential

interests,"

what it is to X's advantage to have, and

"de_

jure inter-

ests," advantages or concerns which, on moral
grounds, X

ought to have.
However, these distinctions fail to rescue the Int-

erest Position from criticisms of it.

If rights are not

themselves interests, then they are neither

a

specific kind

of interest, nor interests in any specific sense of

terest.

amples.

This point is borne out by considering

a

'in-

few ex-

In the case of "de facto interests," a person may

want to rob

a bank,

though no corresponding legal right

exists; and a person may have a legal right to sue a landlord, while lacking any desire to do so.

"prudential interests."

Similarly for

It may be to an employer's advan-

tage to hire female workers at lower salaries than their

male counterparts, even though the employer has no legal

right to do so; and
a

a

defendant may have

a

legal right to

court-appointed attorney, though it is to his/her dis-

advantage to be represented by such attorneys, especially
if the courts and attorneys it appoints are corrupt.

case of "de jure interests" fares no better.

The

It may be

that a slave ought to have certain advantages, e.g., edu-

cational opportunities and social security, even though in

.
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fact he/she lacks any such legal right;
and someone may
have a legal right to sue a destitute
elderly person even
though, on moral grounds, it is suspect
whether this is an
advantage or concern which he/she ought
to have or pursue 33
These examples show that attempts to define
'legal right'
as an interest are not rejuvenated by
invoking a three.

fold distinction between senses of

'interest' or kinds of

interests
If the view of legal rights as interests fails,

then so does the more refined view of legal rights
as in-

terests which the law recognizes, delimits and secures,

whether the law secures them for themselves

(as F.

K.

H.

Maher contends) or for the purpose of protecting other
interests

view which

(as J.
i_s

Stone contends).

The Interest Position

plausible is that legal rights are, or are

among, the chief legal means for protecting, delimiting
and securing interests.
The view of legal rights as the chief legal means
for securing interests is not, however, a definitional

view.

Suppose that in a pre-industrial society, a bow and

arrow constitutes the chief means for securing food.

Or,

suppose, as often is alleged, that hard work is the chief

means to success.
advanced.

In neither case is a definitional view

It may be that one way to identify a bow and
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arrow is to test its effectiveness in procuring
food, or
that a mark of success is that it was bred
of
hard work.

But it is quite odd, and

I

and arrow' and 'hard work'

think,

false to say that 'bow

just mean "the chief means for

securing food

or "the chief means of securing success,"

respectively.

By analogy, it may be the mark of identifi-

cation, or test, of a legal right that it secures some interest; or,

it may be an explanation of why rights are

"valuable commodities" that they are the chief legal in-

strument for protecting human interests.

But this is quite

different from saying that 'legal right' just means "interest" or "the chief legal means for securing interests."
The significance of the Interest Position is not
as a definition of

'legal right.

'

Rather, its signifi-

cance is that it provides a commonly accepted test for

justifying ascription of legal rights, one which captures
a

familiar use of 'legal rights' by lawyers.

In creating

rights and resolving disputes involving rights, lawyers

often ask "What interests are at stake here?" "What interests would be served, overlooked or compromised by taking
this action?"
fact,

The Interest Position does highlight the

so familiar to lawyers,

that operationally signifi-

cant differences result for subjects recognized as having

legally relevant interests, or on whom legally relevant

"
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advantages are conferred.
In fact,

it is just these operational advantages

which legal right-holders have and non-legal
right-holders
lack that lawyer Christopher Stone sought to isolate
in his
use of the terms 'legal right' and 'holder of legal
rights.

In Should Trees Have S tand ing? Stone writes:

First and most obviously, if the term [legal
is to have any content at all, a.n entity
cannot be said to hold a legal right unless and
un til some public authoritative body is prepared to give some amount of review to actions
that are colorably inconsistent with that
"right
^ipht]

.

...But for a thing to be a holder of legal
-"
rights something more is needed than that
some authoritative body will review the actions
and processes of those who threaten it.
As I
shall use the term, "holder of legal right,"
each of three additional criteria must be
satisf ied
They are, first, that the thing can
institute legal action at its behest second,
that in determining the granting of relief,
the court must take injury to it into account;
and, third, that relief must run to the benefit
,

.

.

.

;

of it 34
.

When Stone states that natural objects are not, but should
be,

legal right-holders, he means to emphasize these three

specific legal advantages which the natural environment
lacks but ought to have.
logy,

To use Julius Stone's termino-

they are advantages which the law recognizes, delim-

its and secures for the purpose of protecting other inter-

ests or claims, which advantages natural objects do not
(yet)

have.

"

.
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What is important here about

C.

Stone's account is

not whether his analysis of 'legal right' is correct,
but

that he adopts an Advantages Position view of legal
rights
and legal right-holders to defend the view that natural
ob-

jects can, and should, have legal rights.

Since the Advan-

tages Position is taken here to be

a

®st Position,

then at least one ver-

if Stone is correct,

version of the Inter-

sion of the Interest Position accomodates thesis
The Power Position

.

(T)

Like the Interest Position,

the Power Position is unpopular as a definitional position.

Critics have argued successfully that rights are not powers
because one may have powers to do what one has no legal
right to do, and one may have legal rights one is powerless to enforce.

One may have the power to kill someone

in the absence of any corresponding legal right;

and,

if

the courts are corrupt, one may have the legal right to a

fair trial but no power to obtain
it is "fair

a

trial or to ensure that

.

Advocates of the Power Position might counter that
legal rights are hypothetical powers only, i.e., powers

a

person would have if the courts and authorities acted in

accordance with law.
reply.

As

S.

I.

But to this critics have a damaging

Benn puts it:

But this would be the same as saying that his
rights are the powers he would have if he had
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his rights.
Rights, in other words, may explain
why persons have the powers they do, but they
are not identical with powers. 35

Even the distinction between "positive powers,"

powers actually possessed or available, and "normative
powers," powers one ought to have or which one would
be
just-

ified in asserting, is unhelpful in showing that rights
are
powers.
a

A riparian may have the legal right to challenge

corporate polluter even though, in fact, he/she lacks the

"positive powers" to exercise that right.

Such might be

the case if the riparian were financially destitute and un-

able to avail himself/her self of the legal machinery pro-

vided for initiating action against the polluter.

In cases

of civil disobedience, one may be morally justified in

breaking

a

law, and,

hence, be said to have certain "nor-

mative powers," even though one has no legal right to
break a law.

Thus, although legal rights may presuppose

certain powers of legal right-holders, they neither are
identical to, nor necessarily imply, powers.
The most promising recourse for the Power Position

theorist

is

to withdraw the definitional claim and to

assert instead the weaker claim that often legal rights
secure, guarantee or create legal powers.

The strength of

this restatement is that it is a concession to critics that
the relation between rights and powers is not a defini-

tional one which, nonetheless, preserves the familiar,
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lawyer's notion of the relation between
legal rights and
legal powers.
in ordinary legal usage, legal
powers are
associated both with rights of representatives
(e.g., a gents, trustees, guardians, lawyers,
public officials,

public bodies) and with rights arising
out of contractual
agreements (e.g., the "right or power of
attorney").
They
are associated with rights conferred on
persons because of
their special legal status, function or
circumstances.

These powers sometimes are called "special
rights" or "del-

egated rights."

The powers of a trustee to act on behalf

of the testator, of a landlord to evict a tenant,
of a

policeperson to make an arrest, of

a

court to issue war-

rants are examples lawyers use of these special or dele.

gated rights.

The restatement of the original Power Posi-

tion view in terms of the weaker claim that often legal

eights secure, guarantee or create legal powers captures
this ordinary lawyer's view of the relation between legal

rights and legal powers.
One weakness of this restatement is that it con-

flicts with the Hohf eldian view, widely accepted among
legal positivists, that 'right' properly used does not refer to powers at all.

These theorists would maintain that

so-called "special" or "delegated" rights really are only
powers.

They are powers accorded individuals or public
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bodies for creating, divesting or
altering the legal relations and legal status of others,
including the legal rights
and legal right-holder status
of others.

While these powers

presuppose the legal rights of those
individuals and public
bodies to exercise those powers, they
are not legal rights,

in any proper sense of

'rights.'

What is significant for our purposes
about the restated Power Position view is that its
plausibility does
not rest on determining which, if either,
view of legal
powers is correct--the lawyer's view that
legal powers are
"special" or "delegated" rights, or the Hohfeldian
view
that legal powers are not legal rights at all.
The re-

stated Power Position merely claims that often
legal rights
secure, guarantee or create legal powers.

Its plausibility

is not affected by whether powers are described
correctly

as "special rights" or as "mere powers."

The Claim Position

.

The Claim Position is one of

tne most widely endorsed positions on legal rights.

It is

commonplace now to distinguish "claim-rights" from mere
privileges

(or,

liberties), powers and immunities, also

often called "rights."

Feinberg states that "nearly all

writers maintain that there is some connection between
having

a

claim and having

a

right."

For a majority of

theorists, then, the question is what that connection is
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between rights and claims, and not whether
there is one.
There is a second feature of the Claim
Position
which makes it an attractive position.
it may be that many
of the other historical positions on
legal rights can be
rendered adequately in terms of the Claim
Position.
For
example, some of the views offered by Power
Position theo-

rists actually suggest a Claim Position on legal
rights.

Kocourek defines 'legal right' as "the capability to
claim
an act from another."

But he also defines a claim as "a

legal capability to require a positive or negative act
from

another."

Taken together, the suggestion is that rights

are claims.

Kocourek himself encourages this rendering of

his view when he instructs that "it will be found convenient to substitute for 'right' the term 'claim .'" 38
The two legal theorists Pound and Paton each sug-

gest that the Interest Position is, or could be construed
as,

a

version of the Claim Position.

Pound argues that

both the "senses of 'legal right'" as interest, and as the
chief legal means of securing interests, can be defined

m

terms of "claim." 39

He also argues that:

Interests are claims or demands or desires
involved immediately in the individual life
and asserted in title of that life.^O
Paton, in his discussion of "the element of interest as an

element of right," offers a similar statement about interests

:
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An interest is a claim or want of an
individual
or group of individuals which that individual
or group wishes to satisfy. 41
Thus, Pound and Paton suppose that the
Interest Position

can be considered a version of the Claim
Position.
It already has been shown that there are
reasons

for linking the Correlativity and Rules Positions
with the

Claim Position on legal rights.

Even the Moral Sense Posi-

tion views of Ryan and Boland invoke the notion of a claim
for identifying the moral sense of

'right.'

Thus, the

Claim Position retains some of its attractiveness because
it has the umbrella feature of capturing some of the main

features of the other historical positions on legal rights.
Still, the Claim Position has been criticized on

many fronts.

It is important here to consider what some

of these criticisms are, and to determine which, if any,

construal of the Claim

Position survives the criticisms.

In discussions of the Claim Position, critics and

advocates alike typically distinguish between at least two
senses of 'claim.'

In one sense

(call it "claim^"), a

claim is an actual demand; this is the sense of 'claim' in
"to make a claim."
a

claim is

a

In another sense

(call it "clain^"),

demand which, if made, would be valid, justi-

fied or at least defensible; this is the sense of
in "to have a claim."

(A

third sense of

duced later in this chapter.)

'claim'

On this two-sense

'claim'
is intro-
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distinction, having a claim is contrasted with making
a
claim.
There is an important connection between having

claim and making

a

claim, between

say that one has a claim (claim
2

tual demand

(a

claiir^)

)

claims..,

and claims

is to say that,

a

To

.

if an ac-

were made, then it (the clain^)

would be valid, justified or at least defensible.

Thus,

having a claim may involve making a claim.

Critics ask whether rights are claims in either
sense of 'claim.'

S.

I.

Benn argues that they are not.

Rights are not claims^ because persons possess rights to

things they never do or could demand as due.

A creditor

has a right to be paid a debt by his/her debtor, even

though the creditor may never actually demand payment.

In-

fants have rights, though they themselves are incapable of

claiming (i.e., claiming^) them.

Nor are rights clairr^

according to Benn, since "this would locate the concept not

m

the language of description but in that of norms." 4

But Benn

'

s

criticism is spurious.

rist holds that rights are claims^.

2

No major theo-

Although many hold

that rights are claims2, this need not locate the concept
of

aright

in

the language of norms, as Benn argues.

One

could maintain, as indeed Feinberg and other claim theorists do, that the characterization of rights as claims2
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links the notion of a right to a system of
rules or principles.
In this case, to say that a right is
a claim
is to
2

say that,

if a clain^ were made,

it would be valid,

justi-

fied or at least defensible within a system of
governing

rules or principles.

Here the notions of validity, justi-

fication and def ensibility are no more "in the language
of
norms" than when one validates, justifies or defends

a

specific line in a formal proof by citing the relevant rule
of fftfs^snce used on proceeding lines to enable the deduction.

icisms

Thus,

the Claim^ Position withstands Benn

'

s

crit-

.

As we have seen, McCloskey offers a different crit-

icism of claim views.

He argues that rights are not

claims because rights essentially are rights to, not
rights against, and claims essentially are claims against.
But why suppose, as McCloskey does, that rights essentially
are rights to, or that claims essentially are claims a-

gainst?

Rights created by contractual

creditor's right to be paid

a

agreement (e.g.,

a

debt by his/her debtor) are

"rights against" and many theorists argue that non-contrac-

tual

rights to something (e.g., rights to social security)

impose duties on others and, hence, are not simply "rights
to."

Why suppose that the defendant's claim to impartial

treatment before the law, the landowner's claim to

.

134

noninterference by trespassers, the beneficiary's
claim to
an inheritance are not bona fide examples
of "claims
to"?

McCloskey's criticism of claim views is untenable.
A.

M.

Honore offers a third type of criticism of

the Claim Position.

Like McCloskey, Honore grants that

certain claims protect rights.

But he denies that rights

are identified with claims or with aggregates of claims
He argues:

The right unifies the claims and, very often
outlives them.
It existed before some of the
claims presently recognized were evolved; it
will continue to be the same right, in an
intelligible sense, when new modes of protection are evolved.
There would be no right
without some claims securing it, but the right
to bodily security is no more identifiable
with the claims now directed to securing
people's bodies than my right to £100 under
a contract is identifiable with my present
claim against the debtor for SIOO. 4 3
-

Honore

'

s

criticism is unacceptable because it fails

to heed the distinction between the two senses of

'claim':

claim^, an actual demand, and claiir^, a demand which, if
made, would be at least defensible.

It may be true that

rights exist before claims^, will outlive claims^, will

persist unchanged when the claims^ change, and are not
identified with claims^.
are not claims^.

But it does not follow that rights

To establish that Honore must show what

it may not even be meaningful to assert, viz.,

exist before claims 2

,

that rights

will outlive claiir^/ will persist
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unchanged when the claims^ change.

Appeals to international law and modern
manifestos
on human rights provide a fourth type
of argument against
the Claim Position.
Two lines of criticism are offered.
The first line is that conditions of genuine
human need

generate

welfare rights" which are not mere claims; hence,

legal rights are not claims.

The second line is that,

since people have claims to economic and social benefits

which are not yet transformed into legal rights to those
benefits, rights are not claims.

Neither line of criticism is effective against the
claiir^ view.

The first line construes genuine human needs

in conditions of scarcity

(e.g.

,

the needs for a nutritious

diet and adequate housing) as, or as providing

grounds for,

genuine rights ("welfare" or "human" rights) which are not

mere claims.

It establishes only that "welfare rights,"

if not claims at all, are not claims^.

It is consistent

with this line to argue that these welfare rights are moral
claims, i.e., claims2, which, if they are not also claims^,

ought to be.

That is, one could argue that welfare rights

are demands which are valid, justified or defensible on

moral grounds and which, if they are not already, ought to
be valid,

justified or defensible on legal grounds.

The

claiir^ view of rights is not undone by the first line of

criticism.

"

The second line of criticism construes
genuine human needs as, or as providing grounds for,
claims ("welfare
claims") which are not themselves recognized
legal rights.

But the view that welfare claims are not
legal rights does
not establish that rights are not claims^ A
claim view
2

defender has
valid,

a

legitimate counter: "Many demands which are

justified or defensible on moral grounds lack legal

recognition and, hence, are not legal rights.

Welfare

claims are an example of such legal claims, i.e., claims^

They are human or moral rights which are not yet legal
rights

.

Suppose the critic persists, arguing that, al-

though genuine claims, welfare claims are not rights at
all

— neither

not claims^
of rights."

legal nor moral rights
At

— and,

hence, they are

best, they are "permanent possibilities

The claim

2

view defender now can offer

a

different counter: "If welfare claims are not rights at
all, and, hence, are not claims

some other sense of 'claim.'
to invoke a third,

fered by Feinberg

2

,

then they are claims in

Either they are claims^, or,

"propositional sense of 'claim'" of(call it "claim^"),

they are claims^,

i.e., demands that one has, or should have, certain

rights.

4 4

But the existence of welfare claims

(i.e.,

claims^ or claims^) which are not rights (i.e., claims 2
does not establish that rights are not claims 2

.

This

)

.
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rebuttal successfully defends
the claim., view of rights
against the second line of
criticism.
Thus,

the popular view of rights
as claims

with2
stands each of the four types
of criticisms of the Claim

Position-Benn's, McCloskey's, Honore's,
and the "human
need" objections.

For our purposes, then, the
Claim Posi-

tron on legal rights is taken to
be the view that legal
rights are claimSj,- to have a legal
right is to have a
claim2
The Correlativit y Position

.

The Correlativity Po-

sition rarely is construed as a definitional
position on
legal rights.
Nearly all theorists who subscribe to some

version of the doctrine that legal rights and
legal duties
are correlative define 'legal right' other

than as "correl-

ative of a legal duty."

For example, although Austin en-

dorses the view that legal rights and duties are correlative, he seems to mean by

'legal right' a power, capacity

or advantage of extracting from another or others acts or

forbearances.

in fact, Austin argues that some duties,

so-called "absolute duties"

(e.g., duties to oneself,

to a

sovereign, to animals) do not correlate with anyone's

rights to their performance or forbearance.

This position

would be untenable for Austin if he assumed that 'legal
right'

just means "the correlative of a legal duty."

.

138

Hohfeld

version of the Correlativity
Position also is a non-def initional
view.
He argues that
'right' is

an undefinable,

fundamental legal term which is
best explained in terms of an equivalence
relation or "correlativity with legal duties. Although
entailment relations
hold between statements ascribing
legal rights and statements ascribing legal duties, he
seems to deny that the
two notions are synonymous.
It is precisely for his failure
to make the strong-

er definitional claim that Max
Radin criticizes Hohfeld

correlativity position.

's

Radin argues that Hohfeld incor-

rectly views rights and duties as correlatives,
i.e., as
two distinct notions intimately connected,
when they really
are synonyms. 46 Radin' s own position is one
of the few

clear examples of a Correlativity Position advocate
who

construes that position as a definitional one.

He writes:

[Where B ought to do an act that A desires him
to do] A's demand-right and B's duty are not
correlatives because they are not separate, however closely connected, things at all.
They are
two absolutely equivalent statements of the same
thing.
B's duty does not follow from A's right.
The two terms are identical in what they seek
to describe as the active and passive form of
indicating an act; "A was murdered by B"; or
"B murdered A. "47

Many tangled and difficult issues are raised by the

Correlativity Position, especially ones concerning the
plausibility of thesis

(T)

Since these require in-depth
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consideration, further consideration
of the Correlativity
Position is reserved for
Chapter VIII.

—

rgue that

Rules

m

Critics of the Rules Position

general there are no entailment
relations
Which hold between statements
about legal rights and statements about legal rules. They
argue that there can be
legal rights in the absence
of legal rules, and legal
rules
which bear no direct relation
to legal rights.
Where legal
rules are related to legal rights,
they argue that the nature of that relation is not
fixed.
Some rules deny
rights; others confer or sustain
rights.
Typically, these
critics concede that sometimes the
word 'right' is used
to state a rule of law, as is the
case where 'right' in
the right of the accused to a speedy
trial" is used both
to name a right and to specify or
suggest a rule concerning

correct court procedure in criminal prosecutions.

But they

insist that it is quite incorrect to say that
in general
legal rights presuppose, or are presupposed
by, legal rules
or by any other formal principles of procedure.

While le-

gal rules may describe certain rights, give the
conditions

under which rights hold, or state the legal consequences

which follow the infringement of rights, they are not coupled with rights by any entailment relations.
Some of the Rules Position theorists, e.g., Hart
and Feinberg, would agree that 'legal right' is not defined
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in terms of legal rules.

But that concession
is made, not

on the grounds that
there is no entailment
relation which
holds between legal rights
and legal rules, but on
the
grounds that no formal
definition of 'legal right'
is possible or desirable.
The Rules Position critic
would insist,
and the defender would
deny, that no general
entailment relations hold between legal
rights and legal rules.
The Rules Position retains
its

popularity despite

the critic's objections.

First, it emphasises the
highly-

favored positivist view that
legal rights are civil, political rights only, that they
presuppose a rule-governed
legal system.
Second, it provides a way of
creating new
rights, of justifying ascription
of rights, and of testing
the validity of rights.
Third, it accomodates theorists
who seek a generic identification
of rights in terms of
which both legal rights and moral rights
are rights properly so-called. The Rules Position is
attractive
as a

framework for analyzing rights, even

if

as a position on the analysis of
rights.

it has weaknesses

For these reasons

critics who construe the Rules Position narrowly
as a position on the meaning of 'legal right' overlook
important
features of the position.
The prediction position

.

The Prediction Position

is that statements ascribing legal rights are
predictive

statements about what courts and other public officials
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will do

m

a

given case.

Critics argue that this
view is
unacceptable as an analysis
of 'legal right.'
They point
out that it is not
absurd to suppose that
someone has a
legal right, e.g., to
receive alimony, even
though there
is no likelihood or
expectation that a court
will award alimony.
Nor is it absurd to
suppose that a certain
person
can expect to receive
special treatment by the
courts even
though the person has no
legal right to that treatment,
e.g.,

in cases where the courts
are corrupt.

However, it is not clear that
legal realists and
sociological jurists intend the
Prediction Position to be
a

definitional position.

Certainly legal realism and

sociological jurisprudence have been
heralded for their
rejection of abstract theorization
about rights in favor of
talk about concrete cases,
discernible official behavior
and predictable legal consequences.
On a Prediction Position account, if lawyers ask "Has
my client a right to her
father’s property?” they are asking,
"According to
the

words used by the father in his will,
made, dated and
signed by him in such-and-such a place
and in conformity
with accepted legal procedure, may I demand
from the trustee
or judge that the property be transferred to
my client?
Is it likely that she will be awarded the
property?"

This

may be all that Holmes and Llewellyn intend when they
argue,
respectively, that "every [legal] right is

a

certain

"

142

consequence attached DY
bv tne
thp law +-^
to °ne or more facts
which
the law defines, 4 8 and
that talk of behavior should
be
substituted for talk of legal
rights because the latter
"is
a block to clear thinking
about matters legal" while the
former is not. 49

Summary
Eight historical positions on legal
rights have
been discussed.
They are two strictly natural law
positions (the Moral Sense and Moral
Validation Positions) and
six non-stnctly natural law positions
(.the Interest, Power,
Claim, Correlativity, Rules and Prediction
Positions.
Except for the Moral Validation Position,
each generates a

position on legal right-holders.

In addition, accounts

of legal right-holders which do not
presuppose any of the

historical positions on legal rights have been discussed.
This discussion has made clear just what is as-

serted by each position, separating off the plausible from
the non-plausible versions of each position.

In addition,

it provided the requisite information for determining,

in

succeeding Chapters, VII, VIII and IX, whether there are
any successful objections to the main thesis,

(T)

,

based

on the positions in American legal theory on legal rights

and legal right-holders.

CHAPTER

VII

theories of legal rights and
legal

RIGHT-HOLDERS: THE HISTORICAL

POSITION OBJECTIONS
In Chapter VI,

the eight historical positions
on

legal rights and legal
right-holders were discussed.
in
this chapter, plausible
objections to the main thesis, (T)
based on seven of these positions
are stated and defeated.

Objections to

(T)

based on the eighth position, the
Correl

ativity Position, are discussed
separately in Chapter VIII
Unless otherwise indicated, each
objection is referred to
by the name of the historical
position on which
it is

based.
al

The discussion begins with the non-strictly
natur-

law position objection to

(T)

Non-Strictly Natural Law Position
The Interest Position Objection
VI that the definition of

.

Objections

It was shown in Chapter

'legal right' as an interest or

as the chief means for securing interests in implausible.

Nonetheless, it is true and significant that legal rights

often delimit, secure and protect interests.

On

a

non-

def initional construal of the Interest Position, then,
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.

-

:

,
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there is

a

reasonable objection to

SeCUrS and

*"***

(T)

interests.

are carriers of interests.

"Legal rights de _

Legal right-holders

But natural objects such
as

trees. swamps and bugs
are not carriers of
interests; they
have no interests to
delimit, secure or protect.
Hence,
they cannot have legal
rights."
To determine whether the
Interest Position Objec-

tion is damaging to
be answered:

three interrelated questions
must

(T)

what is an interest?

what is meant by ’inter

est’ when it is claimed
that natural objects do not and
cannot be said to have interests?
Why suppose that natural

objects cannot have interests?

in the discussion which

follows, the answers to these
questions are those given by
Benn and McCloskey.
Their views are taken as representative
of Interest Position views
generally.

defective against

Bothare shown to be

(T)

What is an interest?

Recall that Interest Position

theorists invoke either a three-sense or

a

three-kind doc-

trine to describe interests.

De facto interests

ests^ are what an entity,

actually desires, wants or

likes.

X,

(inter-

Prudential interests (interests^ are what it is to

X's advantage to have.

De jure interests

(interests^ are

advantages or concerns which, on moral grounds, X ought to
have
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Benn's and McCloskey's
views are variations on
this
three-sense doctrine. Benn
offers a distinction between
"at least two senses of
'interest'/' roughly equivalent
to
the distinction offered
above between de facto
interests
and prudential interests,
respectively.
He argues that in
one sense, "an interest
organizes or gives a consistent
direction to otherwise diverse
activity," the sense of
'interest' in "John is interested
in music."
a second
sense, an interest is something
conducive to an entity's
well-being, the sense of
'interest' in "Having one's teeth
checked periodically is in a
person’s interest." McCloskey
argues that the concept of
interests includes not only
what is for a person’s welfare,
but also what is, or ought
to be, of concern to the person.
His view is

m

that interests

are not prudential interests only;
they are also de facto
interests and de jure interests.

What is meant by 'interests' when it is
claimed
that natural objects cannot be carriers
of interests, and
why suppose that natural objects cannot
have interests?

Consider first Benn's view.

Invoking his distinction be-

tween "at least two senses of 'interest'," what

called de facto interests
ests

(interests^

,

(interest^)

I

have

and prudential inter-

Benn's argument is that natural objects

are not carriers of de facto interests.

His argument is
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straightforward: It is proper 0
u
to ascribe
rights only to
subjects having interests
which uiydnize
organize or
nr give a consistent direction to activity,
de facto interests or
interests
But
few,
if any, natural objects
r
are carriers of
interests^ certainly trees and
rocks are
+-

•

not.
Thus, it
is improper to ascribe
rights to at least most natural
objects.
If one concedes that

doing certain things is con-

ducive to the well-being of
natural objects, then they may
be carriers of prudential
interests, interests^
But this
concession is unhelpful in showing
that natural objects
could be said to have rights.
Thus, Berm's argument is that
natural objects can-

not be right-holders because proper
ascription of rights
requires subjects who/which are
interest-carriers which
natural objects are not.
His reasons for denying inter,

e °tl

carrier status to natural objects involve the
notion

of a "chooser."

Only entities having

a

capacity for choice,

i.e., actual or potential choosers, properly
are described
as having rights.

Persons are moral persons, i.e., bear-

ers of moral rights, because of their speical status
as

choosers.

They are capable of making decisions, selecting

ends, and manipulating their social environment to achieve

those ends.

But "choosers" are interest^-carriers

only carriers of interests

x

(de facto interests)

.

are

Hence,

s

'

147

right-holders.

According to Benn, if one allows
'right'
to range over non-choosers
such as natural

objects,
term is being devalued, losing
its specificity."'*'

"the

Benn's account is not as forceful
as it may seem.
He does not deny that natural
objects could be legal rightholders.
in fact, he states explicitly:

Now

see no insuperable obstacle
to the extension
5 to natural objects.
9
The status of
riQht-bea^e
Nearer has already been extended
in
man eingS t0 infants and business law from
corpor^
I

^

,

ations
R ather

,

he argues that if one extends

'right'

in law to

include natural objects as legal
right-holders, then the
notion of a right undergoes an unwelcome
conceptual shift
from its characteristic ascription to
moral personalities
(

choosers,

interest^-carriers)

non-moral entities

to a new ascription to

("non-choosers," non-interest^carriers)

An ascription of legal rights to natural
objects which did

not involve such a shift would amount to

a

tion of natural objects as moral persons

(choosers, inter-

es

^l

_carr i er

)

which they are not.

Thus,

characteriza-

if one ascribes

legal rights to natural objects, one must abandon the
view
of a right-bearer as a moral person, a view which "is rooted very deeply in our mode of perceiving ourselves in the

world, and is not to be lightly surrendered."^
Thus, Benn's argument is that in order to make
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natural objects legal right-holders,
there must be a conceptual shift in the notion of a right
from that of
chooser" to that of "non-chooser."

This shift would

"make it difficult to identify a certain
type of normative

relation that exists between persons, but
which cannot
exist between person and thing ." 4 He
concludes

that al-

though ascription of legal rights to natural
objects is
possible, it requires surrendering our well-entrenched

view that rights are ascribed to moral persons.
Suppose one concedes that natural objects are not

interest^-carriers

;

they are not moral agents, choosers,

bearers of moral rights.

It does not follow that

(a)

objects cannot be ascribed legal rights, or that

nat(b)

ascription of legal rights to natural objects requires

surrendering
persons.

a

deeply rooted notion of ourselves as moral

Proposition

(a)

follows only if it is assumed

that the capacity for choice or for having interests^ is

a

necessary condition for proper ascription of rights.
While this may be true for ascription of moral rights, it
is not true,

at least in any literal sense, for proper

ascription of legal rights.

The main feature of the doc-

trine of legal personality is that it allows for ascription of legal rights to entities acknowledged as non-moral

persons (non-choosers, non-interest^-carriers)

.
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Suppose the view that legal
right-holders are carriers of de facto interests
CL
e
interest^ is insisted
upon at this point.
Is there any sense in
which it is or
might be true that having de
facto interests is a necessary
condition of having legal rights?
If so, then, since artificial persons such as trusts,
funds, idols, ships and corporations have been recognized as
legal right-holders,
.

.

,

it

IS a condition which they
satisfy.

They would be said to

have de facto interests, to be
moral persons. What could
this mean? Surely idols and ships
are not moral persons;
they do not make choices, have
desires, or exercise a will.
If they properly are said to
have de facto interests or
to exhibit moral personality, it
is because the law treats
them as if they had de facto interests
or moral personality,
When, in fact, they lack both.
In some cases, for example
where the artificial person is comprised of
individual

humans (e.g., corporations), talk of the interests

artificial person is

a

of the

convenient shorthand for talk,

however cumbersome, of the interest
Sl of individual humans
who comprise or represent it.

In other cases,

for example

where the artificial person is not comprised of individual
humans

(e.g.,

trusts, ships, idols), talk of the interests^

of the artificial person does not reduce to talk of the

interests^of constituent human members.

Thus,

insofar

as some legal representative is empowered to act on behalf
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°f

^

artlflcial person

'

the law attributes
the acts and

Will of the representative
to the artificial
person, treating the latter as if it
had a will or a capacity
to act.
I" b ° th CaSeS

eral reading,

'

the result ls the same.

Although on

a

lit-

it is false that all
artificial persons

themselves have de facto interests
or moral personality,
on a non-literal reading,
it may be true that all
artificial persons which are legal
persons have de facto interests or moral personality.
if it is true, it

is true just
insofar as the law attributes
to artificial persons a capacity to act or de facto interests;
it is true just insofar as the law treats artificial
persons as if they had a
capacity to act or de facto interests.
And if

it is true,

then the condition that legal
right-holders must be carriers of de f acto interests is a
condition which artificial persons could be said to satisfy.
The case of natural objects as artificial
persons

need be no different.

Insofar as a legal representative

may be empowered to act on behalf of

a

natural object may be said

Similarly, the inter-

ests

1

to act.

natural object, the

of the legal representative, acting in his/her of-

ficial capacity as representative of the natural object,

may be imputed to the natural object itself.

If a neces-

sary condition of an entity's having legal rights is that

.
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the entity has, or is
capable of having, de facto
interests, then, properly
understood, it is a condition

which
natural objects, like other
artificial powers, could be
said to satisfy.
Thus, even if one assumes
that natural
objects are not themselves
carriers of interest
it does
Sl
not follow that they cannot
have legal rights, proposition (a)
,

Nor does proposition

(b)

follow.

Humans may con-

tinue to perceive themselves
correctly as moral persons
without that view being jeopardized
by the ascription of
legal rights to natural objects.

One thing appeal to the

doctrine of legal personality suggests
is that the expressions 'right' and 'person' do not
have the same meaning in legal discourse that they
have in moral discourse.

Benn mistakenly supposes that because
the expressions
right' and 'right-holder'
to moral persons,

course,

in all discourse,

including legal dis-

they apply only to moral persons.

pose, as many theorists do,

of

in moral discourse apply only

However, sup-

that there is a generic sense

right' according to which moral rights and legal
rights

are two kinds of rights.

Moral persons have moral rights;

legal persons, some of whom also may be moral persons,
have
legal rights.
a

Appeal to

a

generic sense of 'right' and to

distinction between two kinds of rights and two kinds of

.

152

persons not only preserves
the view that 'right'
has a
common meaning when used in
moral and in legal contexts.
It also explains how the
view that only humans are
moral
persons can be preserved if
one extends legal rights
to
natural objects.
Benn would reject an appeal
to the doctrine of legal representation as a way
of explaining how natural
objects, themselves incapable
of making choices, nonetheless
could be said to have legal
rights.
He argues that a move
to empower a legal representative
to make choices on behalf of subjects themselves
incapable of "natural choice"
has just the shortcoming of
requiring the unwelcome conceptual shift in the notion of a
right-holder from that of

interest-carrier to that of interest., -carrier

.

By al-

lowing a guardian ad litem to make
choices on behalf of
natural objects, the powers of the agent
are constrained
by the condition that they be exercised
only for the ad-

vantage of the natural objects, i.e., for
what is in their
interests (i.e.,mterests
Since there are not similar con2
)

straints on

.

principal's exercise of his/her own rights,

a

appeal to the doctrine of legal representation
requires

giving up the view of right-holders as moral persons,
choosers, interest^-carrier s
Benn

'

s

view is unfounded, for reasons suggested

,
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already.

First, either it is false
that a necessary condition of an entity's having
legal rights is that it
has,
or is capable of having,
interests^ or, if true, it
is a

condition which natural objects
could be said to satisfy,
second, one need not abandon
the view that only humans
are
moral persons in order to
show that non-humans could
be
legal right-holders.
if one permits a
distinction between
either two different kinds
of persons (viz., moral
persons
and legal persons) or two
specific
senses of 'person'

(Viz.,

a

philosophical or moral sense and

a

legal sense),

then one is able both to preserve
the view that only
humans are moral persons (moral
right-holders, choosers,

interest-carriers) and to explain how
non-humans meaningfully can be said to be right-holders,
viz., legal rightholders.
Third, legal representatives may
use their
powers to secure either the interest
Sl of the principal
(e.g.,

in the case of "ordinary humans")

the principal

(e.g.

or the interests

in the cases of some "non-

ordinary humans," such as infants and mental
incompetents,
and of at least some "artificial persons,"
such as trusts

and municipalities).

Thus, no clue as to whether a prin-

cipal's interestSj^ or interests
2

are secured is gleamed

from the fact that a legal representative makes claims and

choices on behalf of the principal.

;

,

.
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Thus, Benn's reason for
rejecting an appeal to the
doctrine of legal representation
to explain how natural
objects meaningfully could be
said to have legal rights
is

unsatisfactory.

Adoption of the doctrine of
legal representation does not require
abandoning the view that only
humans are moral persons,
choosers, interest-carriers
havers of moral rights.
A reasonable, alternative
inference to both
and

(b)

is open to Benn.

it is that

(c)

(a)

ascription of

legal rights to an entity, unlike
ascription of moral
rights, does not presuppose that
the entity is a moral
person, a chooser, an interes^-carr
ier
(c)

.

One who adopts

in effect concedes that the
issue of the moral per-

sonality of plants, the soil and the like
need not be re
solved in order to defend (T)
Not only is Benn's view not damaging to
the case
for

(T)

it might even be harnessed in support
of

(T)

Consider the case where the law protects landlords
by

permitting recovery for loss due to damage to apartment
units by tenants.

The assumption is that it is to

lord's advantage to be so protected.

what it takes to be in
es ^ s 2‘

a

a

land-

The law protects

landlord's interests,

N° w suppose a particular landlord,

a

i .e

.

,

inter-

wealthy, hu-

manitarian landlord, has no desire to be so protected or
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to so protect herself.

she collects no damage
deposits

from tenants, initiates
no legal action against
tenants
who abuse apartment units,
and absorbs whatever
repair
costs are incurred.
The landlord has no
interest^ in being
protected against damages to
apartment units, even though
the law provides for the
protection of the landlord's interests^ This is a plausible
case where the law provides
for the protection of interests.,,
even though there are
no corresponding interests^

Suppose it is objected both that
the reason why
we can speak truly of a landlord's
having or lacking interests is because he/she has, or
is capable of having,
2

interests^ and that it is because the
landlord has, or
is capable of having,

interests^^ that the law protects the

landlord's interests,,.

Basically, this two-part objection

is that the law protects an entity's
interests
2

only if

that entity has, or is capable of having,
interest Sl
This objection has no force.
it is not true in
.

general, and Benn would deny, that having or being
capable
of having interests
1

interests.,.

is a necessary condition of having

Furthermore, it is not true in this particular

case that the landlord's interests
2

stem from her inter-

ests^ since she has no relevant interests
^

5

Benn pro-

vides no reason for supposing that, where the law protects
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interests
2

,

it protects only those
interests, of interest '

carriers.

what one has is a case
where either there are
no corresponding interests
or, if there are, the
1
case for
saying that the law protects
this landlord's interests,,
is
independent of a case for saying
it protects some interes ts
of landlords.
1
In certain cases,

tect interests
2

only.

then, legal rights in fact
pro-

By conceding that at least
some nat-

ural objects are carriers of
interests
2

,

as Benn does, one

could argue that it is possible
that some legal rights for
at least some natural objects
could be devised for protecting the interests,, of those
objects.
Of course, unless one holds that having interests.,
qualifies an entity
for having legal rights, this does
not constitute an argument for ascribing legal rights to
natural objects.
it
merely points out that legal rights often
do protect inter-

ests^ which interests at least some natural
objects are
purported to have.

As such, it leaves open a move for

connecting up the interests

2

of some natural objects with

legal rights of those objects to delimit, secure
and protect their interests^

McCloskey
gainst

(T)

.

'

s

position does not fare much better a-

He offers two reasons for not talking of legal

rights of "things," even where

a

trustee properly can be

^
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said to oversee the legal
affairs of things:
St
h
h a
ParkS buildin gs, paintings,
etc.
etc
do not
'do
nSr have
h ave interests
?
in' the strict sense
te *ests
such that we could literally
speak
of the trustees caring for
the interest of
h
thing.
Secondly, and partly for this
reason
the trustee could hardly
be said to be the reh
'

-

^

r

s^

(I

s?

^;s

— - ***

am concerned here only with
that part of McCloskey's

argument which is appropriate to

a

discussion of natural

objects specifically, not to
paintings, buildings or other
artifacts.)
McCloskey's two reasons are that things
do
not have interests "in the strict
sense," and, since they
do not, trustees cannot be said
to represent the
things.

What is the meaning of 'interests'
according to
which legal right-holders have, but
natural objects lack,
interests? McCloskey writes:
The concept of interests which is so
important
here is an obscure and elusive one.
Interests
are distinct from welfare, and are more
inclusive in certain respects--usually what is dictated by concern for a man's welfare is in his
interests.
However, interests suggest much
more than that which is indicated by the person's welfare.
They suggest that which is or
ought to be or would be of concern to the
person/being.
It is partly for this reason-because the concept of interests has this
evaluative-prescriptive overtone that we decline to speak of interests of animals, and
speak rather of their welfare.

—

Here the suggestions is that since natural objects do not
and cannot have concerns, they cannot have interests.
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Roughly, McCloskey's
view is
*
,
ls thatn a+
^
tnat natural
objects
lack the
de facto interests (interests
in terests
and de jure interests (in1
terests
necessary both for having
3
rights and for having
legal representatives.
McCloskey grants that certain
actions may be conducive to a
thing's welfare and, hence,
"m its interests," interests.,. But
he prefers substituting talk of what is in the
thing's welfare for talk of
a thing's having interests
because, properly speaking, to
have interests an entity must be
capable of having or possessing things, a capacity which
"things"
-

v

.

•

1
)

)

lack.

Two things are going on in McCloskey's
argument

against ascribing legal rights to "things."

First, he

holds that right-holders are carriers
of interests
1

interests

.

3

concerns.
things.

or

They are entities who/which have or
ought

to have

Second, they are entities who/which can
possess

Since natural objects can neither be said to
have

concerns nor to possess anything, they cannot be
said to
have legal rights.
What about, e.g., mentally incompetent persons who
do not have the concerns necessary for ascribing rights?

Does McCloskey's account require saying that they, like
n ^tural objects,

think so.

do not have rights?

McCloskey does not

Since they are "possible potential possessors

of interests," he grants that "we do attribute rights and

°

.

:
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interests to infants, lunatics,
and even to incurable
lunatics. " He writes
Part of the reason for this
is the thought that
such beings, unlike the
congenital idiot, etc.,
are possibly potential
possessors of interests.
Hence, until it is clear that
they
really be said to have interests/ can never
we treat them
as if they do
.

The reason why the case of
natural objects is different is
that they are not even possible
potential possessors of

anything

McCloskey is firm on the point that
the possibil
ity of possessing something,
particularly rights

and in-

terests, is a necessary condition of
ascribing rights or

interests.

He states that,

A right cannot not be possessed by
someone;
hence, only things which can possess
things
can possess rights 9
.

McCloskey thinks it is this feature of right-holders
as
possessors of things which decisively excludes lower

ani-

mals from being right-holders.

He asks,

"Can a horse pos-

sess anything, e.g., its stable, its rug, in a literal

sense of 'possess'?"
that is.)
same.

It cannot.

(McCloskey does not say what sense
The case for natural objects is the

Since they are not possible possessors of anything,

and since interests and rights are possessed, natural ob-

jects cannot have either interests or rights.
Thus, McCloskey'

s

view is that natural objects are

.
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incapable of having the de
facto interests or de
jure interests necessary for having
rights and for having legal
presentatives.
The reasons why they
cannot be said to
have these interests is
that they cannot be said
either to
have concerns or to possess
anything.
The reason why appeal to the doctrine of legal
representation is unhelpful
is that it is extended
properly only to entities which
are
possible possessors of things,
which natural objects are
not.
Is McCloskey's view damaging
to

think so.

(T) ?

i

do not

It was argued in connection
with Benn's view

that an entity’s having de facto
interests is not a necessary condition of its having legal
rights.
The same is
true for de ju re interests.
Setting these issues aside,
however, McCloskey’s argument fails to
provide adequate
grounds for supposing that natural objects
could not be
said to possess anything, particularly
rights.
Although
he does not provide anything like an
analysis of the con-

cept of possession, McCloskey does offer some
examples of

possessed things and of why we do not speak of "things"
as

possessing anything.

To show that McCloskey's position

fails to establish that natural objects are not possible

possessors of anything, it is important to consider his
examples

.
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McCloskey thinks rights are
possessed.
So are
stables and rugs.
These are among one's
possessions.
Setting aside "category
mistake" worries here, su
E
pose McCloskey is correct
so far.
According to McCloskey,
Who or what can possess
things, and in virtue of
what do
they possess things? He
states:
My right to life is mine;
I possess it.
it is
U
° f my P°ssessions-indeed
?"
m!re so
possess them by virtue of my
rights?10

^

The suggestion is that people
possess things (e.g., horses
stables and rugs) b ecause they
possess rights. The rights
to possess things are what
entitle one to possess those
things.
Thus, only entities having rights
can possess
things

But McCloskey 's argument is confused.

The initial

reason given why natural objects could
not be said to have
rights was that they could not possess
anything.
Here the

suggestion is that being able to possess things
presupposes that one has rights.
Since natural objects

do not

now have rights, obviously, on the latter
account, they
could not be described as possessing anything.

Yet to be

described as possessing things, they apparently must first
be awarded rights.

looms large.

The circularity in McCloskey's account

It will not do to argue,

as McCloskey finally

seems to do, that one cannot describe natural objects as

.
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right-holders because they do not
possess things, and then
restrict the notion of a possessor
to (present) rightholders

McCloskey offers several other
examples to show
that, e.g., animals cannot possess
things.
Two of them
purport to show "the grounds of our
uneasiness"

in speak-

ing of the legal rights of animals
in cases where legal

claims made on behalf of animals are
appropriate:

Suppose that, as a result of deliberate
legal
enactment, the kangaroo came to be accorded
something like the privileged position of
the
cow in India, the kangaroo having full
rights
of movement, on the roads, on private
property,
^ suggest that we should be
reluctant to
speak of the legal rights of kangaroos.
This
is clear from our manner of speaking
of native
birds and animals in sanctuaries today. We
speak of our being obliged to leave them alone,
not of them as having legal rights, not of them
as being legally
entitled to be left alone.
The law confers duties on us, not rights in
the animals 11
.

Of course,
s

a good

rights.

that animals presently do not have legal rights

reason for not speaking of them as having legal
But neither their current lack of legal right-

holder status, nor our reluctance to speak of them as
having legal rights, shows that they cannot have legal
rights.

What, then, is McCloskey'

s

reason for supposing

that our reluctance bears on whether or not animals can

have legal rights?
The answer supposedly is found in the example about
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the kangaroo.

In speaking about
kangaroos,

just as in
speaking about birds and
animals in sanctuaries,
we speak
of our being obliged
to leave them alone,
not of their
having rights, e.g., the
right to be left alone.
Although
we are obliged to
perform or forbear from
performing certain actions regarding
them, they do not have
rights to
this performance or
forbearance. stated in general
terms,
McCloskey assumes that, where
X and Y are entities,
not all
duties of Y to X entail rights
of X against Y 12 However,
even if this assumption is
correct (a topic discussed in
Chapter VIII), all it establishes
is that an argument for
ascribing rights to natural
objects cannot be based on the
view that all duties imply
correlative rights.
It does
not show that natural objects
cannot have rights.
Thus,
even if McCloskey 's description
of how we do and should
talk of kangaroos and of birds
and animals in sanctuaries
is correct, this does not show
that natural objects cannot
be said to have legal rights.
.

One interesting feature of McCloskey'

s

example is

that it actually provides grounds for
supposing what

McCloskey intends to deny, viz., that it may
be appropriate
to speak of legal rights of kangaroos.
These grounds
are

given by McCloskey

's

talk of "privileges."

others have argued that ’right'

"

Hohfeld and

strictu sensu " ought to

'
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be distinguished from
privileges and other "legal advantages."
However, Hohfeld never actually
states whether

privileges are

species of rights, or not rights
at all.
Max Radin attributes to him the
latter view, and criticizes
Hohfeld for holding it.
For Radin, Hohfeld 's distinction
between rights and privileges conflicts
with accepted
usage; privileges clearly are rights.
Other theorists,
e.g., Maher, argue that 'right'
includes the meaning
"privilege." which view one holds bears
on how one assesses McCloskey's example of the kangaroo.
If privileges
are a kind of right (Radio’s view), or
if a legitimate
a

meaning of 'right' includes the notion of
privileges
view)

,

(Maher's

then by saying that kangaroos have certain
legal

privileges, one would be conceding that they have
rights,
in an acceptable sense or use of the term

'rights.

McCloskey's example, which construes kangaroos as having
certain privileges awarded by deliberate legal enactment,
provides grounds for describing them as right-holders.

McCloskey's second example concerns legal systems
in which animals which kill men are tried and,

if found

guilty, executed:
If an animal is given an unfair trial under such

system and its legal representative demands a
new trial, he could perhaps say that the animal
had not received its legal rights (lawyers seem
inclined to speak in this way) but it seems more
a
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ac c urat e and less misleading
simply to sav fhatPr ° PS
in'the*'
orfg
rigmal trial. Compare with a° b
trial of a man 13

^

--ed

McCloskey concludes that it is
"more accurate and less misleading" to say in such cases
that the law had not been

properly observed than to say the
animal had not received
its legal rights.
But has he shown
this?

Some theorists,

e.g., Maher, argue that where
there are two ways to describe a legal situation, one which
is the way lawyers

ordinarily speak and one which is not,
one should opt for
the description and terminology
used by
lawyers.

On an

ordinary lawyer's language" view, then,
it would be "more
accurate and less misleading" to say
that the animal had
not received its legal rights, than
to use some alternative description not used by lawyers.

Why does McCloskey think the proper description
is
that the law had not been properly observed?

To state,

simply, that entities are not described as having
legal

rights does not explain why they cannot have legal
rights.
Yet this is at least part of what McCloskey does say.

He

attempts to clarify why we do not speak of tried and convicted animals in such legal systems as having legal

rights by considering the case of "things."

But this is

what he says about things:
Things do not have legal rights in our system,
but not because this is a peculiarity of our

1

y
i
b C
Se
which *****
to come-close to : ?h
thl " S havin le 9^
9
eights
is not so descr?bed"l4

seS

The question, of oourse,
is whether things could
be so deCould natural objects
meaningfully be described
as having legal rights,
even if they are not now
so described?

Perhaps McCloskey's reason
for saying that in such
legal systems one would not
describe the animals as having
had their legal rights violated
is embedded in his directive "Compare with a trial of
a man."
if so
it is not
clear how the comparison helps
McCloskey's case.
trials
of humans
to say that a trial was unfair
is to complain
of injustice.
it is a way of saying that a
plaintiff's or
a defendant's right to a
fair trial was denied, overlooked,
infringed or otherwise violated.
in such cases, the party's legal right to a fair trial is
not at issue.
What is
at issue is whether that right was
violated.
On this comparison of the case of a convicted animal
with "a trial of
,

m

,

man," it would be fitting to say that the
animal's rights
were denied.
Since this is just what McCloskey intends to
a

deny, it is not clear what comparison McCloskey
intends.

For these reasons, McCloskey's view that natural

objects could not be said to have legal rights because they
could not be said to possess things, and thus could not be

,
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McCloskey's

Interest Position
Objection to (T) is im Plausible.
Since the positions of
Benn and McCloskey are
taken as representative
of the positions
generating reaonable versions of the
Interest Position Objection
to (T)
and neither poses a
successful objection to
(T)
T withstands the Interest Position
Objection to it.
,

—Objection.

(

)

The restated, non-defini-

tional Power Position view
is that legal rights
often create, guarantee or secure
legal powers, and that
those
powers presuppose the legal
rights of those who have them
to have and to exercise
them.
This formulation of the
Power Position seems to
generate a reasonable objection
to
(T)
Legal rights create, guarantee
and delimit legal
powers.
But natural objects cannot
have legal powers.
Therefore, they cannot have legal
rights." However few,
.

if any.

Power Position theorists would
offer this objection.
This can be shown by reconsidering
the "ordinary
lawyer's view" and the Hohfeldian
view of legal powers.
On the ordinary lawyer's view, legal
powers are
"special” or "delegated" rights.
They are rights conferred on persons because of their
special legal status,

function or circumstances, or because of
certain contractual agreements involving them.

Legal powers are not
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identified with the powers
of ordinary h Uma ns
in their nonlegal capacities.
S i milarly
where the view ±s
certain legal powers is
a prerequisite for
having or exercising legal rights, it
is legal representatives
and parties to contractual
agreements who/whioh constitute

^

,

the

appropriate entities for having
these legal powers. On
this view, natural objects
are not the sort of entity
to
which legal powers properly
are ascribed, just as individuals in non-official capacities
(i.e.,

when they are not
acting as legal agents or in
certain contractual positions)
are not the appropriate bearers
of legal powers.

It is

persons in official capacities,
and not represented entities or individuals in
non-official capacities, who proare said to have legal powers.
Given the ordinary lawyer's view
of legal powers
and of who has them, extension
of the doctrine of legal
representation to natural objects is an
extension to the

appropriate sort of entity, viz., the legal
representative,
of the requisite legal powers for
safeguarding the legal

rights of natural objects.

Even if it is only the legal

representative who could be said to have legal powers,
it
is the legally represented entity
who/which has or quali-

fies for the legal rights in question.

Thus,

the ordinary

lawyer's view of legal powers does not preclude ascription

.

,

.
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of legal rights to
natural objects
jeers.

^

+T
tr
it
would not endorse
,

the proposed Power Position
Objection to (T)
The Hohf eldian view is
that legal powers are not
rights at all in any proper
sense of 'rights'.
They are

powers accorded individuals
and public bodies for the
purpose of creating, divesting
or altering the legal
relations
and legal status of entities,
including their legal rights
and legal right-holder
status.
The persons or groups
g such powers are,

tives,

e.g.

,

lawyers, legal representa-

judges and legislatures.

acting in official capacities

It is persons or groups

who/which are the appro-

priate entities to whom/which legal
powers are ascribed.
But, surely, some such groups
(e.g., judges, legislatures)
are empowered to alter the legal
right-holder status of
natural objects,
whether or not they elect to do so is
a

separate issue.

The point is that they could, i.e.,
they

have the legal power to do so.

since, on the Hohfeldian

view of legal powers, it is these persons
and official
bodies who/which properly are said to have
legal

powers,

it would not endorse the Power Position
Objection to

(T)

either
Thus, on both the ordinary lawyer's view and the

Hohfeldian view of legal powers, the Power Position Objection to

(T)

never gets going.

It incorrectly construes

.
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legal powers as belonging
to entities other
than persons
and groups acting in
official capacities (e.g.,
other than
legal agents, judges,
legislatures).
Furthermore, if
having certain legal powers
is a prerequisite for
entering
into contractual agreements,
it is a prerequisite
which
natural objects could be said
to satisfy by virtue of
their
having duly-appointed legal
representatives having the required legal powers. Even
though it is the legal representative who has the legal
powers associated with making
contracts in the name of the
represented entity,
it is the

represented entity (here, the natural
object) who/which is
said to have the legal rights
in question.
For these reasons, the Power Position
Objection to (T) carries no
weight
T he Claim Position O b jection

.

The Claim Position poses one

potentially serious objection to
i.e., demands which,

.

2

15

"Rights are claims

if made, would be valid,

at least defensible.

legal claim

(T ):

justified or

To have a legal right is to have a

But natural objects cannot have or be said

to have legal claims

.

2

Thus,

they cannot have or be said

to have legal rights."

Who or what can have, or be said to have, legal

claims

2

?

Is it consistent with the claim

2

view of rights

to describe natural objects as having legal claims

2

?

If

2

,
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so,

then the Claim Position
Objection to (T) fails.
Who or what can claim?
The commonly accepted
view
is that only humans
can claim.
When that view is not merely stipulated, two
lines of argument typically
are advanced.
The first is that only
entities who/which are moral
agents,
moral persons, rational or
capable of choice can claim.
On the assumption that
only humans are moral agents,
moral
persons, etc., only humans can
claim.
The second line
points to the manner in which
claims are asserted.
For
example, Feinberg says this about
claiming 16 To make
claim to something is to "petition
or seek by virtue of
supposed right; to demand as due;"
"what is essential to
:

claiming

t hat

is the manner of assertion;"

"To claim that

one has rights is to demand or
insist that they be recognized.
The suggestion here is that to engage
in claiming activity is to utter sentences,

issue demands, sign

petitions, or otherwise engage in observable,
public behavior in such a manner as to affirm or
insist that what
is claimed be recognized or granted.

Where what is claim-

ed is a right, claiming activity consists
in demanding re-

cognition of one's rights.

On this line of reasoning,

only humans can claim.

Whichever line is taken, the commonly accepted
view is that only humans can claim.

Suppose this is true.

.
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the claim theorist
'claim,

which sense

(

distinction between senses
of
s,

of

'claim' is it tree.

first and third senses.

(claimj and claim that
(clai^J
mands or Claim that a

Clearly,

Only humans can make
claims
,

only they can make de-

right, interest or
whatever be re-

cognized.

if th e family dog s
persistent barking
,

^

^

back door correctly is
described as a demand or
claim made
by the dog to its owner
that the door be opened
and it be
let outside, it is a
demand or claim in some
sense other
than the performative and
propositional senses of 'claim'.
If the dog's barking
is not described as
"claiming activity," it is because dogs
do not make claims or claim
that.
They cannot be said to claim
in either of the two senses
of 'claim' required for
their behavior to constitute
claiming activity, stated simply,
dogs do not clain^ or
claim^
Suppose, then, that only humans can
claim, i.e.,
can make claims or claim that.
it does not follow that
non-humans cannot be said to have claims.
To have a claim
is to have a claim
and no claim theorist asserts that
2
having a claim entails making a claim
or claiming that.
,

In fact,

Feinberg explicitly states that one can have

a

claim without ever claiming that to which
one is entitled
Presumably he would also grant that, e.g., a landlord
can

17
.
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have

claim to have a tenant
evicted even if the landlord
never actually makes claim
to that right.
what claim theorists do assert is, in
Feinberg’s words, that "having
a
claim consists in being in
a position to claim,
that is,
to make claim to or to
claim that." The relevant
question,
then, is who or what can
be said to be in a position
to
claim?
a

Undoubtedly most claim theorists
would argue that
since only humans can claim, only
they can
be said to be

in a position to claim.

Thus, natural objects could not

be said to be in a position
to claim.
true, also.

Suppose this is

Does it follow that natural objects
cannot

have claims and, hence, cannot have
legal rights?
a

No,

as

reconsideration of Feinberg's position makes
clear.
Feinberg's view is that having

being in

a

a

claim entails

position to claim, i.e., to engage in proposi-

tional and performative claiming.

can be construed as "in

a

which humans correctly

position to claim"?

Feinberg

offers an explicit statement of who can make claims,
and
thus be in a position to claim.
He states,

Generally speaking, only the person who has a
title or has qualified for it, or someone
speaking in his name, can make claim to something as a matter of right. 18
He even identifies "two kinds of cases" of making claims:

174

n

exercise riahtt
title;

in

° f Ca e

the^ther

Thus, making claims

t0 make claim is to

'

f

ZlTtl

(claiming
1

)

ctl^lTsTo^

can consist of either ex-

ercising rights one has already,
or making application for
some rights.
Either the entity who/which
has or qualifies
for
the right, or someone speaking
in the entity's
name,

can make claims.

Thus, on Feinberg's account,
an entity

or its legal representative
can engage in claiming activity.
on the assumption that only
those who can claim can
be in a position to claim,
Feinberg's position is that

only humans who represent themselves
or who are the legal
representatives of other entities can be
in a position to
claim.
Once again we find the doctrine of
legal representation invoked to explain which entities
can be said
to meet the necessary conditions
for having legal rights.

For claims theorists, appeal to the
doctrine explains how
an entity can have or qualify for legal
rights when it it-

self is not able to engage in claiming activity.

in the

case of natural objects, it provides an explanation
of how

natural objects meaningfully can be said to have legal
rights

(i.e.,

legal claims2)

even though it is their legal
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representatives who engage in
claiming activity.
Surely the original
Claim Position Objection
to
<T) would be
insisted upon at this
point: "To have a legal
right is to have a legal
claim.
But having a claim consists in being in a
position to claim. Natural
objects
cannot be said to be in
such a position, where
a legal
representative makes claims on
behalf of the represented
entity,

it is the legal
representative, and not the
repre-

sented entity, who is in the
position to claim, since
natural objects fail to satisfy
a necessary condition
of
having a claim, viz., being
in a position to claim,
they
cannot have claims. Hence, they
cannot have legal rights.
On a claim view of rights,
(T) is false."

According to this objection,

a

necessary condition

of an entity's having a claim
is that the entity be in a
position to claim.
It is alleged that natural
objects
fail to satisfy this condition.
But this is not what claim

theorists do and feel they must hold.

Claim theorists

agree that it is the represented entity
who/which has the
legal right in question, even though it
may be a legal
agent who secures the right.
Thus, claim theorists accept
(

0

)

:

(8)

For any entity, X, if X has a valid legal
claim, then either X or X's legal repre—
senta tive is in a position to claim.

:

.
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Yet the objection that
natural objects cannot
have legal
rights because they fail
to satisfy a necessary
condition
of having a claim, viz.,
being in a position to
claim,
assumes that claim theorists
accept the stronger proposition, (9)
(9)

For any entity, X, if x
has a valid legal
claim, then X is in a
position to claim!

Since they do not, this
objection fails.
It has been argued that
claim theorists endorse
(8)

rather than (9).

if one attributes

(9) to them, then
one is hard-pressed to account
for their endorsement of
the doctrine of legal
representation.
The only way to
account for it would be to argue
that by allowing x's legal representatives to make claims
on behalf of X, X properly is described as being in a
position to claim.
This
may require arguing that X and X's
legal representatives
are in different claiming positions,
or that X is "in a

position to claim" in a different sense
than the sense in
which X's legal representative is "in a
position to claim."
But it would allow one to account for
a claim theorist's

endorsement of
If,

(9)

so understood,

(9)

properly may be attributed

to claim theorists, does the former objection
against

work?

(T)

That is, is it true that natural objects cannot have
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legal rights because they
themselves are not in a
position
to claim?

Consider when one might invoke
(9), so interpreted.
In ordinary language,
sometimes we seem to describe
persons
as
a position to claim when
they never actually claim
anything.
For example, before his death,
the wealthy,
self-exiled Howard Hughes might have
been described as
being in a position to make legal
claims, conduct legal
transactions, or otherwise engage in
claiming activity,
even though for years only the
recluse's

m

lawyers

agents)

(his legal

actually engaged in the claiming activity.

How-

ever, most claim theorists would deny
that, e.g., infants
and mental incompetents are in a
position to claim.
They
are not like Howard Hughes.
in fact, the doctrine of legal

representation was designed to handle just such
cases.
addition, even in the case of Howard Hughes,

In

there is an

alternative, simpler, equally plausible description
of
Hughes's position.

it is to describe Hughes as having legal

claims, which claims are made on his behalf, and in his
name, by his legal representatives.

ally are in the claiming position.

It is they who actu-

But this description of

Hughes, which captures what was assumed in attributing

(9)

to claim theorists,

(8)

reduces to the description of X at

Thus, what is claimed at

(9)

.

is captured more perspicuously

.
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and less awkwardly by

(8)

Whether one accepts my
argument that claim theorists accept (8) outright,
or one attributes
(9) to them,
the outcome is the same.
The objection that natural
oblects cannot have legal rights
because they are not in a
position to claim is not revived
by attributing
Claim Position theorists.
To review,

(9)

to

four views have been defended
here.

First, even if one supposes that
only humans can claim and
can be in a position to claim,
it does not follow that

natural objects cannot have claims.

Second, the standard

argument for why natural objects cannot
have legal claims
fails.

it fails because it assumes that
a necessary con-

dition of X's having a claim is that X be
in
to claim,

a

a

position

view which runs counter to the claim theorist's

endorsement of the doctrine of legal representation.

Third,

since that argument fails, so does the Claim
Position Ob-

jection to

(T)

Fourth, appeal to the doctrine of legal

representation explains how natural objects, incapable of
engaging in claiming activity themselves, nonetheless
could be said to have claims.
The Claim Position is important to the defense of
(T)

ific

in another way.

It provides suggestions of some spec-

legal rights natural objects could be said to have.
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For example, consider
Feinberg's statement that
0t (ySt) th ® Same
is ‘having a right to
x
? 1S rather
like
having a case of at i»' t
that one has a^igSt^S^
fair
hearing and consideration 20

^

-

.

Thus, on Feinberg's
account, having a prime
facie case of
minimum plausibility that
one has a right establishes
the
right to a fair hearing
and consideration.
Thus, on his
account, even if natural
objects have only a prima
facie
case for recognition of
their claims as valid, they
would
have at least one right,
viz., the right to a fair
hearing
and consideration.

Feinberg's account suggests
another right natural
objects could be said to have.
He states that:
For every right there is a
further right to
1
1
aPPr ri :e circumstances, that
h; = the right.
°E’
?l
one has
21

^

What are "appropriate circumstances?"

They include occa-

sions when one is challenged, when
one's rights explicitly
are denied, when one must make
application for rights,

where one's rights are insufficiently
acknowledged or
appreciated.
Thus, if natural objects have any rights
at
all, they have the right to claim they
have a
right.

Does McCloskey's Entitlement Position version
of
the Claim Position pose any objection to

ones considered so far?

(T)

other than the

McCloskey holds that legal rights

are entitlements to have, do or receive something
which

:

give rise to claims
against others.
But it,
uur
if
aq Fembercj
r
as
argues, "entitlements
to" roucrhlv
ougniy are equivalent
to "claims
to '" then entitlements
are claims
J-mo
i n
*
,
1
e
demands
which,
2
lf ma<3e W ° Uld bE
Valld justified or
defensible.
tn this
respect, McCloskey. s view
provides no new objections
to
•

,

-

,

.

.

,

'

'

(T)

.

Furthermore, McCloskey allows
that entitlements
need not be claimed by
their possessors in order
to be
genuine

1-

we are entitled,

to be entitled. 22

tSS

Like Claim Position theorists
generally, McCloskey assumes
that use of the doctrine of
legal representation provides
an acceptable way to describe
an entity who/which cannot
make claims or claim entitlements
as a legal right-holder.
Use of the doctrine to explain
how natural objects could
be said to have entitlements,
and, hence, legal rights,
therefore is permissable.

McCloskey does state that there are limits
to those
who/which can be possessors of entitlements.
He argues
that natural objects are outside those
limits.

But it has

been shown in connection with the Interest
Position Objection that McCloskey

's

reasons for excluding natural objects
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fall short

.

Thus, McCloskey's view,
like those of claim

theorists generally,
provides no insurmountable
objections
to

(T)

.

Different Rules Position

theorists offer very
different accounts of the
nature of
the connection between
legal rights and legal
rules.
Nonetheless, one basic objection
to (T) could be mounted
by
each of them: "Statements
ascribing rights either imply,
or are implied by,
statements about the existence
or nature of a legal rule or set
of rules.
But there is not
and could not be any rules
appeal to which would warrant
describing natural objects as
legal right-holders.
Therefore, natural objects could
not be legal right-holders."
That this objection has no force
against (T) can be shown
by examining the Rules Position
views of Feinberg,
Hart,

and Benn and Peters.

Feinberg

's

position is that an entity has

a

legal

right when its claim is recognized as
valid by the governing legal rules. Although Feinberg
does not offer examples of "governing legal rules," it is
not difficult to
show that some legal rules could be fashioned
such that
appeal to them would warrant recognition as
valid a natural object's legal claims.

Suppose

a

legal rule specifies

that if certain conditions are satisfied, an entity
has

a

,

.

:
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“

facie case for having
a legal right.
Suppose fur _
ther that an entity, X,
has a duly- ap p olnted
legal repre _
sentative, Y, and that Y
aales clai m s in the name,
and on
behalf, of X in accordance
with
11
correct- legal
P
correct
procedure
for so making claims
_
aims.
mh^n a sample
Then,
rule schema covering
such a case would be (RSI)
i

.

(RSI)

if an entity,

X, properly is
presented by an agent, Y and legally reYuaes
correct legal procedure to
petition
in
the name of and on behalf
of X that X be
recognized as having a legal
claim to
ometning
and Y provides a case of
at least minimum plausibility
that X has
1 Cla m to
then Provided there
$
aree no
nn countervailing
^
reasons to override
recogmtron of X S claim to
* as valid,
x has a valid legal
claim to
,

(p

,

'

'

.

'

<f>

Given the view that
claim, appeal to

mg

a

(RSI)

legal right is just a valid legal

attests to the plausibility of say-

that natural objects could have
legal rights 23
.

The steps for determining whether
a natural object
has a legal right are fairly
straightforward.
First, one

determines whether the antecedent conditions
are met (e.g.,
whether Y is a duly-appointed legal
representative of X,
whether Y used correct legal procedure to
petition that X
be recognized as having a legal claim
to
if
<j>)

.

so,

then

the natural object has a prima facie case
that it has a

legal right.

Second, one determines whether there are

overriding reasons for not recognizing the natural object's

.
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claim as valid.

™

For example,
dre there
are
t
tnere competing rules
,

4.

•

Which are relevant in
deciding the case? Does
a conflict
of rights result if
one recognizes the
natural object's
Claim as valid? If there
are countervailing
reasons, do
they warrant withholding
recognition of the natural
object's
Claim as valid? if not,
then X has the legal right
in question
To illustrate how

(RSI)

could be used as a model

for specific legal rules
generating specific legal right
s
consider rule (Rl) and what
Feinberg calls "a right to a
fair hearing and consideration":
(Rl)

Whenever an entity or its legal
repreasserts a claim to something, and follows correct
legal procedure
for seeking legal recognition
of that
claim as valid, and provides a
case of
at least minimum plausibility
for that
claim, then the entity has a
right to a
fair hearing and consideration.

Whether or not

(Rl)

is acceptable,

it is stated in terms

which capture the substance and form
of Feinberg'
ment of what it is to "have a claim to
X."

rule which Feinberg ought to accept.
Feinberg, an entity has

a

But,

Thus,

state-

s

it is a

according to

legal right when its claim is

recognized as valid by the governing legal rules.
to

(Rl),

Appeal

then, permits the construal of natural objects
as

having at least one legal right, viz., the right
to

hearing and consideration.

Here Feinberg'

s

a

fair

version of the

f

t

:

184

Rules Position not only
poses no obstacles to the
defense
of (T
it helps that defense.
)

What about Hart's version
of the Rules Position?
Hart argues that an entity,
X, has a legal right
if, under
the rules of the legal
system and given the events
which
have transpired, some person
Y is obliged to do or
refrain
from doing some action provided
X or X's agent so chooses,
or until X or X's agent choose
otherwise. A statement of
the form 'X has a legal right'
is a conclusion
of law in a

particular case falling under those
rules.

Could there be

some legal rules which oblige some
person

to do or ab-

(s)

stain from doing some action provided
the legal representatives of natural objects choose that
they should? if so,
then Hart's sufficient condition account
of 'having a legal
right' permits one to describe natural
objects as legal

right-holders.

Consider
(R2)

a

candidate rule,

(R2)

Where

a duly appointed legal representative
of a delimited forest area is legally empowered to maintain that area as a recognized "wilderness area," no humans may trespass on or use that area for recreational,
industrial or other purposes without the
express written consent of the forest's
legal representative.

According to

(R2)

,

all humans except those whom the forest's

legal representatives choose to exempt are obliged not to

trespass on wilderness areas.

On Hart's sufficient

:
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condition account of

'X

has a legal right,' a
wilderness

area which is legally
represented by an agent so
empowered
would be said to have a
legal right.
which legal right?
Although Hart's account
provides no clues, one could
de-

scribe the legal right as

a

right to non-interference
a-

gainst any humans not specifically
exempted.

Whether or not

(R2)

is acceptable as stated,

and

whether or not the legal right
in question correctly is
described as "the legal right to
non-interference" is not
What matters here. what matters
is that
(R2)

ple of

is an exam-

rule appeal to which substantiates
the view that
natural objects could be said to
have legal rights, on
Hart s account of 'X has a legal
right.'
a

(R2

)

is an example of what Hart calls
a

imposing rule" or

a

"duty

"primary rule of objection."

it is a

rule which requires humans to refrain
from certain action,
whether or not they want to.
it might be stated more

simply as

(R3)

(R3)

In addition,

humans may trespass on wilderness areas.
there could be companion rules to

(R3)

,

what

Hart calls "power conferring rules" or "secondary rules."
These are rules which confer powers on humans to introduce

new primary rules, to extinguish or modify old ones, or to

determine the duration or control of them.

They concern

not merely physical movements and changes, but the creation

.

.
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or variation of duties.

For example,

(R4)

(R5) and
R6
are examples of secondary
rules which could be
introduced

in conjunction with
<R4)

(R 3

)

,

(

)

:

3
h 11
rec °9 nized as a primary
rule of
Lf legal system
if the
which imposes on
n
S P eclall y exempted
the obligation not
nni°^
to trespass on wilderness
areas.
l'

(R5)

The court has the power to
appoint leqal
3
63 or desi 9 nated wilderness
f
areas and to confer
arearSnd'
on those representa6 P° w ® rs and privileges
customk
nly bestowed
on legal representatives.

^

(R6)

Where a legal representative of
a desigt
1 SrneSS area is le<
? all Y empowered
snJi for,
f
, in
to speak
and
the name of, the area
it represents, the court has
the
recognize the wilderness area as power to
having
certain legal rights; specifically,
it has
the power to recognize the
wilderness area
as having a legal right to
noninterference
y trespassers against any humans not
exempted by the wilderness area's
legal
representative

(R4)

identifies (R3) as

(R5

confers powers on courts to appoint legal
representa-

)

a

primary rule of the legal system,

tives of wilderness areas, and

(R6)

confers powers on

courts to create or recognize legal rights of
wilderness
areas
Hart does not specify whether it follows directly
from rules such as

(R2)

and

(R3)

that an entity has legal

rights, or whether other rules must be taken together with

rules such as

(R2)

and

(R3)

to generate that conclusion.

Nor does Hart suggest which legal rights an entity might
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said to have in any
particular case.

Nonetheless, what

is necessary to show
that natural objects
could be legal

right-holders on Hart's view
has been shown, viz.,
that
rules such as (R2,-(R6,
could be devised in
accordance with
Which it is possible and
meaningful to ascribe legal
rights
to natural objects.
Benn and Peters offer a
necessary condition account
of having a right.
To say that X has a right
is to imply
that there is a rule which,
when applied to the case of X
and some person Y, imposes
on Y a duty to X, if x chooses.
An objection to giving natural
objects legal rights on
their view is that there is not
and cannot be a rule which
imposes on anyone a duty to natural
objects.
This objection is not very promising.

such as

(R2

)

which imposes on humans

a

a legal rule

duty not to tres-

pass on wilderness areas could be devised
and interpreted
such that the duty is understood as
a duty to the wilderness area, imposed on would-be trespassers
unless the

wilderness area specifies otherwise.

in the next chapter,

Chapter VIII, it is shown that talk of legal duties
to
natural objects is meaningful.

Here it suffices to say

that since Benn and Peters argue only that the
existence
of such a rule is a necessary condition of having legal

rights, there is

a pr ima

facie case for supposing that

:.

,

.
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condition could be satisfied
in the case of natural
objects
Suppose it is conceded that
<R1 )-(r 6
could be legal rules of a legal system,
but objected that, nonethe)

less,

there are no existent legal
rules which could be invoked to show that natural
objects could have legal rights.
That this objection is not
threatening to the case for (T)
can be shown by considering a
sampling of accepted legal
rules
(R7)

No human being may kill another
human being.

(RS)

Liability results from failure to
employ due
care under the circumstances.

(R9)

Business and industry must maintain
standards
of fair competition and just and
reasonable
rates

(RIO)

One must stop, look and listen where
traffic
is to be expected.

(Rll)

Use of vehicles in this park is prohibited.

(R12)

Contracts must be kept.

(R13)

Creditors have

Rules

(R7)

and

a

(R11)-(R13)

right to be paid.
are examples of existent legal

rules which are clear-cut and highly specific.
of

(R7)

for example,

is fairly precise.

The meaning

Although there

are exceptions to this rule, e.g., killing in self-defense,

typically these exceptions are identifiable in relatively

straightforward terms and are taken to be exceptions to the
general rule against homocide.

On the other hand, rules
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<R8)-(R10), are hi h ly elastic,
g
stated in language which
permits varying degrees of
latitude as to what may or
may
not be included within
the scope of the rule.
(R8), the
basic rule of negligence law,
and (R9) are stated in
very
broad terms, employing the
so-called "India Rubber concepts of "due care," "fair
standard," and "just and reasonable rates." Adjudicating
agencies are allowed much
leeway in determining whether
or not to treat a certain
case as falling within the scope
of these rules.
This
point is put by saying that these
rules have an "open texture or "fringe of vagueness."
It is the open texture of rules
which permits new
cases to be handled deftly, and which

explains how law

gradually is built from precedent to
precedent.
Once the
decision is made to include a case or a
given set of facts
as falling under a rule,

the case is treated as a prece-

dent, often establishing in effect a
subordinate rule that,
in the future,

similar cases or facts of

will be included under the rule. 24

listen

rule,

(RIO)

,

a

similar kind

The "stop, look and

which in some jurisdictions precludes

recovery by one who failed to stop, look and listen before
crossing

a

railroad track, is an example of a subordinate

rule which evolved from cases falling under the general

rule of "due care."

in other situations, a rule is express-

ed in such broad terms that no subordinate rules emerge;
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each case is left to be
decided 'on its own facts,"
i.e.,
'within the rationally
possible outside limits of
the ruie,'
by the discretion of the
adjudicating agency. 25
In light of this discussion,
why not suppose that
several of the rules given
above could be invoked and
"Widened" to cover the case of
natural objects as possible
legal right-holders? For
example, by invoking rule (R8),
industries located in areas known
to be the habitat of animals which are members of endangered
species could be made
liable for failure to employ due
care against endangering
the lives of these animals.
where they are found liable
for failure to use due care, one
could construe the animals
as having certain remedial
rights against the industries
concerned.
Included among these might
be the right to

sue for damages.

As Christopher Stone suggests, favorable

monetary awards could be paid into
in the animals'

name,

a

trust or fund set up

to be used solely for purposes which

benefit the animals, e.g., providing then increased
protection, perhaps even isolation, against humans.

While it does not follow from the fact that an in-

dustry is liable where members of endangered species are
concerned that members of that species have legal rights
against the industry, it is possible to construe the animals as having legal rights in such cases.

Their eligibil-

ity for legal right-holder status could be insured by
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invoking other legal rules

'

e rr
g
*

*'

a

primary rule such as

(R14)

and a set of secondary
rules, including rule
(RIS):
(R14) No human being
may kill an
a member of the species n ff animal which is
3
Y esignated
an "endangered species."
,

:R15)

2*

-

a
U
n
11S
animal which is a membe r of an n^f C± ??
deaigna ted "endangered
species,
species " aa rn
courtl has the power to grant
y
survivors of the species aa legal
i 0 „n
representar ,,a
d to empower that
representative
lmS
gain fc the offea ding humans
in the name,
nSio anda on ?behalf,
of
viving members of the species. the sur-

m

If the claims made by the
legal representatives are recog
2 ed as valid, the
natural objects would be said to
have

m

certain legal rights.
Similarly, one could appeal to rule (Rll)
as the
basis for ascribing certain remedial
rights to forests
against trespassers, e.g., rights to seek
legal relief for
damages incurred as a result of the activities
of the

trespassers.

One legal effect of successfully invoking

existent rule (Rll) could be the conferral of legal
rights
on natural objects.
In this respect, appeal to proposed
legal rules

(R2)

-

(R6)

would be no different.

Each

provides a meaningful, reasonable basis for saying that
natural objects could be legal right-holders.
I

have argued that the idea of legal representa-

tives for natural objects is plausible.

If it is,

function of a legal representative of, say,

a

then one

pine forest

.
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might be to make certain
kinds of contracts on
behalf of
the forest with certain
kinds of businesses or
industries.
For instance, suppose
a specific lumber
company wants to
log a specific pine
forest.
Although other legal avenues
might be available and even
preferable 27 for any number
^cieidoie,
Of reasons
an official body (e.g.,
a court, may choose
to designate a legal
representative for the forest and
to
recognize the representative
as empowered to make contracts
with the lumber company in the
forest's name. A contract
might specify that the lumber
company is permitted to log
the forest provided that,
for every tree cut
,

down, the

company plants another pine tree
in the logged area.
in
case of breech of contract, the
terms of the contract
specify that the company agrees to
pay five
times the

current market value of

a

pine tree of specified dimen-

sions, which money is to be deposited
in

established for that purpose.
one could invoke rule (R12)

a

fund or trust

As a party to a contract,

as the basis for recognizing

natural objects as holders of certain rights.

Presumably,

one right natural objects could be said to have
is the

right to sue the company for breach of contract by
the

company
It is interesting to note that rules
(R13)

(R12)

and

have special significance in the account provided

.

.

:
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by Benn and Peters.

They claim that appeal
to (R12) and
(R13) illustrates two
ways rights may be ascribed
to an
entity.
There can be a particular
ascription of rights
which imply, but do not state,
general rules,
e.g.,

(R i 2);

or,

there can be general ascriptions
of rights, stated by
general rules, e.g., (R13)
According to the account
.

provided by Benn and Peters, the
rules that contracts must
be kept, (R12)
and that breach of contract
by one party
to a contract gives the other
party (parties) certain
rights (a rule like (R13)
are the appropriate sort of
rules for ascribing rights to an
entity.
On their account
then, appeal to a rule such as
(R12) for ascribing rights
to natural objects would be
totally appropriate.
,

)

,

This discussion suffices to show
that the differ-

ent versions of the Rules Position
offered by Feinberg,
Hart, and Benn and Peters fail to
generate a reasonable

objection to

(T)

in fact,

the Rules Position on legal

rights can be harnessed effectively in support
of
The Prediction Position Objection

.

generates one basic objection to

(T)

(T)

The Prediction Position

"Statements ascribing

legal rights are predictive statements that, given
certain
facts, certain legal consequences will follow.

that an entity has

a

To say

legal right is to say that if certain

circumstances prevail, certain court action is likely.
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But With natural objects
there is not and could not
be any
likelihood that situations would
arise where legal consequences (e.g., remedies, benefits,
compensation) for
natural objects themselves
would follow. Hence, natural
objects cannot be said to have
legal rights."
is this
objection to (T) threatening?
Of course,

in present cases involving
natural

objects it is unlikely that natural
objects will be singled
out as proper recipients of "legal
remedies." But this
only points out the obvious, viz.,
that natural objects
presently lack legal rights.
Previous discussions have
shown that the "facts" could be otherwise.
For example,

legal rules could be devised according
to which a duly

represented forest area is recognized as entitled
to

compensation for damages against persons unauthorized
to
trespass in the forest area; and seals could be
recognized
as having legal claims against fur-seeking seal
hunters

who violate legal restrictions against tracking and

killing seals for their fur.

If the existence of certain

legal rules is included in the set of relevant "facts"

governing

a case,

then clearly court action directed at

giving natural objects themselves certain legal remedies
is possible.

On the Prediction Position view of legal

rights, the possibility that such court action is forth-

coming attests to the possibility of granting legal rights

.
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to natural objects.

Whether or not it is likely
that natural objects
Will be legal right-holders
depends on whether
or not

courts so construe the facts.

But that they could so con-

strue the facts ensures that
ascription of legal rights to
natural objects is possible.
Thus, the Prediction Position
Objection to (T) fails. To use
Holmes's terminology, it is
possible that "the antecedent
facts which the law defines"
and the consequent legal rights
attached by law to these
facts could be such that natural
objects are genuine legal
right-holders

Strictly N atural Law Position Objections
The Moral Sense P osition Objection

Position defines
of 'right.'
this position

'legal right’

.

The Moral Sense

in terms of a moral sense

There is one basic objection to
29
:

based on

(T)

"Natural objects cannot have legal rights

because legal rights are rights in a moral sense of
the
term

rights,

'

and natural objects cannot meaningfully be

said to have rights in any moral sense."
(T)

The defense of

against this objection is to show that it is compat-

ible with the meanings of

'right'

in a moral sense given

by theorists Grotius, Pufendorf, and Ryan and Boland to

describe natural objects as havers of rights in

a

moral

.
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sense, and,

hence, as legal
right-holders.

AS we have seen, the
views of Grotius and
Pufendorf
on the meaning of 'right'
are strikingly similar.
They
define rights as the moral
qualities (Grotius) or moral
powers (Pufendorf, of persons
which enable them to have,
do or receive something
lawfully or properly. On
their
views, to say that legal
rights are rights in a moral
sense
IS to say that the quality
or power which enables
entities
to have, do or receive
something has been lawfully or
properly acquired and held; it
is recognized and secured
by a politically organized
society 30
.

One could dismiss straightway

an objection to

(T)

based on the views of Grotius
and Pufendorf, since the
cirticism given in Chapter VI of the
Power Position shows
unacceptable any view of legal rights
as powers, capabilities or capacities.
However, there is a plausible
recasting of the Grotius-Puf endorf view
which does generate
a reasonable objection to (T)
Suppose their view is that
a legal right is a lawful (or,
proper) authority or means
to have,

do or receive something from another.

Legal

right-holders, then, are entities who/which have this

authority or means.
tion to

(T)

The recast Grotius-Puf endorf objec-

is that natural objects cannot be said to have

this lawful authority or means and, hence, cannot be
said
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to

have

legal rights.

Is this objection
damaging to

(T) ?

think this objection fails,
as appeal to the
doctrine of legal representation
again shows.
By appointing legal representatives
for natural objects one
provides
a meaningful way of saying
that natural objects have
the
lawful (or, proper) authority
or means to have, do or
receive something, and, hence,
to have rights in a moral
sense.
Where the legal representative
acts on behalf of
the natural object it represents,
one can describe either
the legal agent or the natural
object as having the lawful
authority to have, do or receive
something.
in either
case, it is the natural object
which would be said to have
the legal rights in question 31 The
added condition that
this authority be recognized and secured
by a politically
organized society could be satisfied, for
example, by
I

.

appeal to a set of legal rules or principles
specifying
the conditions for appointing legal
representatives for

natural objects and the scope of the legal authority

ascribed to those representatives.

Thus, by extending the

accepted doctrine of legal representation to the case of
natural objects, a meaningful way is provided for describing them as genuine legal right-holders on the recast

Grotius-Puf endorf view of legal rights.
What about the Ryan-Boland version of the Moral

?
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Sense Position?

establishing

Does it pose any formidable
obstacles to

(T)

Recall that on the Ryan-Boland
view a right is "an
inviolable moral claim to some
personal good." when this
claim is "created by civil
society," the right (moral
claim)

is a legal right; when
it is

"derived from man's

rational nature," it is a moral
right.
In addition, Ryan
and Boland argue that rights
are the moral means whereby
the possessor is enabled to
reach some end. Could natural
objects be said to have moral
claims to some personal

good,

and to have the moral means
to reach some end through the

possession of rights?

If so,

the Ryan-Boland version of

the Moral Sense Position poses no
successful objection to
(T)

.

There is no significant problem in
describing

natural objects as enabled to reach certain
ends through
the possession of rights.
For example, if the end sought
is to procure a legal injunction against
certain pollution

activity by

a

specific industry, the possession of a right

to be party to injunctive settlements could
enable natural

objects to reach that end.

if there is a problem,

it

lies with the notion of rights as moral claims to some

personal good, and with the description of right-holders
as entities who/which possess the moral means to reach

certain ends.
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Recall that the philosophical
view of persons is
that only humans are
'persons;" only they can set
goals,
make choices, have de
facto interests, be moral
agents.
The notions of a "personal
good" and of the attainment
of
ends, like other notions
involving the philosophical
view
of personality, apply
properly only to humans.

Thus, on
the philosophical view
of who/what is able to
use moral
means to achieve some personal
good or attain some end,
natural objects are not the
appropriate sort of entity.
But we have seen that the
legal view of persons is
quite different.
On the legal view, the notion
of a person can apply to what is
non-human.
The cognate notion of
a "chooser," an entity
having a will or a capacity to
act,
applies to non-humans just insofar
as there is some natural person empowered to act on
behalf of the non-human,

legal person,

whether the non-human is

a

municipality,

church, corporation, trust, fund, ship
or idol, the treatment of them as entities having certain
legal capacities
is the same.

The non-human is said to act through its

legal agent, even though it is only the legal
representa-

tive who engages in claiming activity, makes choices,

selects goals, attains ends.
If the Ryan-Boland view of legal rights has any

plausibility at all, it must accomodate the related doctrines of legal personality and legal representation.

To

?

.
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do so and yet retain the
definition of 'legal right'
as a
"moral claim to some personal
good'' they must allow
talk
of some "personal good"
for non-humans.
Once such talk is
permitted, however, the conceptual
barriers to describing

natural objects as having rights
in a moral sense break
down
This does not end the matter,
however.

The Ryan-

Boland position could be revised
to accomodate the two
doctrines of legal personality and
legal representation by
dropping references to "some personal
good" achieved
through "moral means," yet retaining
the view of legal
rights as moral claims.
Then their view generates a reasonable objection to (T)
"Legal rights are rights
:

in a

moral sense, i.e., moral claims.

In particular,

moral claims created by civil society.

they are

But natural objects

cannot have moral claims; hence, they cannot have
legal
rights.

Is this objection successful against

(T)

To answer this one must examine what Ryan and

Boland say about moral claims.
is not very clear.

Unfortunately, their view

For one thing, they hold that, although

rights are rights in

a

moral sense (i.e.

there are different kinds of moral claims.

,

moral claims),

There are

those created by civil society (i.e., legal rights), and
those "derived from man's rational nature"
rights)

.

(i.e., moral

Since they hold this two-kind doctrine of moral

,
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Claims,

it is not essential to
the notion of a moral
claim
that it be '•derived from
man's

rational nature."

m

particular, moral claims which
are legal rights need not
be.
As such, the Ryan-Boland
version of the Moral Sense Position, taken by itself, does
not produce the objection
that
natural objects cannot have
legal rights because they are
not rational beings.
All that is required for an
entity
to have legal rights is that
it have moral claims "created
by civil society," not that
it have moral claims derived
from its nature as a rational entity.
For another thing, it is not clear
whether their

account is

a

necessary or a sufficient condition
account.

Sometimes it seems to be merely a sufficient
condition
account: An entity, X, has a legal right
to
something,

if the civil society creates a
moral claim to

recognizes X as having that claim.
view, it is impotent against

(T)

.

<j>

$

and

But if this is their

Even if natural objects

could not be said to have such claims, it would not
follow
that they could not be said to have legal rights.

other times, their account seems to be
tion or definitional account.

that such legal rights as

a

a

If it is,

At

necessary condithey must allow

creditor's right to be paid,

a

contractor's right to goods and services contracted for,

a

plaintiff's right to sue for damages incurred by

another's acts are genuine examples of moral claims, viz.,
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those created by civil
society.

claims

But if these are moral

there is no special
problem describing natural
objects as having moral
claims.
,

For these reasons. The
Ryan-Boland position is not
problematic for the defense of
(T)
Having defined 'right'
as "moral claim," their
distinction between legal
rights
and moral rights as two
kinds of moral claims is
given in
terms of the source, rather
than the nature of a moral
claim.
A moral claim created by
civil society is a legal
right.
This makes the central issue
in determining whether
natural objects could be said
to have legal rights that
of determining whether they
could be said to have statecreated moral claims, or, alternatively,
whether the state
could be said to create moral claims
for them.
Whether or
not natural objects could be said
to have moral claims
.

,

b eforehand
a

,

so to speak,

is not at issue.

Insofar as, e.g.,

plaintiff's right to sue, is an acknowledged legal

right, it must count as a state-created
moral claim.

But

natural objects could be said to be recipients
of such
claims.

Thus the Ryan-Boland version of the Moral Sense

Position Objection fails.
The Moral Validation Position Objection

.

The Moral Valida-

tion Position is the view that natural law or moral prin-

ciples provide the mark, test, or justification for ascription of valid legal rights.

The distinctive feature of

"

.

,

"

,

..
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this position is that it
is

a

view on the validity of
legal

rights, and not a view on
the nature of legal rights
ger
dOSS n0t P res «PP°se any
particular thesis about
the meaning of 'legal right'
or about the conditions
under
Which statements of the form
'X has a legal right'
are
true.
It is open for advocates
of this position to concede the possibility of ascribing
legal rights to natural
obgects.
What they might deny is that
the legal rights
one could ascribe to natural
objects are valid, that their
ascription is justified on natural
law or moral grounds.
Properly speaking, then, any objection
generated by the
Moral Validation Position would be
directed at the view
that natural objects could be said
to have valid legal
rights, not to the view that they could
have legal rights.

— “
'

The Moral Validation Position is a
good example of
a position which generates which I
call "objections concerning (T)
rather than "objections to (T)
,

.

objection challenges the truth of
to

(T)

(T)

if an

it is an objection

if an objection challenges the significance of

establishing

(T)

and not the plausibility or truth of

it is an objection concerning

(T)

(T),

Since the Moral Vali-

dation Position is a position on the validity of rights,
it does not address the issue whether ascription of legal

rights to natural objects is possible.
the basis of any objection to

(T)

Hence, it is not

What objection

:
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concerning

(T)

does it suggest?

The most promising Moral
Validation Position objection concerning (T) turns
on the notion of a moral
law
or principle
"A valid legal right
is a positive right
:

which is recognized as binding,
de iure legitimate, in
accordance with natural law or
moral principles.
But
there are no such principles
which could be used to justify
recognition of natural objects
as legal right-holders.
Hence, natural objects could
not be said to have any valid
legal rights.
Any rights they might be said
to have would
be at best invalid, imperfect,
unenforceable rights."

real.

The threat of this objection is
more apparent than
A moral or natural law principle
specifies what

actions or kinds of actions are right,
wrong or obligatory. 32

The following are two paradigm
examples of moral

principles
(MPl

)

(MP2)

Killing humans is wrong.
Acts which injure humans are wrong.

Although both (MPl) and

(MP2)

may be unacceptable as stated

requiring modification or clarification, each is
principle.

a

moral

Appeals to them constitute the grounds for

justifying an individual's claim against being killed, an
instance of
security.
a

human has

a

more general claim to personal freedom and

Claim position theorists often suggest that if
a

claim against being killed or

a

claim to
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freedom from bodily or other
injury, the recognition
of
these claims as valid is
called for by these (and
perhaps
Other) moral principles.
They are examples of moral
principles, appeal to which
validates a right.
Could moral principles
concerning natural objects,
analogous to (MP1) and (MP2)
be framed such that appeal
to them provides grounds
for recognition of a natural
object's claim to certain rights
as valid?
Suppose it is
meaningful to speak of harm or
injury to natural objects,
e.g., to seals and to wilderness
areas.
Then the following
would be meaningful moral principles:
,

(MP3)

Killing seals for their fur is wrong.

(MP4)

Acts which cause irreparable injury
(harm)
to wilderness areas are wrong.

Like principles

(MP1)

and (MP2

)

,

principles (MP3) and

may require modification or clarification
to be
acceptable.
Still, they are genuine moral principles.
(MP4)

Furthermore, as in the case with (MP1) and (MP2)

,

appeal

to them could establish a prima facie case
for saying that

ascription of legal rights to natural objects is justified
on moral grounds and, hence, that they could be said
to

have some valid legal rights.

These could be construed

as rights against being killed or rights to freedom from

certain kinds of damage or injury.

Certainly there are details to work out in order

2
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to show that appeal
to

(MP3)

and

(MP4)

validates a claim
made on behalf of seals
and wilderness areas,
respectively,
just as there are details
to work out to show
that appeal
to (MP1, and (Ml?
justifies a human's claim
against being
killed and to freedom from
bodily injury, respectively,
)

still, on two popular views
of legal rights, viz.,
the
Claim and Rules Positions,
appeals to (MP3) and (MP4)

vide the basis for such

a

case.

pro-

Suppose seals and wilder-

ness areas are regarded for
purposes of the law as having
claims to non-interference
against fur-hunting seal
killers and trespassers, respectively.
On Feinberg’s
view, these would be claims of
seals and wilderness areas
against physical injury, the recognition
of which as valid
might be called for, at least in
part, by appeal to (MP3)
and (MP4), respectively. Appeal
to (MP3) and (MP4) attests
to the possibility of construing
natural objects as having
valid legal rights.
This account is sketchy.

Just what is the connec-

tion between a moral principle and a legal
right such that
the former "calls for" recognition of the
latter as valid?
Is it sufficient that appeal to moral
principles provides

some justification for ascription of rights?

What counts

as acceptable justification and how specific must the

statement of

a

moral principle be?

Ryan

and Boland do not
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say.

The important point
here

is

that the sketchines s
of

this account befalls
accounts of rights for
humans as well.
If appeal to (MP1,
and (MP2, provides a
case for ascribing
Valid legal rights to
humans, then, on the
Ryan-Boland
account, appeal to (MP3)
and (MP4) provides a
similar case
for ascribing valid legal
rights to natural objects.

Whatever difficulties there
are in clarifying the
relation
between a legal right and a
governing moral principle,
these difficulties arise in
the case of humans as well.
Summary

Plausible objections to thesis

(T)

based on seven

of the eight historical
positions on legal rights and

legal right-holders have been
stated, discussed and defeated.
As such, a strong case for (T)
already has been
made.
What remains to be shown is that
there are no
successful objections to (T) based on the
eighth historical
position, the Correlativi
ty Position, or on non-historical

position views about legal right-holders.

This is the

task in the succeeding two chapters of
the dissertation,

Chapters VIII and IX.

,

CHAPTER

VIII

THE CORRELATIVITY POSITION
in Chapter VII, objections
to

based on seven
Of the eight historical
positions on legal rights were
defeated.
In this chapter, the
Correlativity Position Objection to (T)
based on the eighth historical
position,
is defeated.
In addition, an objection
to (T) based on the
view that all legal right-holders
are legal duty-bearers
defeated.
By refuting these two objections,
(T)

it is

shown that appeals to the notion
of what a legal duty or
legal duty-bearer is, and to the
relations presumed to
hold between legal rights and legal
duties, fail to undermine the plausibility of (T)
The Correlativity Doctrines
It often is said that rights and duties
are corre-

lative.

However, it is not always clear just what this

claim means.

In this section,

I

identify three separate

doctrines of the correlativity of rights and duties,
what
I

call the logical, moral and legal correlativity doc-

trines.

Each doctrine advances distinct theses about what

it means to say that rights and duties are correlative.
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By separating off
correlativity theses accepted
by Correlativity Position theorists
from other correlativity
theses,

pinpoint just what is meant
by saying that legal
rights and legal duties
are correlative.
Theo logical and moral corr e
lativity doct rine.
In The
Right and The Good, W. D.
Ross offers a helpful
framework
identifying various claims
about the meaning of the
statement that rights and
duties are correlative. 1
Ross
claims that the statement may
stand for any one, or any
combination, of four logically
independent statements.
Using Ross's schema, we get the
following four statements:
d°) If A has a right against B, then B
~
- has a
duty to A.
(11)

If B has a duty to A,
“

against
(12)

B.

then A
~ has a riqht
y

If a has a right against B,
~

duty to B.
(13)

If A has a duty to B,

against

B.

What is asserted at

then A
- has a

then A
~ has a riqht

(10)

is that if an entity,

A,

has a right to receive something from
another entity, B,
then B has a duty to A to provide that
something; the con-

verse is asserted at

(11)

.

What is asserted at

(12)

is

that if A has a right to receive something
from B, then A

also has a duty to provide something else to

verse is asserted at

(13)

B;

the con-

5
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Nearly all, if not all,
theorists who accept some
thesis about the correlativity
of rights and duties
accept
(10).
Ross claims that (10)
"appears unquestionably true." 2
Feinberg claims that where
right’ means "claim-right,"
U0) is "logically unassailable." 3
Markby's view that no
right can exist unless there
is a duty exactly
correlative
to it, and Korkunov's
view that every right
necessarily
presupposes a corresponding
obligation are endorsements of
(10)
If the statement that rights
and duties are correlative meant simply (10)
then not only would there be
no
disagreement among theorists about
the truth-value of that
Statement; there would not be any
confusion about the
interpretation of that statement.
.

,

However, many theorists mean something
more by the
statement that rights and duties are
correlative than the
interpretation given at (10)
For example, Marcus Singer
interprets the statement to mean both
.

(10)

and

(11)

writes
A has a right against B, then B has a duty
and if B has a duty to A, then A has a
right against B.
This is a pattern of correlativity that seems unassailable
If

to A,

.

Legal theorist Salmond takes the same position:

There can be no right without a corresponding
duty, or duty without a corresponding right,
any more than there could be a husband without
a wife, or a father without a child. 6

.

He

^

.
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Following Feinberg, Benn and
Peters, 7 I refer to
'the logical correlativity
doctrine" as the doctrine which
endorses (10) and (11)
Theorists who hold either
(10) or
(11) but not both hold a
specific version of the logical
correlativity doctrine.
.

Some theorists subscribe to the
quite different
correlativity theses given at (12)
and (13).
For example,
T. P. Neill holds that an
entity's rights are conditional
upon its bearing a duty, (12).
He writes:
Each of these rights [rights man
enjoys as a
member of political society], of
course, involves an obligation on the part of
all others
r
But each of these rights, it
P f Ct it
?5 be
should
remembered, is also founded on a
corresponding duty on the part of its possessor.
The right to freedom of religion,
for example,
is based on the duty to worship
God, just as
the right to work is based on the duty
of selfpreservation and self-perfection.
‘

Feinberg disagrees with Neill.

Feinberg argues that it is

conceivable that an entity has

a

genuine right to some-

thing, X, but no corresponding duty to respect
the X's of

anyone else.

9

if what Feinberg calls

are conceivable, then

(10)

"dutyless rights"

is true even though

is

(12)

false

Again following Feinberg, Benn and Peters,
to

I

refer

the moral correlativity doctrine" as the doctrine which

endorses both
or only

(13)

(12)

and

(13).

Theorists who hold only

(12)

are said to hold a specific version of the

.
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moral correlativity doctrine.

If there are

,

dutyless
rights," then the logical
correlativity doctrine may
be
true even though the moral
correlativity doctrine is false.

Whether or not

a

theorist concedes "dutyless

rights" and, hence, affirms
or denies (12), turns on
whether or not the theorist
grants that non-ordinary
humans
(e.g., infants, mental
incompetents) or non-humans (e.g.,
animals) have rights.
Defenders of (12) argue that
an
entity's ability and willingness
to shoulder responsibilities is a prior condition for
recognizing or ascribing
rights to it.
The rationale in support of
(12) is that
acceptance of duties is the price an
entity must pay to
have rights.
Entities without moral natures, then,
do not
qualify as right-holders. Thus, appeal
to (12) often is
the grounds for supposing that animals
cannot be said to
have rights.
However, if one holds that infants and animals have rights though, lacking a moral
constitution, they
have no duties, then one denies (12). A
concession of

dutyless rights" in certain cases is an admission
that
ascription or recognition of rights may be appropriate
even
if the entity in question fails to satisfy
certain moral

conditions
The non-controversial proposition, then, is

(10).

Part of the task involved in assessing various correlativity
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theses about rights and
duties is^ Hofo
uuries
determining which of
(11) -(13) also are
true.
This is no easy matter.
It involves resolving some fairly
knotty issues.
Ross's discussion of propositions (10)
-(13) provides an instructive
case in point.
Ross assumes (10) is true.
He also assumes
that we have duties to
animals, though they have
no duties
to us.
if Ross's assumptions are
correct, then propositions (10) and (13) cannot both
be true, since together
they imply that our duty to
animals involves a duty of
animals to us.
Given Ross's assumptions,
(13) must be
false.
For similar reasons, given Ross's
assumptions,
propositions (11) and (12) cannot both
be true.
Together
they imply that our duty to animals
involves a duty of
animals to us, contrary to the initial
assumption.
Deciding which of (11) and (12) is true
is not so easy, however.
Should we say that although we have duties
to animals they have no rights against us, in
which case (11) is
•

i

false?

Or,

should we say that animals have rights against

us but no duties to us,

one denies

•

(11)

,

in which case

(12)

is false?

If

then one eliminates not only the possibil-

ity that animals have rights, but the added possibility

that so-called "duties of beneficence" generate rights to

beneficent treatment.

If one denies

(12),

cedes that there may be "dutyless rights."

correct view?

then one con-

which is the

t
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Theorists disagree.

Austin denies

11 ), arguing
that there are duties to
which no rights correspond,
viz.,
absolute duties" or "duties
of imperfect obligation"

(e.g., duties to God and
to animals).

affirm

(11)

but deny (12).

(

Benn and Peters

They argue:

r ° POSiti n

(12 >] raa Y
true in most
i
certainly.
some
cases
in which
it is 'not
attribute rights to infants,
idiot= anda even ani
mals, to
absurd to attribute duties. 10 whom it would be

casef ihere

e

-

Ross's solution has it both
ways.

Arguing that animals

have neither rights nor duties,
but that duties of beneficence do generate rights to
beneficent treatment, Ross
concludes that (11) is false when A
is not a moral agent
and true otherwise.
Since his doubt about (12) turned
on
whether or not animals have rights, and
since he resolves
that they do not, Ross concludes that
(12)

(12)

is true and

(11)

is true.

Thus,

sometimes is true.

Clearly, then, part of the task involved in
dis-

cussing cor relativity theses is to determine which
of (10)(13)

are, or are thought to be, true.

to determine which of

(10) -(13)

A separate task is

is advocated when it is

claimed that rights and duties are correlative.

For exam-

ple, which pair of propositions is intended when it
is

claimed that rights and duties are "opposite sides of the
same coin,

"the same relation viewed from different
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perspectives"?

Which is intended when it
is claimed that
"rights and duties cannot exist
without the other"?
The problem of identifying
which correlativity
theses claims are intended often
arises because correlativity theses are asserted in
conjunction with other theses.
For instance, Korkunov argues
that since duties cannot exist without corresponding
rights in a definite person, "it is impossible to derive
all legal relations from
the assertion of a right." 11
Claims about the derivation,
the logical priority, or the
justification of rights or of
duties frequently are asserted as part
of correlativity
packages.
This often makes it difficult to determine
just
which proposition of (10) -(13) is intended.

Propositions

(10) -(13)

provide

a

general schema

for identifying different correlativity theses.

So far,

two logically independent correlativity doctrines
have

been discussed, the logical and the moral correlativity

doctrines.

Consider

different correlativity doctrine,

a

one for the specific case of legal rights and legal duties.
The legal correlativity doctrine

.

The Correlativity Posi-

tion on legal rights asserts that legal rights and legal

duties are correlative.
adapting propositions

Just what does this mean?

(10) -(13)

By

to the case of legal rights

and legal duties specifically, one gets an account of what
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might be meant by saying
legal rights and legal
duties are
correlative, analogous to the
account given of rights
and
duties generally:
(10

)

(H

)

If A has a legal right
against B, then B
~
has a legal duty to A.
-

If B has a legal duty to
A, then A has a
legal right against B.

(12')

if a has a legal right
against ~
B, then A
has a legal duty to B.
-

(13’)

If A has a legal duty to B,
then A
~ has a
legal right against B.

All theorists who hold that
legal rights and legal
duties are correlative hold (10').
They agree with Austin
that every legal right presupposes
a legal duty incumbent
on a party other than the party entitled. 12
Although some

theorists (e.g., Hohfeld, Feinberg) hold
that (10') is
true only when 'right' is used in its
proper sense, they
agree that when 'right' is used correctly,
(10')

Thus, all Correlativity Position advocates
hold

is true.

(10').

However, some Correlativity Position theorists
argue that

(11')

also is true, and that (10') and

(11')

taken

together capture what is meant by saying that legal rights
and legal duties are correlative.
tion.

This is Hohf eld

1

s

posi-

Of his proposal to describe a right in terms of "its

correlative," duty, Hohfeld writes:
In other words if X has a right against Y that
he shall stay off the former's land, the correlative
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x“o say^f^hi

place?13

Y 12 Und6r a dut
y to ™rd

where 'right' is used in
the proper sense of
"claim-right,"
Hohfeld states that:

another Phase of the same
-that
nat 1S
is
the whole riqht-dutv" >-oi relation
=
may ® viewed
from differen? angles. 14
,

4--;

Hohfeld

'

,

position is adopted by legal
theorist
Holland, who argues that the
pair of correlative terms
's

'legal right' and

'legal duty' express, in
each case,

"the
same state of facts viewed
from opposite sides." 15 Both
Hohfeld and Holland accept the
conjunction of (10') and
(11') as what is meant by
the claim that legal rights and
legal duties are correlative.

Julius Stone grants that bilaterality,
or the endorsement of (10') and (11')
generally is regarded as a
mark of a legal system. 16 However,
Stone's own view is
that it is conceivable that a legal
order could be framed
,

so as to impose only duties on members
of society.

lar views are advanced by Kelsen and Feinberg.)

concludes that the issue whether or not

a

(Simi-

Stone

particular duty

has a right in some other person correlative
to it, i.e.,

whether or not (11')

is true,

tual grounds alone.

It "turns on interpretation or policy

or both.

it

17

cannot be decided on concep-
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Other theorists argue
against
that,

(

11

')

D n the grounds

in faot,

there are legal duties
which do not correany rights of determinate
persons.
For example,
C. K. Allen argues
that duties imposed by
criminal law often have no corresponding
legal right:
s pertinent to bear
in mind the preponderance
of public over private
crimes when we
told
W
n a tl
t ° ld
that aU
are reXtive to rights
r
xt would seem, on the
*.
contrary
that
th
ur crimin al law swarms with
Y
duties
wh? n
n
rrela ed t0 1Sgal
but
arf
'absolut:. dnt?°
i
^ Utles ln Austin's
sense, imposed by
4-v,
the organized power of the
State in the general
interests of society. 18
i-

L

*4” ^?4s

'

'

^ts,

,

.

The legal duty not to possess
certain sorts of objects
(e.g.,

counterfeiting and burglary equipment)
and the duty
to hang a condemned criminal
frequently are cited
as ex-

amples of legal duties for which there
is no correlative
legal right vested in any determinate
person (s).

Markby advances

a

view similar to Allen's.

Citing

the examples of the legal duties to
abstain from cruelty to

animals and from certain acts of immorality,
Markby contends that "there are, in fact, many duties to
which there
are no corresponding rights," even though "no right
can

exist unless there is

a

duty correlative to it."^

Like

Allen and Markby, theorists Gray, Holmes and Kelsen also

affirm (10') but deny (11'). 20
What about propositions (12') and (13')?

Many le-

gal theorists hold that legal right-holders also are legal
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duty-bearers, and vice versa.

They accept the view that

entities having legal rights
also have at least one legal
duty, and entities having
legal duties also have at
least
one legal right.
But notice that neither view
is what is
asserted at (12') and (13'). what
is asserted
at

(12')

is

that if an entity. A, has a
legal right to something against another entity, B, then A
also has some legal duty
to B; the converse is asserted
at (13').
Thus, it is open
for theorists who accept the
view that all legal rightholders are legal duty-bearers, and
vice versa to deny
(12
or (13
,

'

)

'

)

.

Furthermore, neither (12*) nor

(13

•)

is what Cor-

relativity Position theorists mean by the
statement that
legal rights and legal duties are correlative.
As
the

quotes cited indicate, what is meant by that
statement is
either simply (10'), or (10') and (11') taken
together.

Correia tivity Position theorists would distinguish
between
claims which they accept as true about legal right-holders
and legal duty-bearers, and claims which they offer as
in-

terpretations of the statement that legal rights and legal
duties are correlative.

Thus, even if

(12')

and

(13')

are

true and accepted as true by Correlativi
ty Position theorists, the Cor r ela t i vi ty Position on legal rights is not

identified in terms of them.
All Correlativity Position theorists endorse (10');
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some, but not all, endorse

then,

of

(11

,

as well

.

For Qur

the Correlativity Position
is characterized in
terms

(10'): A given position
on legal rights is the
Correl-

ativity Position if, and only
if, it endorses (10').
i
refer to "the legal correlativity
doctrine" as the doctrine
Which endorses 10 ') and (11');
theorists who subscribe to
only (10') endorse a specific
version of the legal correlativity doctrine. Thus, while the
Correlativity Position
on legal rights is characterized
in terms of the specific
legal correlativity thesis given
at (10'), some Correlativity Position theorists subscribe
to the
(

stronger, gen-

eral legal correlativity doctrine
given as the conjunction
of theses (10
and (11
'

)

'

)

.

To review, there are three separate
doctrines of

the correlation of rights and duties:
the logical, the moral,

and the legal correlativity doctrines.

Theorists who

claim that rights and duties are correlative
may mean by
that claim any one, or any combination, of the
six statements given at

(10) -(13),

(10')

and

(11').

Some theorists

accept specific versions of all three doctrines; other
accept only versions of the logical or legal doctrines;
others, viz., theorists who deny the meaningfulness
Oj.

non-legal right', may accept only a version of the legal

correlativity doctrine.
A discussion of all three doctrines, and not just
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of the legal correlativi
tv
ctrine, is important to
y doctrine
the
defense of (T)
It enables one to
isolate oorrelativity

^

•

.

theses about legal rights
and legal duties from
other correlativity theses.
it also enables one to
clarify just
What is, and what is not,
endemic to the Correlativity
Position on legal rights.
Two Objections to

(T)

There are two basic objections
to

volve the notion of

a

legal duty.

(T)

which in-

The first, what

I call
"the Correlativity Position
Objection," assumes the legal

correlativity thesis given at (10'):
"Natural objects cannot have legal rights because we
do not and cannot have
legal duties to them."
The second, what I
call "the Legal

Duty Objection," assumes a connection
between being a
legal right-holder and being a legal
duty-bearer not given
by any of the correlativity theses (10')
-(13'): "Natural
objects cannot have legal rights because they
cannot have
legal duties.
Both are plausible objections
'

to

(T)

The remainder of the chapter is a defense of

against both objections.
three sections help

(T)

The discussions of the first

to set up the arguments against the

Correlativity and the Legal Duty Objections, advanced in
the last two sections, respectively.

Even

though
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the discussions of all
three sections are
relevant to both
Objections, the discussion
of the first section
("duties
to" versus "duties
concerning") is of particular
importance
to assessing the
Correlativity Position Objection.
it fo _
ouses on a familiar distinction
which is invoked in arguments designed to show that
humans cannot have duties
to
non-humans, and that non-humans
can have neither rights
against, nor duties to, humans.

duties

to" versus "duties concerning

distinguish between "duties to"
concerning"

(or,

(or,

."

Theorists often

toward)

and "duties

regarding, involving, relating to,
in

respect of) in discussions of the
correlation of rights
and duties.
Only duties which are "duties to"
correlate
with another person's rights; statements
of "duties concerning" others neither entail, nor
are entailed by, statements of the other's rights.
So, for example, Bernard
Mayo argues that the doctrine of the
correlativity of
rights and duties does not extend to all
duties the discharge of which involves a specific persons or
persons.
There must be a duty to that person in order for
the person concerned to have a right 21
.

Quite naturally, the distinction between "duties
to" and

"duties concerning" also features in arguments for

the rightlessness of non-humans.

It is argued that since

^

"
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not have any duties to
non-humans, even though we
may be said to have duties
concerning them, they have
no
rights against us.
For example, Kant argues
that we cannot be said to have duties
to animals distinct from
whatever duties we have regarding
them:
To judge by mere reason,
man has no dnfiPQ
except to men (himself or
others),.
[Man
there6
n a e ”° dUtY t0 any
beln
°ther
than
9
man
And i£ h
® Upposes
hat he has such another
duty then th^s
auty,
this happens through an
amphiboly of
the concepts of reflection;
and so hil supposed
6S
oth ® r bein 9 s is merely his
dutydo himself
self.
He is led to this misunderstanding
because
he confuses his duty regarding
other hedge
n
9
a duty toward these bil
ngs. 22
'

y

,

For Kant,
to humans

"duties to animals" actually are
just "duties
.

Some theorists suppose that even the
expression

duty to" is ambiguous; only some
"duties to"
with rights of others.
Feinberg, for

correlate

instance, argues

that 'to' in

'B

has a duty to A’

is ambiguous and obscures

crucial distinction between two distinct
offices A could
be said to occupy, the office of claimant
(creditor, proa

misee)

or the office of mere beneficiary (i.e., a party

who/which stands to benefit from performance of an owed
act
but who/which is not a claimant). 23
owed another.

A duty is something

When it is said that B owes A something,

whether or not A has

a

right to what is owed depends on

which office A occupies.

When A occupies the office of

,
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claimant

then B's duty to A
generates a right of A's
to
the owed act.
However, when A occupies
the office of mere
beneficiary, then A has no
rights to the owed act.
Thus,
while it always follows
from the fact that a party
is a
claimant that it has a right
to what is owed, it
does not
always follow from the fact
that a party is an intended
beneficiary that it has a right
to what is owed.
Only ben-

eficiaries who/whioh also are
claimants have rights to
promised acts.
Hart offers a similar line of
reasoning about the
ambiguity of the preposition 'to'
to show that we should
not extend to animals and babies
whom it is wrong to illtreat the notion of a right to
proper treatment. While
animals and babies are affected by
our ill-treatment
of

them,

and may stand to benefit by the
performance of any
duties we have not to ill-treat them,
the office they occupy in such cases is that of the mere
beneficiary 24 Lik
.

Feinberg, Hart suggests that it is only
where 'to' in 'B
has a duty to A' indicates that A occupies
the office of
claimant that A correctly can be said to have
a right.
The view which emerges, then, is that rights
are

correlative with duties only where duties are "duties
to
claimants," and not where they are "duties to mere beneficiaries" or "duties concerning."

Since what sometimes is

expressed as "duties to" natural objects really are only

.
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"duties to mere beneficiaries"
or "duties concerning
natural objects," natural
objects cannot have rights
against
us

The question here is
whether humans could be said
to have legal duties to
natural objects. One way
to put
this is to ask whether
natural objects ever could
be said
to occupy the office of
claimant.
if so
then the sugges _
tion is that they could have
rights to owed acts.
what has
been said already in connection
with the Claim Position on
legal rights suggests that they
could be so described, i.e.,
they could be said to have
claims against us.
Is there another way of showing that humans
could be said to have
legal duties to natural objects?
order to answer this
question,
the next two sections I consider
the kinds of
,

m

m

duties commonly accepted as instances
of genuine "duties
to" and the notion of a legal duty.
Ki nds of duties

.

In his essay "Duties,

Feinberg identifies ten kinds of duties.

Rights, and Claims,"
He argues that

only seven of these necessarily are correlated
with rights
of others.

Since Feinberg'

s

account is as complete and re-

presentative as any offered, the discussion of kinds of
duties which follows is limited to the account he gives.
The ten kinds of duties identified by Feinberg are

what he calls duties "of indebtedness," "of commitment,"
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of reparation,"
"of respect,"

"of need-fulfiiument,
illment

"

"of
of reciprocation,"

"of community membership,"
"of compelling

appropriateness," and "of obedience."

He argues that the
first five necessarily are
correlated with other people's
E ersonam rights (i.e., rights against some
specific,
nameable person (s) requiring
performance of some act).
The
duties of respect and of community
membership necessarily
are correlated with other people's
in rem rights (i.e.,
rights which bold, not against some
specific, nameable person (s)
but against "the world at large").
The remaining
three kinds of duties are not necessarily
correlated with
other people's rights.
Each of the first seven kinds of
duties permits talk of one party owing
something to an26
other.
if one accepts Feinberg's account
of which kinds

—

,

of duties are, and which are not, necessarily
correlated

with rights of others, then only

a

discussion of the first

seven kinds of duties is relevant here.
"Duties of indebtedness" are duties arising out of

contracts and are the most familiar case of one party's
owing something to another.

In the relation between debtor

and creditor, the debtor is said to owe something to the

creditor, who has

a

right to what is owed.

"Duties of commitment," being based on promises,

provide another case of owing.

obligated to

a

promisee, who has

A promisor is said to be
a

right to the services

.
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or goods promised.

Where dutiesS of
commitment are obli ga tions to mere benefirTat-ioc
LL
beneficiaries, the
intended beneficiaries
have no rights against
the promisor.
The third kind of
duties

»^„+.
duties

of reparation,"
are duties to repair
harm done or to
otherwise make good a
loss caused by "negligence,
recklessness, carelessness,
,

dishonesty, malevolence,
or the like...
The duty-bearer is
said to owe reparation
to the claimant.
"Duties of need-fulfillment"
are less obvious oases
of owing.
Feinberg describes them
as "duties abundance
owes to need." His example
is from an advertisement
for
a set of recordings
by Winston Churchill.
According to the
advertisement, Churchill "feels
that he owes this legacy
to
the world."
Feinberg construes this as a
duty of need-fulfillment Churchill has, giving
rise to in personam rights
in others

"Duties of reciprocation" are
related to duties of
gratitude except that reciprocation
does, while gratitude
may not, require action.
if a benefactor once freely
gave
his/her services to a beneficiary
in need whose circumstances now put the beneficiary in
a position to help the
former benefactor, then the beneficiary
is said now to owe
the former benefactor his/her
services.
According to

Feinberg, the ex-benefactor has right
to receive help now
from the former beneficiary, who has
a duty to proffer such

^
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help.

According to Peinberg,
"duties of respect" and
'duties of community
membership" necessarily
are correlated with other people's
in rem rights.
Duties of respect
typically are correlated with
"negative rights," i.
e .,

rights to other people's
abstentions, forbearances,
or
noninterference.
Duties of respect are
duties to refrain
from obtruding upon or
interfering with the person
or property (including the privacy)
of others.
They are typified by the duty we all
have to stay off a landowner's
property.
"Duties of community membership"
typically are
correlated with "positive rights,"
i.e., rights to another's
performance of some pul,
act ratner
rather than
fhan to mere omissions.
Duties of community membership
include the "duty of care
that every citizen is said to
owe to any and every person
a position to be injured by
his negligence" and the duty
to come to the aid of accident
victims.
Feinberg calls
these duties, and the rights correlative
to them, duties
and rights of community membership
because "it is their recognition, more than anything else, that
molds a society
into a cohesive community ."

m

On Feinberg'

s

account, where

a

duty is an instance

of one of these seven kinds of duties, statements
of duties

entail statements of other person's rights, and
statement
of rights

(i.e.,

rights of indebtedness, of commitment, of
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reparation, of respect, and
of con^unity membership)
entail
statements of other people's
duties.
Thus, to say they
"are necessarily correlated
with rights of others" is
to
endorse the logical correlativitv
doctrine the conjunction
y aoctnne,
of (10) and (11)
.

Femberg

is among the many theorists
who accept

both the logical and the legal
correlativity doctrines.
Where right refers to
"claim-rights" and 'duty' refers

to

something one party owes another,
Feinberg endorses both
sets of propositions (10) and
(11),

It is reasonable to suppose,

and

and

(10')

(11').

therefore, that Feinberg

's

description of the kinds of duties which
necessarily are
correlated with rights of others can be
extended to cover
legal contexts.

Do examples of genuine legal rights
and

legal duties bear this out?

Legally binding contracts or promises generate
legal rights and legal duties which fit Feinberg
's description of rights and duties "of indebtedness"
and "of commit-

ment."

Negligence law permits legal reparation for harm

and injury due to another's carelessness, generating
legal

rights and legal duties falling under Feinberg'

cation of rights and duties "of reparation."

s

classifi-

Legal rights

of landowners against trespassers, and legal duties of tres-

passers to stay off another's land, provide examples of
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what Feinberg calls
right and duties „ Qf
respect
tive nuissance doctrine
imposes legal duties on

„

parties for

to use due care against
injured other parties,

generating remedial rights
of injured parties.
These’ rights
and duties fit Feinberg
s description of
rights and duties
"of community membership."
The only questionable
cases are
Whether there are legal
rights and legal duties
fitting
Feinberg
description of rights and
duties "of need-fulfillment" and "of reciprocation."
However, whether
'

or not
there are these other kinds
of legal rights and duties,
it
is clear that legal contexts
provide examples of at least
five kinds of duties which,
according to Feinberg, necessarily are correlated with rights.
Th e notion of__a_l egal duty

.

There is not the variation in

accounts of legal duties that we have
seen in accounts of
legal rights.
The pattern has been to focus on
analyses
of

'legal right' and to characterize
a legal duty as what

one party owes another, viz., a
right-holder.

Despite dif-

ferences among theorists on the meaning
of 'legal right',
they all agree that a legal duty is what
one party is re-

quired (compelled, commanded, obligated, bound)
by positive
law to do or forbear from doing.
This is illustrated by

considering

a

sampling of views on legal duties offered by

different rights position theorists.
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Austin's view is that to
have
liable to

a

legal duty is to be

legal sanction in the event
of disobeying a
command.
Parties who/which are commanded
to do or forbear from doing acts covered
by the sanction are said
to
"lie under a duty."
a

Power theorist Gray offers
virtually the same view:

ebearances which an organized
society
societv'Vm
^°J
will enforce
are the legal duties of
Wh ° Se 3CtS and f °rbearances
are
enforced?29
Power theorist Holland argues that
whenever one is entitled
to have others act or forbear,
and the other's performance
is enforced by the power of the
State, then these acts and
forbearances are the other's legal duties. 30
Holland argues that it does not matter whether
one describes these
compelled acts or forbearances as one
party's legal duties,
or as another party's legal rights:
...when the State will compel B to carry out,
either by act or forbearance, the wishes of
A, we may indifferently say that A has
a legal
right, or that B is under a legal duty.^i
Thus, Gray's and Holland's views are that legal
duties are

those acts or forbearances which an organized society
will

require and enforce.
Salmond
a

'

s

version of the Interest Position is that

right is "any interest, respect for which is a duty, and

the disregard of which is a wrong.

"

A legal duty is "an

.
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act the opposite of which
should be a legal wrong ." 32
To
say an entity has a legal
duty is to say it is
legally
wrong for the entity not to
act in certain ways.

Consider two more examples.

Rules Position theorists Benn and Peters describe
a legal duty as what
a legal
rule requires a party to do
to some other party, vis.,
the
icjht - holder

Thsy write:

-

.

If we say that Y has a duty
to act in a certain
way, we mean that there is
a rule that 1leave?
®s
him no choice in the matter
matter, fhnf
that 'requires'
it of him 33
.

An entity is said to have
a legal rule

a

legal duty insofar as there is

which requires that it do some
act to some

other party.
On Feinberg's claim view of rights,
a legal right-

holder is

a

claimant, one who has

a

claim
2

other party to something owed.
owed to a claimant, and

a

against some

A legal duty is what is

legal duty-bearer is the party

who/which owes something to

a

claimant.

since ascription

of legal rights and legal duties is
governed by legal

rules, an entity has a legal duty when,
according to the

governing legal rules, it owes something to others
(i.e.,
claimants)

These examples suffice to show that the notion of
a

legal duty as what an entity is required by positive law

to do or forbear from doing is accepted by theorists of
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different historical positions
on legal rights.
A legal
duty-bearer is the entity
who/which is so required.
Two questions arise.

First, could humans be
said

to have legal duties to
natural objects?

Second, could
natural objects be said to
have legal duties to humans?
If the answer to both
questions is "yes," then both
the
Correlativity Position and the
Legal Duty Objections to
(T)

fail.

Legal duties are
of one party owing another
party something.

Enti-

ties have legal duties when
positive law requires that
they act or forbear in certain
ways.
Are there plausible examples of legal situations
where persons could be

described as owing something to natural
objects, or as
required by positive law to act or forbear
in certain
ways? That is, could humans be said
to have legal duties
to natural objects?
If so, then the Correlatively
Pos-

ition Objection to

(T)

has no force.

In Chapter VII it was argued that one could
mod-

ify existent legal rules, or fashion new rules,
according to which natural objects could be construed
as legal

right-holders. Some of those rules also provide

a

basis for

.
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g that humans could be
said to have legal
duties to

natural objects.

rule (R3) and accepted
legal rule
<R3)

N ° hUmanS
1

^

For instance,
reoonsider

^spass
r

(

R8

)

:

°n wilderness areas.

1

care inder toe circSmstfnces! e t0

US<5

dUS

one way to interpret
(R3, is aS a
duty-imposing rule a
rule which requires
humans to act or forbear
so as not to
s on wilderness
P
areas.
The duties imposed
could be
described as duties of
noninterference owed by humans
not
specially exempted to
wilderness areas. These are
duties
which fit Feinberg's
description of "duties of
respect."
Appeal to (R3), then, could
provide the basis for construing humans as having
certain legal duties to wilderness areas, viz, a legal
duty not to trespass on
wilderness areas
,

This example shows that one
could speak meaningfully of "duties to natural
objects" and do so while
leaving open the question whether
natural objects can have
legal rights.
Of course, if (11*) is true,
as many
theorists hold, then the example
does also show that
natural objects could be said to
have (legal) rights.
But
neither the Correlativity Position nor
the Correlativity

Position Objection assumes (11*).
Hence, where the view is that

(10')

Each assumes

(10')

is true and that

only.

,
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^

natural objects cannot
have rights because „
e cannot
any duties to them,
the example shows
this view incorrect.
It is incorrect because
talk of duties to
natural objects
is meaningful and
plausible in at least the
case where the
ascription of legal duties
is justified by
appeal to
governing legal rules.
Take another case.

Suppose

a

particular forest

contains a stand of a rare
species of tree and that, in
the
area where these trees grow,
it is clearly marked
that all
humans should use exceeding
care in trespassing in the
area.
Suppose further, that a particular
group of hikers,
through "negligence, recklessness,
carelessness," and the
like intentionally destroy
large portions of the stand of
trees.
By appeal to the basic rule
of negligence law,
(R8),

a proper

authority (e.g.

an administrative agency,

court) may find them liable for
failure to use due care
under the circumstances.
In particular, they could be
a

construed as having what Feinberg calls
"duties of reparation" and as owing this reparation
to the forest to repair
damages done.
of course, this is not how
the legal

situation presently would construe the facts;
but it could
so construe them. Humans could be construed
as having
duties of reparation" to natural objects.
Two objections might be advanced at this point.
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first is that the argument
for saying humans could
be
described as having legal
duties to natural

^

because it simply assumes
that natural objects have
legal
rights and that is the
question at issue. This
objection
misses the mark, however.
Of course, it is true
that by
providing an account of why
humans could be said to have
legal duties to natural
objects one also thereby
provides
reasons for supposing natural
objects could
have legal

rights.

This is true, but not because
the question of
rights for natural objects is
begged.
it is true because
there is an important connection
between the notions of a
legal right and a legal duty.
That is what the Correlativity Position is all about.
Some theorists (e.g.,
Salmond)

put this by saying that the relation
between

right' and

and 'wife.'

'duty'

is like the relation between

'husband'

By providing reasons for supposing
a woman is

wife one also provides reasons for supposing
someone else
is a husband.
But it does not follow that an argument for

a

saying that a particular woman is

a

wife merely assumes

that someone else is a, perhaps her, husband.
the meaning of

wives,

'wife,

'

to tests for identifying women as

to particular facts about the woman in question

together provide reasons for saying
a wife.

Appeal to

a

particular woman is

By analogy, by providing reasons for supposing

.
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that we could be said
to have legal duties
to natural
objects one also provides
reasons for supposing that
natural objects could have
legal rights.
But it does not
follow that the argument
given here for why „e
could be
said to have legal duties
to natural objects
merely assumes
they could have legal
rights.
Appeal to the meaning
of 'legal duty,' to
examples of legal duties,
and to legal
^ tu.3. t io n s where
nere fhp
the legal relation properly
is described
as a case of one party's
owing something to another
together provide reasons for saying
that humans could be
said to have legal duties to
natural objects.
•

l

The second objection is that
the proper description of the relation between
natural objects and individual humans in the examples
given is not that of one party

owing something to another, as

I

have maintained.

Rather,
it is of one party being obliged
to act in certain ways

with regard to natural objects.

But such statements about

being obliged do not entail statements
about having duties.
Thus, the objection goes, we may be
obliged to act in

certain ways where natural objects are concerned,
but we
have no duties to act in those ways towards
natural
objects
The second objection involves

being obliged and having

a duty.

a

distinction between

What is it to be obliged?

Some theorists suggest a distinction between different
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senses of

'oblige.^

Inonesense

(call it . QbUge
to be obliged is to
be ordered or
threatened.
To saj a
party is obliged is
to say that the party
1
is given an
order backed by threats.
A person forced at
gunpoint to
hand over his/her wallet
is obliged, to do
so.
Xn a secoi*
sense (call it "oblige,"),
to be obliged is to
have a
moral duty, to be morally
bound.
To say a party is
iged
is to say the party
has a moral duty.
2
Being obliged to keep one's
promises is having a moral
2
duty to do
SO.
Statements that someone is
obliged, do not, though
statements that one is obliged.,
do, entail statements
about
_

one's duties.

it is only where

'oblige' is "oblige," that

persons have duties to act or
forbear.
Using this

distinction, the objection is that

although we may be obliged
1

to act or forbear in certain

ways where natural objects are
concerned, we are not
obliged to do so, i.e., we are
not morally bound to do
2
Thus, we have no duties to natural
objects.

so.

The second objection also fails,
and it fails for
an important reason.

senses of

'oblige'

The distinction between the two

is a distinction between being ordered

or threatened to do something and
having a moral duty to
do something.
The sense of 'oblige' according to which

statements about being obliged entail statements
about

having a duty is the second sense, oblige

.

As such,

the
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duties referred to are

m^

duties.

But the Correlate,
Position and the argument
g i ven here a g ainst its
objection
(T) make no claims
about whether humans have
moral
duties to natural objects.
Even if we have no moral
duties
to them, and, hence,
are not obli g ed to treat
them in
2
certain ways, it is still
open whether we could have
legal
duties to them.

This rebuttal raises a
crucial issue.
Certainly
it is suspect whether we
have moral duties to natural
Objects, and whether they have
moral rights against us.
But arguments intended to
show that we have no moral
duties
to them do not show, as so
many theorists mistakenly have
assumed, that we could not be
said to have legal duties to
them.
This would be the case only if
it were assumed in
law that a person’s having legal
duties to another presupposes that the person has moral
duties to the other,
i.e., (14):
(14)

If b has a legal duty to A, then
B has a
~
moral duty to A.

Proposition

(14)

,

taken together with the claim that we

have no moral duties to natural objects,
does yield the

conclusion that we have no legal duties to them.
if any,

legal theorists hold

(14)

.

But few,

This is because all

theorists who hold some correlativi
ty thesis about legal
rights and legal duties hold (10').

But

(10')

and (14)

.

,

.
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taken together imply
(15)

:

If a has a legal right
against £
B, then B
has a moral duty to A.
-

(15)

And few, if any, legal
theorists hold (15).
not, and would not want
to, hold

Thus,

they do

(14)

Similarly, the claim that
natural objects have no
moral rights supports the
Correlativity Position Objection
that humans cannot have legal
duties to natural objects
only if proposition 16 is
assumed:
(

(16)

)

If B has a legal duty to A,
then ~
A has
moral right against B.

Proposition

(16)

,

a

taken together with the claim that

natural objects do not have moral
rights, does yield the
(17)
conclusion
that we have no legal duties to them.
But few,
if any, legal theorists hold
(16).
This is because they
hold (10
and (10') and (16) taken together imply
(17)
which few, if any, of them hold:
)

,

If A has a legal right against B, then
A
has a moral right against B.

Thus,

they do or would reject (16)

What this points out is that, in discussions of

correlativity theses and duties to non-humans, one must
keep separate the moral positions and the legal positions.

While it may be significant and true that humans and
natural objects cannot be parties to a moral right-duty

relationship, this does not show that they cannot be

)
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Parties to

a

legal right-duty
relationship,

said so far is plausible,

if what I

it is possible that
they could

be parties to legal
right-duty relationships.

The Legal Duty Object
on
.

^

(t)

is that natural objects
cannot have legal rights
because
they cannot have legal
duties. 35

Could natural objects be

said to have legal duties?

That is, could they be
required

by positive law to act or
forbear in certain ways?
Consider again the view that
appeal to legal rules
provides a justification for
ascription of legal duties to
entity, and the legal rule
that contracts must be kept,
(R12).

(R12)

is an example of what Hart
calls a "primary

rule of objection" or

a

"duty imposing rule."

in effect

It stipulates that parties to
contracts are obligated by
law to keep the terms of contracts
into which they enter.
By introducing "secondary rules"
or "power conferring

rules," one can make explicit the content
of primary rules
such as (R12). Secondary rules (R16)
,

(R17)

and

(R18),

for example, might be introduced in
connection with rule
(R12)

:

(R16)

Rule (R12) is recognized as a primary rule
of obligation of the legal system which
imposes on parties to contracts the obligation to act or forbear in the ways
specified in the contract.

(R17

The courts and legislatures have the powers
to recognize natural objects as parties to

.
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contracts
<R18)

Whl ° h are
rties to contracts have rec °9ni^d as
parties
p
the obliaatinn

£

contract^

^^

+•«

(R16)

identifies (R12) as a primary
rule of the legal
system, (R17) confers powers
on courts and legislatures
to
create legal duties for natural
objects, and (R18) specifies that natural objects
which are parties to contracts
have certain legal duties.
However, by appeal to rules
(R12) and (R16)-(R18), a
means is provided for recognizing
natural objects as genuine legal
duty-bearers. 36
As

parties to contracts,

they could be required by
positive

law to act or forbear in certain
ways.

Perhaps it will be objected that
this argument
fails because natural objects cannot
act or forbear, that
"acts" properly understood are what
philosophers call
actions,
i.e.
willed events, and that only humans can
perform actions. Since legal duties are
described as acts
,

or forbearances required by law, natural
objects cannot

have legal duties.
This objection has no punch.
a

condition of an entity's having

be able to act or forbear,

a

When it is said that
legal duty is that it

it is assumed that all legal

persons satisfy that condition.

Either they themselves

have that capacity, or their legal representatives have

it.

,
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m

either case, as Markby
says of corporations,
-so far as
it is possible that
acts should be done
through a representative it will be presumed
that a corporation may
do
these acts ." 37 Thus, if
one extends the doctrine
of legal
representation to cover natural
objects, the condition that
legal duty-bearers have the
capacity to act or forbear
is
a condition which natural
objects could be said

to satisfy.
The Legal Duty Objection
is not saved by any argument
which supposes otherwise.

Summary
Two objections to

(T)

have been stated and de-

feated, the Correlativity Position
Objection and the Legal
Duty Objection.
it has been shown
that humans could be

said to have legal duties to natural
objects, and that
natural objects could be said to have
legal duties to

humans.

The discussion of this chapter completes
the

first of the two moves in defense of

(T)

viz., the move

to defend it against reasonable
objections based on the

historical positions on legal rights and legal rightholders.

The task in the next chapter, Chapter IX, is to

complete the second move in defense of

(T)

,

viz.,

the move

to defend it against non-histor ical position objections.

:

CHAPTER

!

x

remaining objections
In this Chapter plausible
objections to and con-

cerning

which do not presuppose any
particular historical position on legal
rights and legal right-holders
are
stated and defeated.
These are objections which
could be
advanced by theorists of any
of the eight historical
positrons.
By defeating them, the
case for (T) is complete.
(T)

No n Historical Position s on
Legal Right-Holders
T he Moral Person and t h e
Moral Rights Positions

The Moral
Person Position is the position
which affirms any of the
following as necessary conditions of
an entity, X, having
legal rights: X is a moral person,
a moral agent, subject
to moral law; X is rational,
capable of choice, has a
will.
Typically, then, the Moral Person Position,
is

construed as an endorsement of
(18)

(18)

For any entity, if X has legal rights,
X is a moral person.

then

The Moral Person Position is related closely
to

another position, what
on legal right-holders.

endorsement of

(19)

I

call "the Moral Rights Position"

Typically, it is construed as an

:
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<19)

a y
tity X '. if * has le al
',
rights,
?
^
rnen
then Xx has
h^ moral
rights.

On the assumption that
all and only moral persons
have moral rights,
18
and (19) are logically
equivalenfc
However, it is possible that a
theorist might deny the
existence of non-legal, "moral"
rights, yet affirm that
(

,

there are moral persons, i.e.,
persons capable of choice,
of acting, of willing.
For this reason, whatever
connections do hold between them, the
two positions are treated
separately here.
The Moral Person and the Moral
Rights Positions

seem to generate the following two
objections to (T)
respectively: "Natural objects cannot have
legal rights because they are not moral persons";
"Natural objects cannot
have legal rights because they cannot be
said to have

moral rights."

According to the Moral Person Objection,

natural objects are not the appropriate sort
of entity to
have legal rights; they are not moral persons.

According

to the Moral Rights Position Objection, moral
rights are

not the sort of rights natural objects could be said
to
have.

Is either objection damaging to

(T) ?

The Moral Person Position Objection

.

The Moral

Person Objection is that natural objects cannot have legal
rights because they are not moral persons.

It assumes that

the moral personality of non-humans must be established if a
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move to give natural
objects legal rights ls
to be taken
seriously.
Even Christopher Stone
seems to make this
assumption when he defends
the natural object
more, N0 M,
by arguing that natural
objects have wants and
needs.
He
writes, "natural objects
can communicate their
wants
(needs) to us"; we can
say, for example, that
the smogendangered stand of P
pines
es wants
want^ the smog stopped,
or that
"the lawn wants water.
But all such arguments are
misguided.

They incor-

rectly assume that in order to
show that non-humans could
be legal right-holders one
must show that they are moral
persons.
Indeed, if non-humans were moral
persons that
would be good reason to extend
legal rights
to them.

And,

surely, our reluctance to extend
legal rights to non-humans
may be explained in part by our
association of rights with

moral persons.

But, as the doctrines of legal
personality

and legal representation make clear,
neither the non-moral
person status of non-humans, nor our
reluctance to ascribe

rights to non-humans, establishes that
non-humans cannot
have legal rights.
Trusts, funds, idols, ships and muni-

cipalities are not moral persons, though they have
been
treated as legal persons, bearers of legal rights
and

duties.

In order to accomodate these two doctrines,

then,

the Moral Person Position, like other positions
on legal

rights and legal right-holders, must abandon

(18)

in favor

.

.
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of

(20)

:

(20)

For any entity, X if y
h
legal rights
then X or X's lecral
9
representative
is a
moral person?

™

n

,

'

As long as there is
some moral person (e.g.,
a legal representative) in a position
to act on behalf of
natural
objects, natural objects
could be said to have
legal
rights

)

Thus, insofar as the Moral
Person Position adopts
rather than (20) it affirms
something about legal

right-holders which is false; hence,
it fails to generate
a plausible objection
to (T)
if the position is revised
to accomodate the doctrines
of legal personality and
legal
representation, abandoning (18) in
favor of

no objection to

(T)

.

in either
timer case,

(20),

it poses

the argument for

(T)

is secure against the Moral
Person Position.

The Moral Right s Position
Objection

.

The Moral

Rights Position Objection is that
natural objects cannot
have legal rights because they cannot
be said to have moral rights.
It fails for the same reason the
Moral Person
Position Objection fails.
To accomodate the accepted

doctrines of legal personality and legal
representation,
it must adopt
(21)

(21)

in lieu of

(19)

;

For any entity, X, if X has legal rights,
then X or X's legal representative has
moral rights.

?

,
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That is, If it is at all
plausible that a moral
rights
condition must be satisfied
for proper recognition
or as
cription of legal rights,
then it is the condition
given
at (21)
and not the condition
given at (19)
„h i
C h is

,

plausible.

As such, the Moral Rights
Position, like the
Moral Person Position does
not pose a damaging objection
'

to

(T)

.

Ot her positions

other less frequently asserted
views on
the necessary conditions for
an entity, X, to have legal
rights are that X is a member
of a community, X is capable
of self-movement, X has a soul,
X is subject to natural
law, and X is capable of being
party to a lawsuit.
Clearly/ the latter poses no
serious problems for (T)
.

.

The

argument that natural objects could be
said to have legal
rights on each of the eight historical
positions on legal
rights provides a basis for saying that
they could be
parties to lawsuits.
But what about the other four positions? Are they problematic for a defense
of

Each of the remaining four views is
the Moral Person Position.

a

(T)

variant on

As such, objections to

(T)

based on them are defeated by defeating the Moral
Person

Position Objection.

The assumption underlying the view

that only entities which are members of communities
can

have legal rights is that the existence of rights requires
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mutual recognition.

since such recognition
is possible
only among rational
beings, only they can
be "members of
communities." Hence
ence, nnh,
only they can have rights.
Natural
objects, non-rational beinas
cannot ube members of
g
communUties and, hence, cannot
have legal rights. As
John
Passmore puts it,
,

y

d Ubt

rm a immunity
wi?h°pianis 'an? m ?
rtl
a
1
e'
inVOlVeS "ll ?°ur of
ttM Si ?f if 15CyCle
essent ial to a community
that'thf
K
that the members
of it have common interests
1 obli 9ations, then
men,
nts, animals and soil do
P
not form a community. 2
Since this view assumes that
'community' means "moral
community" or "community of moral,
rational beings," it is
a version of the Moral
Person Position.
'

f°

fantffffr"^

The view that legal right-holders
must be capable
of self-movement also is a Moral
Person Position view.
It has been stated in various
ways: Only entities "capable
of exercising their own motion,"
"capable of rational

self-determination," or "capable of initiating
actioncan be legal right-holders.
it is not a view about sentient beings, or about any entities
who/which exhibit
behavior.

it is the view that only agents capable
of

choice or action can have legal rights.

Only they can

will movements, choose ends, initiate actions.
it is a Moral Person Position view.

As such,

,

.

,

.
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The case is the same
for the related views
of legal right-holders as
"havers of souls" or
"subjects of
natural law." Entl ties
having souls and subject
to natural
law are rational entities,
moral agents, i.e., moral
persons.
Like the other two views,
theses two views reduce
to the Moral Person
Position stance that only
moral persons can have legal rights.
They yenerate
qener^P no
no new or dam-

ping objections

to

(T)

Thus, none of the
non-historical positions on

legal right-holders subscribed
to in the American legal
tradition poses a successful
objection to (T)
On all the
.

manor views in American legal
theory on legal rightholders, natural objects could
be- described as legal
rightholders.
Remain ing Objections Concerning

(T)

The distinction between "objections
to" and objec-

tions concerning"

(T)

was introduced in connection with

the Moral Law Validation Position
Objection, in Chapter
VII.
If an objection raises reasonable
doubt about the

significance of establishing
cerning

(T)

the case for

(T)

it is an objection con-

if it questions the truth or plausibility
of
(T)

it is an objection to

mainder of this chapter

I

(T)

in the re-

consider three objections
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concerning

T,

ln the order in which
they are discussed
they are the Conflict of
Legal Rights Objection,
the
(

.

"Which Rights?" Objection,
and the Social Value
Objection.

Tj^pnflict

of Legal Ri ghts_Objection.

in a given situation.

X's and Y's rights to something,

Often legal rights

On a claim view of rights,
*,

conflict when X's and

Y S claims to * cannot both
be recognized.
'

view of rights, x's and Y's
rights to
rule (s) governing recognition
of

<j>

On a rules

conflict when the

X's right as valid and

the rule governing recognition
of Y's right as valid cannot both be realized.

The fact that legal rights often
conflict is the

basis of a reasonable objection
concerning

(T)

:

"if one

gives natural objects legal rights,
situations will arise
where rights of natural objects and rights
of humans will
conflict.

Some of these conflicts will involve some
basic,

inalienable rights of humans, e.g., the rights
of liberty
and of property.

Recognition as valid rights or claims of

natural objects would require that humans give up
some of
their basic rights and that basic human liberties
be re-

stricted.

But these rights and liberties are absolute and

nonsacrif iceable; there is no reasonable justification for

restricting them.

Thus,

in the only really important cases

where talk of rights matters— cases where rights conflict—

.
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t^e

is no reasonable
ground fQr recognizing
a rlght
0l a lm ° f 3 natUral

«

‘“Ving priority over

a

right or liberty of
humans."

^

basic

The Conflict of Legal
Rights objection raises
two
related issues: First,
in casec:
cases where rights of
natural
objects and rights of
humans conflict, would
recognition
as valid rights or
claims of natural objects
require that
we abandon the
well-entrenched view that
certain rights of
humans are absolute and
inalienable? Second, are
there
any reasonable grounds
for restricting the
rights or liberties of humans and, thereby,
for giving rights or
claims
Of natural objects priority
over rights or claims of
humans? Both issues must
be addressed in order to
defeat
Conflict of Legal Rights
Objection concerning (T)
In what follows 1 argue
that,

first, the view that

some rights of humans are
basic, absolute, or inalienable,
properly understood, is not
sacrificed by recognition of
some rights or claims of natural
objects as having priority over some rights or claims
of humans; second,
the

lustification for restricting the rights
and liberties of
humans where natural objects are
concerned need be no

different than the justification for
restricting the rights
and liberties of humans where other
humans are concerned.
For these two reasons, the Conflict
of Legal Rights Objection does not undermine the significance
of showing that

"
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natural objects could
have legal rights
(T)
Certainly the ascription
of legal rights to
natural objects will involve
llmitations Qn
exerc se of
many rights and liberties
of humans.
But such restrictions
are a feature of any
legal system in which
rights are ascribed, and not a peculiar
feature of a system in
which
rights are ascribed to
natural objects.
Furthermore, no
rights are "absolute" in
the sense that they
always have
priority against any competing
claims and never involve
any restrictions. All
rights are limited by rights
of
others or by duties imposed
on right-holders.
For example,
A's right to use and enjoy
his/her property does not permit A to dispose of the
property in any way A chooses,
or
to build any structures
which fit A’s fancy on the property.
Fire, health, building and
zoning regulations, to
cite a few, all restrict ones
"right to obtain and enjoy
property." Even traditional natural
rights theorists
admit these limitations on alleged
basic, inalienable
rights of humans.
Although they maintain that all humans
have certain absolute, inalienable
rights, they qualify
this by saying that there are restrictions
on the exercise
of those rights.
These are restrictions "necessary to
,

^

_

.

ensure each other man the free exercise of
the same
right

.

3

Thus,

the accepted view is that no right always
has
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priority over competing
claims, that the exercise
of any
right is subject to
limitations.
This point ofte „ is
put
by saying that "the
right to *" always is
understood as
a "prima facie right,"
i.e., a right to
* unless a stronger, competing claim
(right) is recognized
as valid.
Typically, theorists who
persist in describing an
actual right
as "absolute" mean by
that, that in the situation
at hand,
there is no competing claim
which overrides recognition
of
the right as valid.
Thus, whether one calls
actual rights
''prima facie rights" or
"absolute rights ," the accepted
view
is that all rights are
such that they may be overriden
by

competing claims (rights)

,

or their exercise may be re-

stricted.

Since it always is possible that
basic rights of
humans may be restricted or overridden
by competing claims
(rights)
the view that some rights are
"absolute"
,

or

"inalienable," when properly understood,
need not be sacrificed by recognition of some claims
(rights) of natural
objects as having priority over some claims
(rights) of
humans.

The case of natural objects would be
just another

example of what already is acknowledged about
"absolute"
or

inalienable" rights, viz., they can be restricted
or

overridden.

The pertinent question, then, is whether

there are grounds for restricting or overriding
claims
(rights)

of humans in order to recognize as valid competing
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claims (rights, of
natural objects.
l8 there any justification for restricting
the rights and
liberties of humans
where natural objects
are concerned?

Consider two principles
which frequently are
offered as justifications
for restricting the
freedom or liberty of humans.
These are what Feinberg
calls "the Private
Harm Principle” and "the
Welfare Principle," 4
(22) and (23),
respectively:
(

22

)

Restriction of a person's
liberties is
lustrfied to prevent harm

(inju^T to

(The Private Harm Principle)
(23)

Restriction of a person's li
bertie s is
justified to benefit others.
(The Welfare Principle)

According to Feinberg, these two
liberty-limiting principles specify "kinds of reasons
that are always relevant or
acceptable in support of proposed
coercion, even though in
a given case they may not
be conclusive." 5
Although endorsement of one principle
does not
commit one to endorsing the other,
often the Private Harm
and Welfare Principles are endorsed
together.
The reason
for this has to do with the notion
of a harm.
a

Typically

harm is considered to be an invasion of
an interest.

Human-inflicted harms are considered injuries to
interest, to "something in which he has

a

a

person's

genuine stake." 6

One way to harm persons is to deprive them
of what they
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need.

According to Feinberg,
to claim that persons
J
need
certain things is to rlaim
claim that they cannot
get along very
well in the end without
them 7 one way to
prevent or
remedy a harm, then, is
to provide people
with what they
need, i.e., to benefit
them.
Thus, interference with
the
liberties of some has been
justified often both in order
to prevent harm (injury)
to oth^s and to benefit
others.
The related concepts of
harm and benefit have been
invoked in support of the
move to give natural objects

tw

.

legal rights.

Some theorists (e.g.,

B enn)

argue that
natural objects could be said
to have prudential
interests
(interests
Certain human activities
2
affecting natural
objects could be considered
conducive to their well-being
in their interests”) and others
harmful to their wellbeing ("not in their interests").
That is, certain human
activities could prevent or remedy
harm
)

.

(

(injury)

interests

2

of natural objects,

to the

other theorists (e.g.,

c.

Stone)

put this by saying that natural
objects themselves
are harmed (injured) or benefited
by certain kinds of
human activities.
Rivers are harmed (injured) by the presence of toxic pollutants, and benefit
from efforts to

remove or stop the discharge of toxic
pollutants.

Evidence

of this harm and benefit, respectively,
might be the

river's loss of fish and plant life when the
pollutants
are present and their return when the pollutants
are

.
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treated or removed.

The
ne view which
emerges is that certain

Kinds of human activity
directly harm i njure)
either
interests of natural
objects or the natural
2
objects themand that, certain kinds
of human activity
benefit
natural objects.

^

(

Some theorists

(p n
r
(e.g.,
C.

d
stone,

Douglas)

take the

argument one step further.

They argue that there
are
moral grounds for recognizing
natural objects as legal
right-holders, grounds based
on the view that the
natural
environment ought to be valued
for its own sake, and not
merely for its use-value to
humans.
They include moral
reasons among the reasons for
conferring on natural objects certain legal-operational
advantages, e.g., the right
to initiate court action.
Given the notion of an interest
as an advantage which, on
moral grounds, an entity ought
to have (i.e., interest
or de ^ure interest), their view
3
amounts to a construal of natural
objects as entities

which have, or ought to be recognized
as having, such
interests
Harms clearly are invasions of de facto
interests
(interests^
But many theorists would argue that they
also may be invasions of prudential interests
.

(interests.,)

and de

j

ure interests

(interests^)

.

One can harm an entity

by depriving it of certain things which
are to its

•
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advantage to have

^

hv
by d ° ln 9 ln jury
to its interest
°r by depriving it
of cert-ain
^
tain advantages
which, on moral
grounds, it ought to
have (i.e., by doing
injury fco itg
interests^. if this is
so, then at least
some theorists
would argue that certain
kinds of humans activities
do or
prevent harm to natural
obiects bv
oojects
by ,w
doing or preventing injury to their interests
and interests
(i
'

e

)

2

If talk of harm

.

3

(injury)

objects is plausible, then

a

or benefits to natural

reasonable case can be made

for restricting the rights
or liberties of humans
by appeal
to extended versions
of the Private Harm and
Welfare
Principles, (24) and (25),
respectively:
(24)

11
3 person s liberties
toward
natural "nh
°f is justified
objects
to prevent
arm ^injury) to them.
S Harm
(The Extended
Principle)
’

^

(25)

Restriction of a person's liberties
toward natural objects is
justified to
benefit them.
(The Extended Welfare
Principle)

use Feinberg

s

language, appeals

to

principles

(24)

and

would "always be relevant or
acceptable in support of
proposed coercion, even though in a
given case they may
not be conclusive."
(25)

Consider

a

case where

a

river is or could be said

to have a claim to be free from
irreparable damage incurred

by human pollution activity, or to
have a claim to seek
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redress for damages so
incurred.
The river's exercise
of
that claim may interfere
with some liberties
or rights of
humans.
To justify. or at
least provide a prima
facie
case for. that interference,
one could appeal to
the
Extended Harm and Welfare
Principles. Not only do
they
Provide reasonable grounds
for justified restriction
of the
liberties and rights of
humans where natural
objects are
concerned; they provide the
sort of justification
which
theorists accept as appropriate
for restricting
the lib-

erties of humans generally.
The argument advanced here
is not that evidence
of
harmful (beneficial) human
activity towards natural
objects
establishes that they have rights.
It is that, if one
allows that talk of harm (benefit)
to natural objects is
meaningful, appeal to the Extended
Harm and Welfare Prin-

ciples provides

a

plausible justification for restricting

the liberties and rights of
humans.

Furthermore, it is

reasonable to suppose that some claims
of natural objects
(e-g., a river's claim to be free
from irraparable damage
due to the presence of toxic
pollutants) could be given
priority over some claims of humans (e.g.,
an industrial
polluter's claim to have the right to pollute).
This would
not interfere with the claim, properly
understood, that
some rights of humans are "absolute."

For these reasons,

.
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the Conflict of Legal
Rights Objection concerni
ng

(T)

i«

unsuccessful in underm ini ng
the significance of
establishing

(T)

What

I

call the "which

Rights?" Objection challenges
the significance of
establishing T ) from a different
angle: "Suppose natural
objects meaningfully could
be said to have legal
rights.
Which legal rights could
they be said to have?
They could
only be said to have
inconsequential procedural
rights;
there are no substantive
legal rights which could
be conferred on them.
Consequently, natural objects
could not
be said to have any rights
which matter.
This makes establishing (T) rather unexciting."
Is there any force to
this objection?
(

The "Which Rights?" Objection
appeals to a dis-

tinction often used in classifying
rights, viz., the
distinction between "substantive"
("primary,"

"antecedent")

rights and "procedural"
In the case of humans,

(

"secondary ,» "remedial

"

)

rights.

"substantive rights” are associ-

ated with personal freedoms (e.g.,
rights to express oneself,

to associate and assemble)

and with privacy and

security (e.g., rights to be let alone,
to have one's body
unharmed, to have one's reputation undamaged).
So-called
rights to equal treatment and consideration"
(e.g.,

rights
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to vote,

to be free of raclal
and sexual discriminafcion)

often are classified as
substantive rights.
Procedural
rights" are associated
with the legal means for
vindicating substantive rights.
They include rights
associated
With "due process of law"
(e.g., rights to counsel,
to a
trial, of appeal) and
with legal remedies (e.g.,
rights to
be parties to injunctive
settlements, to sue for
damages).
The main issue raised by
the "Which Rights?"
Objection is
whether natural objects could
be said to have
substantive
rights or to have procedural
rights of any consequence.
..

Could natural objects be said
to have any rights "which
makes a difference"?
That they could be said to have
rights which matter
seems evident from previous
discussions.
There are many
procedural rights natural objects
could be said to have.

These include "due process" rights,
such as the rights to
initiate court action, and to appeal
agency and judicial
decisions affecting them; rights to
seek redress
for dam-

ages, to be parties to injunctive
settlements and to re-

ceive relief which benefits them; the
rights to be parties
to contracts, to a fair hearing and
consideration.
But

surely these are rights which matter.

For one thing, if

natural objects have the rights to initiate
court proceedings and to receive legal awards in favorable
judgments,

then they have access to the legal machinery
necessary for
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ensuring legal and
non-legal remedies fn
for injury to them.
For another thing,
whether or nor
not tney
thev h,
have such rights
matters to how we treat
them.
Our behavior toward
them
would be subject to legal
sanction, rather than
to public
censure or moral sanction
alone.
•

•

The case is the same
for substantive rights.
Socalled "rights to
noninterference" by others are
standard
examples of substantive
rights which humans have.
They
are construed either as
"active rights," rights to
do or
not to do something, or
as "passive rights,"
rights to have
something done or not done by
others.
For humans, rights
to

noninterference include the general
rights to privacy
be let alone
and to physical security.
)

But it was
argued previously (in Chapter
VII, in connection with the
Claim and Rules Positions) that
natural objects could be
described as having rights to
noninterference. These
rights could be construed as prima
facie rights of natural
objects to be let alone, or to be
physically unharmed.
There are other "rights" natural
objects could be
said to have.
Some of them are called "rights" by
lawyers,
though they are called "privileges,"
"powers," or "immunities by many legal theorists.
Whichever expression one
adopts, their conferral on natural objects
would have

tangible significance.

For example, natural objects could

a

"
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be accorded immunity
from prosecution fQr
aamages
the occurrence of
..natural disasters,..
e. g ., floods

^^

quakes

,

earth.

droughts.

Like humans, they could
be accorded
freedoms from 'bills of
attainder.' and from
"ex
facto
laws
,

^

.

one might give natural
objects

a

right for which

there is no analogue yet
among rights of humans,
a "right
to freedom from ecocide."
This would be a non-interference right where relief
for injury is sought along
lines
used in traditional negligence
law.
Certain natural objects could be construed
as having a "right to
freedeom
from ecocide," imposing on
humans a duty to use care
against endangering the lives
of those natural objects.
For failure to use due care,
offending persons could be
liable.
The natural objects, in turn,
would have certain
remedial rights against the offending
persons.
The terminology "right to freedom
from ecocide" is
borrowed from traditional negligence
law.
"Failure to use
due care" often is cited as the
grounds for making a person,

B,

liable for some action performed against
another

person, A.

Roughly stated, when B takes action against
A,

it is a case of "assault."

"battery."

if B strikes against A,

if A dies as a result,

it is

suppose A is a natural object, e.g.,
gered species.

"homocide."

it is

Now

member of an endan-

One could argue that when persons perform

:

.
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certain actions against
certain natural objects
such that
they, or some of them,
die as a result, the
action is
ecocide." The offending
persons could be made liable
for
having committed acts of
ecocide, where recovery is
sought
on grounds of the offending
person's failure to use due
Care.
The antecedent ("substantive",
right of the natural

objects would be the "right to
freedom from ecocide."
Thus, both subtantive and
procedural rights "which
make a difference" could be
ascribed to natural objects.
As such, the "Which Rights?"
Objection concerning
(T)

fails
T he Social Value Objection

"social value of rights."

.

Many theorists emphasize the
What

I

call the Social Value

Position generates a plausible objection
concerning
"Legal rights are not ascribed
indiscriminately.

(T)

It is

appropriate to grant legal rights to entities
only where
there is some social value or end served
by doing so.
But
there are no social values served by awarding
natural objects legal rights.

Hence, ascription of legal rights to

them is at best inappropriate."

jection threatening?

is the Social Value Ob-

is there any social value or goal

served by giving natural objects legal rights?
That reasonable social values or goals are served
by conferring legal rights on natural objects can be shown
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by defending two
claims: first, social
values or goals
are served by providing
a legal means for
protecting
natural objects against
certain types of behavior,
second
the conferral of legal
rights on legally rightless
entities provides a legal
means for protecting those
entities
against certain types of
behavior.

HOW can one establish the
first claim? The evidence is voluminous that
there is an "environmental
problem." Most people view
this problem as a type of
social problem, the control
of which is presumed to
be
desirable for the society as a
whole.
Generally it is
agreed that, although there are
fuzzy cases, there are
Clear-cut cases of avoidable,
unacceptable behavior affecting natural objects, e.g.,
the wholesale destruction
of swamp lands, the discharge
of toxic materials into the
air and water, the indiscriminate
slaughter
of seals,

wolves and moose.

it also is agreed that efforts
to con-

trol adverse human activities
towards natural objects are

ineffectual without supportive legal
principles and regulation.
Behavior which threatens the survival of
natural
objects, and the lack of legal protection
of natural objects against such behavior, are viewed
as socially un-

desirable; the converse behavior, and provisions
for legal

protection of that behavior, are viewed as socially

desirable.

On the assumption
that what

TOlmy

desir
able (or, is desirable
for the society as
a whole, has
social value or serves
social goals, it is
agreed that
providing such legal
protection of natural
objects has
S ° ClalValUe ° r
SerVSS SOcial
The first claim,
then, is widely accepted.
Of course, this is not
to say that there are
no
difficulties in specifying
what counts as behavior
adversely affecting natural
objects, in identifying and
assessing such behavior, or
in specifying and
evaluating
the social values or
goals at issue in any given
case.
Human ignorance accounts
for some of the difficulties.
Often our activities destroy
species we know nothing
about, or are harmful to
natural objects in ways of which
we are unaware.
But much of the difficulty
is because
there are viable, alternative
and sometimes incompatible

perspectives for describing and
valuing both natural objects and behavior acknowledged
as affecting natural objects.
For example, from an industry's
perspective,
a

forest may be described and valued
as

a

replenishable

resource for the production of lumber
and paper products,
for human consumption.
So conceived, one might describe
and assess behavior affecting forests
according to whether
it increased, decreased or had no
effect upon the productivity of forests. From a recreational
perspective.

.
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a forest

may be described and
valued as a space providing
opportunities for various sorts
of sporting activities,
e.g., hiking, camping,
picnicing.

so conceived, behavior

affecting forests might be
described and assessed
according
to whether it enhances,
obstructs or has no effect
upon
the recreational possibilities
of forests.
From an aesthetic perspective, a forest
might be described and assessed to a "work of art,"
invoking feelings of awe and
wonder in those who view it.
So conceived, behavior
affecting forests might be described
and assessed according
to whether it increased,
reduced or left unaltered
the

"natural beauty" of the forest.

The pattern is clear.

Depending on the perspective from
which natural objects
and behavior affecting them is
described

and valued, one

may get different, even incompatible,
views about whether
the behavior itself, or the legal
protection of or against
that behavior, has social value or
serves social goals.

Similarly, there are difficulties associated
with
clarifying what a social value or goal is,
and with

choosing social values and goals.
nomic

(social)

For example, the eco-

goals of maintaining levels of unemployment

no higher than 4% and of making housing
available and

affordable for all Americans may conflict with the social
value or goal of protecting more "green areas" from industrial development, or with the goal of reducing all forms
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Of Pollution activity.

Still, ln spite of
such disagree _
meats about social goals
and which behavior
serves or disserves these goals, it is
agreed that providing
legal protection of natural objects
against behavior adversely
affecting them does serve
some social values and
goals.
As
such, the first claim
stands.

What about the second claim,
viz., that the conferral of legal rights on
an entity provides a means
of
legally protecting the entity
from certain types of behavior? The truth of this claim
can be shown by reconsidering what some of the historical
positions
on legal

rights say about legal rights.

According to the Moral

Sense Position, legal rights
enable entities to do or
receive something from another
lawfully.
According to the
Interest Position, legal rights
protect interests, both
what an entity actually wants or
needs, and what it is to
an
entity's advantage to have.
The Power Position maintains that legal rights create and
secure powers, allowing
properly empowered individuals or bodies
to create or alter
the legal relations of other entities.
According to the

Correlativity Position, legal rights impose
duties on
others to act or forbear in certain ways. The
combined
Claim and Rules Positions describe legal rights

as claims

validated by appeal to

governing legal rules, which

.
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rules also oblige others
to do or abstain
from doing certarn actions.
On the Prediction
Position view, statements
ascribing legal rights
are predictive statements
that if

certain circumstances
transpire, certain court
action will
follow.
Each of these positions
construes legal rights as
legal instruments for
safeguarding legal right-holders
against various types of
behavior affecting them.
Each
acknowledges that the conferral
of legal rights on an
entity is one way to provide
that entity with the legal
means for protecting itself
against certain kinds of behavior.
As such, the second claim
also stands.
This discussion establishes
that the conferral of
legal rights on natural objects
could serve some social
values or goals. The conferral
of legal rights on hitherto
gaily rightless entities is, in
an important respect, a
mechanical way of providing those
entities with a means for
gaining access to certain legal
protections.
This is true
because of the nature of legal rights,
and not because of
the nature or individual
characteristics of right-holders.
By giving natural objects legal
rights, one provides them
with a means for gaining access to
certain legal protections, protections which have or could
have social value.
Thus, the Social Value Objection
concerning (T) is not

damaging

,

..

,
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Summary
No non-histoncal
position on legal
right-holders

poses any insurmountable
objection to (T)
Furthermore,
the significance of
establishing (T) is not
damaged by the
Conflict of Legal Rights,
the "which Rights?"
or the

Social Value Objections
concernina
rmng
the significance of
defending

reasonable objections to

(T)

(T)

m
(T)

u
Having
established

and having defeated all

the only task which remains

IS to bring together the
argument for

m

.

(T)

the remaining section, the
Conclusion.

That is done

.

,

.

CHAPTER

X

CONCLUSION
The main thesis of this
dissertation was that ascription of legal rights to
natural objects such as
forests, rivers and seals
is compatible with
American
legal theory on legal rights
and legal right-holders,
thesis (T).
no attempt was made to
defend the stronger,

normative claim that natural
objects should have legal
rights, thesis (S)
As such, no effort was made
to consider the disadvantages of giving
natural objects legal
rights, or to provide a full-scale
account of how that
move might be accomplished.
Thus, many practical details
and important normative considerations,
so vital to
an

adequate defense of

{

S

)

were not addressed.

What the

argument did establish was that objections
to giving natural objects legal rights based on
theories of what a
legal right

is and on who or what meaningfully can
be

said to have legal rights were unfounded.

In this respect,

the argument provided clears the way for any
argument

designed to establish thesis
The defense of

move was to defend

(T)

(T)

(S)

involved two basic moves.

One

against objections to it based on

the prima facie exhaustive historical positions in
271

,

.

,

.
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American legal theory on
legal rights and legal
rightholders.
These were two strictly
natural law positions
(the Moral Sense and
Moral Validation Positions)

and six

non-strictly natural law
positions (the Interest,
Power,
Claim, Correlativity,
Rules and Prediction
Positions)
The other move was to
defend (T) against objections
which
did not presuppose any
particular historical
position,

objections which could have been
advanced by theorists of
any of the historical
positions.
These were objections
based on proposed necessary
condition accounts of
'X

has a

legal right' and included the
Moral Person and Moral
Position Objections.
In addition,

(T)

was defended against objections

which called into question the
significance of establishing
(T)
rather than the truth of (T)
These so-called objections "concerning" (T) included
the Conflict of Legal
Rights Objection, the "Which Rights?"
Objection,
and the
Social Value Objection.
It may be helpful to review the
development of the

argument for

(T)

according to chapters.

main thesis of the dissertation,
two-move strategy for defending

Chapter II,

(T)
(T)

In Chapter

I

the

was stated and the

was outlined.

In

"Why Give Natural Objects Legal Rights?,"

concerns which motivate the move to make natural objects
legal right-holders were discussed.

This discussion
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showed how the issue

"

rights for natural objects „

and set the stage for
the argument, offered
in subsequent
Chapters, that natural
objects meaningfully could
be said
to have legal rights.
The notions of a legal
person and a legal representative were discussed in
Chapter III.
This discussion
laid the groundwork for
the argument, made repeatedly

throughout the dissertation, that
theorists cannot hold
the positions they do, and
feel they must, hold regarding
the doctrines of legal
personality and legal representation and deny the possibility
of ascribing legal rights
to natural objects.
In Chapter IV,

"Legal Fictions," it was argued

that it is compatible with accepted
legal theory on the
nature, purposes and justification
for proper use of a
legal fiction to suppose that the
notion of environmental
personality is, or involves, a legal fiction.
Thus, if

ascription of legal rights to natural objects
is, or involves, a legal fiction, the argument for
(T)
is not

damaged by it.
In Chapters V and VI,

the various positions in

American legal theory on legal rights and legal rightholders were discussed.

in Chapter V it was argued that

theories of legal rights can be divided into two camps,

strictly natural law theories" and "non-strictly natural

,

.

.
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Strictly natural law
theories affirm what
non-strictly natural law
theories deny, viz., that
there
IS a necessary connection
between legal and non-legal
rights, the nature of which
is given by appeal to
natural
law or moral principles.
In Chapter VI the eight
historical positions on legal
rights and legal right-holders-two

strictly natural law positions
and six non-strictly
natural
law positions— were discussed.
The discussions of Chapters
V and VI furnished the
background material necessary
for the main thrust of the
argument for (T)
advanced in Chapters VII and VIII.
these chapters it was shown
that none of the eight historical positions poses a successful
objection

m

to

(T)

m

addition, it was shown that several
of the positions, including the favored Claim and Rules
Positions, provide
suggestions of specific legal rights natural
objects could
be said to have.

Remaining objections were stated and defeated
in

Chapter IX.
to

(T)

,

These were non-historical position objections

as well as objections concerning the
significance

of establishing

(T)

In conclusion,

the defense of

(T)

against the

different kinds of objections to it, and against various
objections concerning it, establishes that ascription of
legal rights to natural objects within the American legal

,

,
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framework is neither absurd
nor impossible.
Furthermore,
that defense shows that
several of the positions
provide
not only positive grounds
for supposing that natural
objects could have leqal ricrhts hnf _...
rignts, but suggestions of
y
rights
which might be ascribed to
them
unem.
Thnc
ihus, having removed the
basic kinds of objections to
(T)
secured the significance
of establishing (T)
and offered additional
reasons for
supposing that natural objects
meaningfully could be
described as legal right-holders,
the case for (T) is complete.
The move to give natural
objects legal rights
ought not be delayed because of any
intuitive feeling that
it is absurd, impossible or
unreasonable to speak
,

.

v,

of natur-

al objects as legal right-holders.

dissertation should lay to rest.

That feeling this

'
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ooject in other cases, one may choose to
speak of the
entire river, or of the river proper plus
tributaries,
portages, and adjoining land as a natural object.
Nonetheless these problems are not foreign to
either the philosopher or the lawyer.
Wittgenstein, for
example, argued for the futility of trying to
define
game
even though we all have fairly clear ideas about
.
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representatives
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could not judge
their needs Should Trees Have Standing?
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However
his treatment of objections is not, and
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be, exhaustive of the kinds of
objections which might be
advanced against (T)
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There are three basic theories of corporate
personaiity, the Fiction, Bracket and Realist
theories.
The Fiction theory is that a corporation
is a person for
legal purposes only; the personality of
corporations is a
mere legal fiction.
Corporations have no real will or
capacity to act; they have only fictitious wills and
capacities to act.
The Bracket theory regards the members
of a corporation as the actual bearers of legal
rights and
legal duties, which, for reasons of convenience only,
are
attributed to "the corporation." it is as though brackets
Parentheses are placed around the members of a corporation to which a name, the name of the corporation, is
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given.
When properly desrrihi^
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For example, no attempt is made to assess
Fuller s views that the truth of a statement is a
question
of degree and of its adequacy (Ibid.,
p. 10) or that the
fiction of the personality of ships is an "abbreviatory
fiction" (Ibid., pp. 81-82).
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etymology of the word 'person' is interestThe word 'person' derives from the
word persona,
a word originally used to describe the
mask through which an actor's voice was
sounded in classical Greek drama.
Gradually, for example in Roman law,
it came to have the meaning associated
with 'legal persona,' bearer of legal rights and legal duties.
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CHAPTER V
F ° r select ed bibliographies
on natural law and
„
legal positivism
see Appendix A.
2

For example, legal positivist H. L.
A. Hart
lassiGal natural law theory in terms of the
^
Law Validation
Thesis,
(2).
He writes,
[lheories of Natural Law posit] that there
are
certain principles of human conduct, awaiting
discovery by human reason, with which man-made
law must conform if it is to be valid. (The
Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971)
p. 182
Natural law theorist Lon Fuller describes natural
law in
terms of the Law Non-Separation Thesis,
(3)
He writes,
Natural law. .is the view which denies the
possibility of a rigid separation of the is
and the ough
.... (The Law in Quest of Itself
~
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 5.
Their discussions suggest that Hart offers (2) and Fuller
offers (3) as a necessary condition of a natural law
theory.
In addition. Fuller explicitly denies that (2)
is a necessary condition of a natural law theory.
He
argues that a natural law theorist might concede the validity of 'bad law.
What the theorist will not concede is
that there is "a hard and fast line between natural law
and ethics" (Ibid., p. 6); i.e., the theorist will not
deny (3)
Thus, neither Fuller nor Hart would accept in
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Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush
(Dobbs Ferry,
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The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1972 ed
s.v.
ociology of Law," by Philip Selznick. N.
S. Timasheff
o
ers a similar statement in a commentary
on H. Kantorowicz s definition of the sociology of law.
Timasheff
writes
H. U. Kantorowicz gives a correct,
but too
narrow, definition of the sociology of lav/:
it is to be an investigation of social life
in its relation to law, especially the
investigation of correlations between law
and other social domains
economics, politics,
techniques, art, religion, etc. ("What is
"Sociology of Law’?" p. 225).
(lo

.

.

n

.

,

—

20

Encyclopedia of Ph ilosophy, s.v.
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CHAPTER IV
One obstacle to presenting an
historically accurnt
f StriCtlY natural law
definitions
of 'legal
?iah?^
i5 be
K
ight °h
should
mentioned at the outset. Until the seventeenth century, the literature on
political and legal
° s ° ph
cuse on Problems of duties rather than
Y
prob^
lems of rights— duties
owed by individuals to a landlord,
king, church or God.
Not until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did the notion of rights,
particularly of
irthrights or "natural rights," gain attention.
Modern
analyses of the expressions 'legal right' and 'legal
right-holder' are just that-- modern analyses.
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Matura! objects should be
ascribed legal rights.

Propositions St ated in the Dissertation
1

(

)

ne ess r ^ connection between
positive law
J
t ls)f and morality (or, law
as it ought
.;
n
re ° f that connec tion is given by
appeal9 tn natural law or moral
principles.
(The Law Necessity Thesis)

Tor
°

'

aW ®^ sQ

^
4

^

All and only positive law which
conforms to natural
or moral law is valid.
(The Law Validation Thesis)

(2

(

3

)

(

4

)

(

5

)

(

6

)

(

7

)

There is no strict separation between
positive law
and morality.
(The Law Non-Separation Thesis)

There is a necessary connection between legal
rights
and non -legal rights (natural or moral rights)
and
the nature of that connection is given by
appeal to
natural law or moral principles.
(The Rights Necessity Thesis)
All and only legal rights which are based on natural
or moral law are valid.
(The Rights Validation Thesis)

There is no strict separation between legal rights
and non-legal rights (natural or moral rights)
(The Rights Non-Separation Thesis)
The meaning of

'legal right'
316

is given in moral terms.
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(

8

For any entity, X, if
X has
then either X or X's legal a valid legal claim,
representative is in a
position to claim.

)

(9)

(

10

If A has a right against
B,

)

(

11

)

If B has a duty to A,

(

12

)

If A has a right against B,

If A has a duty to B,

(13)
(

10

')

S

dutf to A?
(11,>

S a

aga!ns? B
<12

S

’’

dut| to B?
(13

)

then B has

a

duty to A.

then A has a right against
B.

then A has a duty to

then A has a right against B.

16931 rl9ht against
S< th en B has a legal
16931 dUtY

the " * has a legal tight

16931 rlght against
S' the n A has a legal

If A has a legal duty to B, then
A has
~
against B.

a

legal right

a

moral duty

(14)

If B has a legal duty to A,

dS)

If A has a legal right against B, then
B has
~
duty to A.

d 6)

If

5 has

against
(17)

(18)

a
B.

B.

le 9 al duty to A,

then B has

a

moral

then A
~ has a moral right

If A has a legal right against
right against B.

B,

then A
~ has a moral

For any entity, X, if X has legal rights, then X is
moral person.

a
(19)

For any entity,
moral rights.

(20)

For any entity, X, if X has legal rights, then X or
X's legal representative is a moral person.

X,

if X has legal rights,

then X has

s

.
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(

21

)

For any entity, X, if x
has legal rights, then X
or
legal representative has
moral rights

X'
(

22

Restriction of a person s libertie
s is justified to
prevent harm (injury) to others.
(The Private Harm Principle)

)

.

'

(23)

a PerSOn s liberti
’

benefifo?he?s.

^

is justified to

(The Welfare Principle)
(24

obSririuL?f P

Tr

liberties toward natural
PreTCnt irre P^able harm
S

(injury) to^them
(The Extended Harm Principle)

Restriction of a person's liberties
toward natural
eCtS 1S Justified to benefit
them.
?m^
(The Extended Welfare Principle)

(25;

R ules and Rule Schema Stated in
the Dissertation
(RSI)

If an entity, X, properly is legally
represented by
an agent, y, and Y uses correct
legal procedure to
petition
the name of and on behalf of X that
recognized as having a legal claim to something, X be
*,
and Y provides a case of at least
minimum plausibility that X has a legal claim to
then, provided
there are no countervailing reasons to
override
recognition of X's claim to
as valid, X has a valid
legal claim to

m

<j>

,

(f>

<j>

(Rl)

Whenever an entity or its legal representative has
or asserts a claim to something, and follows
correct
legal procedure for seeking legal recognition of
that claim as valid, and provides a case of at least
minimum plausibility for that claim, then the entity
has a right to a fair hearing and consideration.

(R2)

Where a duly appointed legal representative of a
delimited forest area is legally empowered to maintain that area as a recognized "wilderness area," no
humans may trespass on or use that area for recreational, industrial or other purposes without the
express written consent of the forest's legal representative
.

)) )
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(R3)

No humans may trespass
on wilderness areas.

(R4)

35 3 Primary rUle ° f
Spe ~
cially exempted the obligation
tros
ass
on
P
wilderness areas.

thehegal

nDtoT

(R5)

P

1

S

S ^ eS
customarily bes towed on legal P
repre sen tatives^
(R6)

e

e

1
SentatiVe ° f a desi 9 >«ted wilderis lea?n Y em P owered to
speak for, and in
the name
ame of,
of
the area it represents,
the court has
reC
1Ze the wilderness area as

ness

a rea

having
certain legal rights;
certai^lea?!
°h?
specifically, it has the power
to recogmze the

wilderness area as having a legal
right to noninterference by
trespassers Igainst anv
mans not exempted by the wilderness
axed
area'ss regal
legal
representative.
(R7

No human being may kill another
human being.

(R8)

results frora failure to employ due
care
under the circumstances.

(R9

Business and industry must maintain
standards of
fair competition and just and reasonable
rates.

(RIO)

One must stop, look and listen where
traffic is to
be expected.

(Rll)

Trespassing in this forest is prohibited.

(R12

Contracts must be kept.

(R13)

Creditors have

(R14)

No human being may kill an animal which is a
member
of a species officially designated an "endangered

DDD

species

(R15)

a

right to be paid.

"

.

If a human kills an animal which is a member of an
officially designated "endangered species," a court
has the power to grant survivors of the species a
legal representative and to empower that representative to make claims against the offending humans in

)))

.

320

the name, and on behalf,
of the surviving members
the species.
of

»*•

o<

»u.

w lch lm Poses on parties
to contracts the obl-irUt-^
° r f ° rbear in the
ways specified in the
contract.

^

(R17)

The courts and legislatures
cognize natural objects as have the powers to reparties to contracts
.

(R13

the ways specified in the
contract.

31

to
in

Moral Principles or Rules
(MP1

Killing humans is wrong.

(MP2

Acts which injure humans are
wrong

(MP3)

Killing seals for their fur is
wrong,

(MP4)

Acts which cause irreparable injury
(harm)
ness areas are wrong.

to wilder-

,,,

.

.

,.

.

.
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